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Abstract

Like all U.S. states, prior to the Civil War Tennessee maintained an active militia
system. This dissertation examines the establishment, function , and decline of this
organization. For more than eighty years the Tennessee militia participated in a number
of military conflicts. It also played an important role in the state ' s social and political
development.
The militia was among the first institutions established by the early Tennessee
settlers. It began as an informal collection of every able-bodied male. By 1 800 the
militia had grown considerably, and the volunteers, who served by choice, assumed the
burden of meeting the state' s military needs.
During Tennessee' s first years, the militia was useful as a support mechanism for
Tennessee' s bureaucratic processes. It was the framework by which men paid taxes and
voted. Militiamen also built roads. D uring the early nineteenth century the mi litias had
become important social institutions, and militia membership became a tool for men
seeking social and political advancement. The militias eventually emerged as political
organizations as well. Militiamen worked together to assert their political wilL and
volunteer companies became associated with political parties.
The Tennessee militia was a very active military organization. The earliest
militiamen defended against hostile Indians and were thus critical to the survival of the
white settlements. By the 1780s, however, the militia became a tool to drive the state' s
Indian people from their tribal land. In 1 83 8 the state used the militia i n the infamous

IX

Indian removal . Militiamen from the Volunteer State also participated in every major
antebellum conflict. When in active service Tennessee volunteers typically performed
well. However, during peacetime many volunteer companies did not train regularly. The
state did, however, always maintain a few well-trained and well-armed companies.
After the removal of the eastern Indians the Tennessee militia declined rapidly.
By 1 850 the state no longer needed to keep large numbers of men trained for military
service, and the militia ceased to exist as a functional organization.
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Introduction

In July 1 848, two regiments and one battalion of tired and homesick Tennesseans
boarded ships at Vera Cruz, Mexico, and sailed toward home. These men had served for
one year during the Mexican War as militiamen. Although they had experienced little
fighting, like all victorious soldiers they returned home as heroes. They were not only
proud of their service to their country, but also proud of their status as citizen soldiers of
their home state, for they were part of an honored mi litary tradition dating from the state' s
first white settlements.
In the eyes of these men and the general citizenry, the Tennessee militia had
consistently proven itself to be one of America' s finest military institutions, with an
unstained record of victory and courage. During its long history the Tennessee mi litia
had played a prominent role in some of America' s greatest military victories, including
the battles of King ' s Mountain, Horseshoe Bend, and New Orleans. Furthermore, the
Tennessee militia had produced Andrew Jackson, the most celebrated war hero of his day
and to his contemporaries the embodiment of a great leader. 1
What these soldiers did not know was that they were the last true members of
their organization to see active service. As in other states, by the late 1 840s the militia no
longer served a useful purpose in the Volunteer State, and had thus l argely disbanded. By
the 1 850s men who had at one time willingly invested time and money in military

1 John T. Moore and Austin P. Foster, Tennessee the Volunteer State, 1 769-1 923
(4 vols. Chicago: S . J. Clarke Publishing Company, 1 923), 1 : 437-38 .
1

training no longer felt compelled to do so. Laws requiring thi s training were repealed,
and one of Tennessee' s most significant institutions quietly came to an end.
The militias were the foundation of the American military from the beginning of
white settlement in North America until the late antebellum era. These bodies of citizen
soldiers, loyal to their state or local government, served in every military conflict and to
many Americans represented the ideals of freedom and democracy. They were critical to
the survival of white settlement, as well as to the formation and development of the
United States.
Despite their importance, the mi litias h ave received scant attention from
hi storians. The most recent work on the militias is James Whi sker' s The Rise and
Decline of the American Militia System, which focuses almost exclusively on the colonial
era and is, for the most part, a study of the militia laws. Two earlier works, The American
Militia, Decade of Decision, 1 789-1 800, and History of the Militia and the National
Guard, both by John K. Mahon, discuss the militia from a national perspective,
emphasizing the development and decline of the American militia ideal . Mahon argues
that the United States relied on the mi litias for two reasons: first, Americans were wary of
strong central governments and thus opposed standing armies that could be used to
suppress the rights of free people; and second, after the American Revolution the U.S.
government could not afford to maintain a large army and turned to the relatively
inexpensive mi litias as a means of national defense. Mahon is critical of the militia
system, noting that militiamen were typically poorly trained and poorly equipped. He
observes that state militias declined during the antebellum era, and by the time of the
2

Civi l War were defunct in most states, at least functionally if not officially. This decline
was due largely to lack of funding and support by the federal and state governments?
A dissertation by Kenneth

0.

McCreedy, "Palladium of Liberty: The American

Militia System, 1 8 1 5- 1 86 1 , was the first study to recognize the diversity of the militia
"

systems. McCreedy bui lds on Mahon ' s conclusions, acknowledging that many
militiamen were poor soldiers and not well-trained and equipped. However, McCreedy
asserts that the changing society and economy of the United States during the antebellum
years made the militias obsolete and their maintenance burdensome. McCreedy does not
insist that every state militia was i mproperly maintained. Instead, he emphasizes that
each individual state militia was organized to meet the needs of its state and declined
when it was no longer necessary.3
Several state militia studies have been written , including dissertations on the
mi litias of Florida, California, the District of Columbia, Virginia, South Carolina, and
Kentucky, and books on those of Louisiana, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania. These works
support McCreedy' s point that each state militia had a distinctive purpose and experience.
The California militia, for example, was a police organization designed to maintain law
and order. In South Carolina the militia was a tool to control the large slave population.4

2Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 8 1 -82, 97-98.
3Kenneth 0 . McReedy, "Palladium of Liberty: The American Militia System,
1 8 1 5- 1 86 1 " (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1 99 1 ), 5-7, 1 48-52.
4George C. Biddle, "The Organized Florida Militia from 1 82 1 to 1920" (Ph.D.
diss., Florida State University, 1 965); Delio Dayton, "The California Militia, 1 850- 1 866"
(Ph.D. di ss., University of California, Berkely, 195 1 ) ; Martin K. Gordon, "The Militia of
the Di strict of Columbia, 1 790- 1 8 1 5" (Ph.D. diss., George Washington University, 1 975);
3

While it has been mentioned in many works on the hi story of Tennessee, as well
as in studies of the conflicts in which Tennesseans participated, the Tennessee militia has
never been the topic of a major study. The purpose of this dissertation is to remedy this
deficiency. It examines the creation, evolution, and decline of the Tennessee militia. The
militia began as a loosely organized arrangement of frontiersmen, and evolved into one of
the state' s most significant antebellum institutions. It played a key role in the
establishment and organization of the state government, and was an important social and
political institution until its dissolution in the 1 850s. The militia was also a very active
military organization. Its members took part in numerous local, regional , and national
military campaigns.5
This study is based on an assortment of primary sources. No large collection of
exclusively militia-related material exists. Most of the information has come from
collections of government documents such as the governors' papers, legislative reports,
and state laws. Eyewitness accounts of militia events also have proved useful as have

FrederickS. Aldridge, "Organization and Administration of the MilitiaSystem of
Colonial Virginia" (Ph.D. diss., American University, 1 964); Theodore H. Jabbs, "The
South Carolina Colonial Militia, 1 663- 1733," (Ph .D. diss., University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hi ll, 1973); HarryS. Laver, "Muskets and Plowshares : Kentucky ' s Militia, the
Creation of Community, and the Construction of Masculinity, 1 790- 1 850" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Kentucky, 1 998); Jack David L. Holmes, Honor and Fidelity: The
Louisiana Infantry Regiment and the Louisiana Militia Companies, 1 766-1821
(Birmingham: Privately printed, 1 965); Richard G. Stone, A Brittle Sword: The Kentucky
Militia (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1 977); William P. Clarke, Official
History of the Militia and the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania from the
Earliest Record to the Present Time (Philadelphia: C. J. Hendler, 1 909).
5Maurice L. Rowland, ''The Militia Laws of Tennessee to the Year 1 860"
(Master' s Thesis, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1 927) is an informative, albeit
incomplete, compilation of militia legislation.
4

newspapers, collections of family papers, and muster rolls.
The Tennessee militia existed before the Volunteer State was born, played a key
role in bringing the state into exi stence, and took on new roles as the state matured.
Tennessee' s hi story cannot be properly understood without some appreciation of the
militia. If this di ssertation makes that appreciation possible, it will have accomplished its
purpose.

5

Chapter I
The Militia Ideal and the Creation of a National Defense System

The arduous colonization of North America by England in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries created a new kind of citizen . Unlike the European peasant who
looked to the state for protection and guidance, this citizen looked inward. Fiercely
independent, he saw no need for guidance or assi stance from any earthly authority higher
than himself.
The advancing Age of Absolutism created a European school of thought that
struck fear into the hearts of many North American colonists. Whereas many Europeans
viewed absolutism as a natural expression of God ' s authority which created and
maintained order and stabi lity, these colonists saw absolutism as little more than the
tyrannical oppression of the indi vidual . The principle tool of the tyrant was the military.
Early colonists looked with abhorrence as European despots engaged huge military
machines to squelch any attempt at citizen rule.
Early Americans intending to create a new society without the chains of military
oppression faced a di lemma, however: no society, however enlightened or free, can
survive without the stability and protection an army provides. The solution to thi s
dilemma was the citizen-soldier. The citizen-soldier would b e a free man, with neither
the ability nor the inclination to participate full-time in military affairs. Also, he would
have no desire to defend those forces that infringed on the liberties of others. Citizen-

7

soldiers could, however, with proper training, be prepared to defend their homes,
maintain order, and perform all other necessary functions of an army. The American
colonists believed that trained citizen-soldiers would provide the benefits of a military
without the risks to liberty.
The institutional manifestations of the citizen-soldier ideal were the militias .
These organized units of part-time soldiers could, in theory, be trained as well as any
professional army. The militia tradition had its origins in medieval Europe. Prior to the
Norman Conquest, a hierarchical "fyrd" system of mi litia exi sted in England. The "select
fyrd" was a military organization of infantrymen comprised of members of the upper
peasantry. All men possessing a specified degree of wealth had to participate, and the
crown required these men to train regularly and be prepared for military service. A "great
fyrd" complemented the select fyrd. Every able-bodied man in a given locality comprised
the great fyrd. Custom dictated that these men be called only for defense. In 1 066 King
Harold used members of both the select fyrd and the great fyrd at the battle of Hastings. 1
After the Norman Conquest, English monarchs continued the militia tradition. In
1 1 8 1 Henry II declared in the "Assize of Arms" that all able-bodied males were to own
arms and be prepared for military service to the King. In 1 285 Edward I declared in the
"Statute of Winchester" that such men were to be used to defend the nation and ensure
internal tranquility. Over time, law and custom defined the duties of English mi liti amen
as almost exclusively defensive. Parliament eventually forbade the crown to send the

1 C Warren Hollister, The Military Organization of Norman England (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1 965), 1 5- 1 6.
8

militiamen outside of their respective localities, although monarchs frequently ignored
this restriction. In 1 326, for example, English militiamen went to France and devastated
a French army at the battle of Crecy. 2
As feudalism declined, the nature of warfare changed. The longbow and l ater
muskets and cannons made the mounted knight obsolete and made the infantry the most
critical component of an army. Tudor monarchs, who ruled during the sixteenth century,
greatly increased the effectiveness of the militias, which were well suited for service as
infantry. By the time of American colonization, the militia was a basic element of
English life. By the mid-seventeenth century substantial numbers of English men,
although not professional soldiers, were armed, trained, and ready to defend the crown.
The American colonies adopted this militia system.3
The colonists quickly realized a genuine need for their militias. The ever-present
possibility of war with Spain or France as well as the conflicts with Indians required that
the colonial militias be large and active. And, too, the possibi lity of slave insurrection
was never far from the colonists' minds.
The early colonists establi shed rudimentary militias almost immediately after
arrival in the New World. The colonies were mostly capitali st ventures, and the investors
placed a high priority on the protection of their investments. Many colonial leaders, such

2Charles G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth 's Army, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University
Press, 1 966), 2-5.
3For a detailed discussion of the British militia during the Tudor years see Lindsay
0. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1 638 (London : Routledge and Keagan Paul,
1 967); Alfred W. Crosby, Throwing Fire: Projectile Technology Through History
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 70-73.
9

as John Smith and Miles Standi sh, were soldiers by training and wasted no time before
preparing the settlers for military confrontations. In most cases, however, these early
militias required little more than that all able-bodied men be prepared for local defense.
In 1 623, Virginia required all adult male citizens to possess a firearm and in 1 626 made
all men between the ages of seventeen and sixty subject to military service. A similar law
passed in 1 639 required all white males of military age to render military service if called
on to do so by the colony. Other colonies established militia policies resembling those of
Virginia. Massachusetts Bay passed a law in 1 63 1 requiring all males between the ages
of sixteen and sixty to organize into mi litia units. Maryland and New York had similar
laws. 4
The core of every colonial militia was the company. The company was the
smallest unit in a militia system and it was generally made up of men from a specific
geographic area. Companies exi sted in most towns or other localities in colonial America
and varied in size based on the number of eligible men . They might number anywhere
from twenty to two hundred. Large companies divided when enrollment grew beyond
manageable size. The militia members usually elected the company officers, although
selection methods varied. High-ranking officers were generally appointed by the colonial
governor or the legislature. Officers tended to be the men with the most formal military
training, and militia leadership brought with it a measure of status within a community.5

4Russell F. Wiegley, History of the United States Army (New York: Macmillan,
1 967 ; reprint, Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1 984), 4-6.
5John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 1 5- 1 6.
10

The training of the early militias varied considerably among the colonies. Mi litia
companies trained more frequently when a military threat was present. Each colony had
laws requiring regular dri ll and practice, but these were not systematically enforced.
Militiamen frequently avoided training, and in some cases militiamen studied military
techniques that were better suited for the battlefields of Europe than for the frontiers of
North America. Considering the successes and failures of these early militias, most
military historians agree that early colonial militias were insufficiently trained.6
One frequent problem for colonial militias was a lack of arms. The militia
members were generally required to provide their own firearms, yet many ordinary
citizens could not afford to do so. State-owned weapons were few . The problem of
arming the mi litias was aggravated by the dearth of gunsmiths in the colonies and an all
too frequent shortage of gunpowder.7
Over the course of the colonial era, the militias became more formalized and
eventually took the form they would carry well into the antebel lum era. In most cases, all
able-bodied men were required to maintain membership in their local militia company.
Laws required the men to muster and train regularly and to keep a working firearm.
However, by the eighteenth century these regular militias met rarely, if at all , and hardly
constituted an effective military force. Laws that regulated the militias were laxly
enforced. The reason for the decline lies in the rural nature of the colonies. Most men

6Ibid. , 1 8 .
7Ibid. , 1 7 ; Michael Bellesiles, Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun
Culture (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 95-96.
11

were farmers and could not afford to devote much time or money to military training.
Once threats of Indian attacks lessened, most communities saw little reason to require
every able-bodied man to stand fit for call.8
The militia systems, however, did not fade. Volunteer militia companies emerged
where regular militias effectively disappeared. Men who served out of choice rather than
obligation formed volunteer militias. Volunteer companies were almost exclusively self
supporting, and they were in some respects as much fraternal organizations as state
authorized military entities. These volunteer companies filled the military role that, in
theory, belonged to the regular militia and to the entire male population. Until the mid
nineteenth century most states maintained thi s dual system of an inactive regular militia
and an active volunteer militia. States typically considered their volunteer militia
companies to be the only militia groups of any consequence, and most militia laws passed
applied to them. When a military need arose during the colonial or antebellum era, these
volunteer companies would muster. Once organized, the men would become soldiers,
either officially or unofficially, in the service of the state or federal governmentY
An important characteristic of the volunteer militias was the high social and
economic standing of their members. Well-to-do and better-educated members of a
community comprised the bulk of volunteer militiamen. The most obvious reason for
this is the expense of belonging to such an organization . Although theoretically the state
and local governments funded the militia companies, in practice government bodies gave

8McCreedy, "Palladium of Liberty," 9- 1 4
9Ibid. ; Mahon, History ofthe Militia and the National Guard, 1 7- 1 8, 3 1 -32.
12

volunteer mi liti as very little support. Membership thus required the purchase of a
uniform, a firearm, and other supplies. Because volunteer companies met and drilled on a
regular basis, often several times a year, members had to have the financial means to
devote considerable time to the militia. Membership in volunteer cavalry units was
especially expensive, given the high cost of horses and equestrian equipment. These units
were often limited to the upper classes. Membership in a volunteer company became an
i mportant status symbol and often a virtual requirement for men seeking positions of
respect and leadership in a community. 10
By the late colonial period, the system had matured into a well-organized, albeit
imperfect, military structure. Fear of tyrannical central authority had reached a high point
by this time, making a loosely organized group of volunteers the preferred basis for a
military. Despite crown attempts at consolidating the militia system, the thirteen colonies
fiercely defended the autonomy of their militias. 1 1
The defense of an autonomous militia system paralleled the development of
American revolutionary thought. The Age of Enlightenment produced a generation of
English philosophers who disapproved of centralized authority and gave emphasis to
individual self-worth. Some of the more radical of these philosophers openly criticized
long-standing British institutions such as the church and the monarchy, arguing that these
organizations did not act in the best interests of the people. Two of these writers, John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon, enjoyed wide readership in the colonies during the

10Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 7 5 , 8 1 -84.
1 1 1bid., 23, 3 1 -34.
13

eighteenth century. Their most popular work, Cato's Letters, denounced all forms of
centralized power, and helped form the ideological basis of American individualism. By
the late colonial period, the writings of Trenchard and Gordon , as well as other
philosophers espousing similar views, circulated extensively throughout the colonies.
The educated classes read and took to heart these writings . 1 2
These philosophers were very critical of standing armies and the power they
represented. These men argued that power, such as that held by an autocratic state, was
by its very nature aggressive. Power corrupted men and destroyed liberty. The standing
army was the method by which men in power oppressed the people, and thus standing
armies were incompatible with a free society. In a 1 698 pamphlet Trenchard asserted that
every English monarch since James I ( 1 603- 1 625) had used a strong army to enforce
despotic rule. The result, he said, was that the English people "had so entirely lost all
sense of liberty, that they grew fond of their chains."13
The role of the mi liti as as defenders of liberty did not prevent them from
defending the crown when called. By definition the militiamen were soldiers and the
colonial mi litias participated in all major colonial wars. During these conflicts the
significant flaws in the militia systems became apparent. Because each colony
maintained an independent militi a system and the autonomy of each militia was fiercely
defended, inter-colonial military cooperation was virtually impossible. The colonies were

12Bemard Bai lyn , The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 968), 22-54.
13Thomas Trenchard, A Short History of Standing Armies in England (publisher
unknown, 1 698; reprint, London: Booksellers of London and Westminster, 173 1 ), 3 3 .
14

very reluctant to commit their militi as to campaigns outside their own borders, and many
militiamen refused to accept orders from officers not their own. This forced the British
government to enlist men from outside the militia organizations when troops were
needed. 14
Colonial mi litiamen fiercely defended their right to determine where they served
and how long they served. Thus, colonial militias rarely engaged action beyond their own
localities; and when called for action, they rarely remained mustered for more than a few
days or weeks. Although the colonists acknowledged the need for cooperation in times of
major military conflicts, in practice they generally refused to cooperate. Colonists
believed their safety lay in a voluntary effort by independent citizens rather than a large
scale operation controlled by a central authority. Most military conflicts in the colonies
were Indian skirmishes handled by the militias on a local level. Colonists saw larger
conflicts as primarily the responsibility of the British regular army.
The French and Indian War ( 1754-63) saw the first use of American militias on a
large scale; and although the British won , the inadequacies of the mi litia system became
apparent during the conflict. During the first three years of the war, colonies frequently
refused to provide men. In 1757, the British government made a number of changes
designed to coax the colonies into participating. The British chose more officers from
among the colonists, and granted colonial officers equal authority to those from Britain.

14Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 25-26.
15

Gradual ly the colonial militi as became significantly involved in the war effort, and their
increased support helped tum the tide of battle. 1 5
Although by the end o f the war thousands o f colonial militiamen were serving the
King, their record was not strong. Some units, such as the New Jersey Blues (a volunteer
mi litia), performed as well as the British regulars. These men considered themselves to
be professional soldiers, not militiamen. More typically, however, mi litia units
performed poorly in all respects. The units that did best were the volunteer companies,
which were better equipped, trained, and led than their regular counterparts. The New
Jersey Blues were by one account "the likeliest well-set men as perhaps turned out on any
campaign." The regular militiamen, however, were not only poorly equipped and trained,
but were in most cases forced into action against their will. Desertion rates among them
were high . One deserter who had been caught complained, "Gentlemen, you seem
surprized at our desertion , but youl not be surprized if you'l consider that we have been
starved with hunger and cold in the winter, and that we have received no pay for seven or
eight months; now we have no cloaths an you cheat us out of our allowance of rum and
half our working money." 16
The American Revolution played a significant role in shaping the militia system
that would endure into the antebellum era. Despite the i mportance of the militia system

15Ibid. , 29.
16Fredrick P. Todd, "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," Military
Affairs 5 (Summer 1 94 1 ), 76; Stanley Pargellis, ed. , Military Affairs in North America
1 748-1 765: Selected Documents from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle (New
York: D Appleton-Century Company, 1 936), 202.
16

to the founding fathers' ideals of freedom, the Continental Congress found itself militarily
unprepared when fighting began in 1 77 5 . As had been the case in the French and Indian
War, the state militias proved ineffective in fighting a large-scale conflict. Moreover, the
well-organized British redcoats were far superior to anything the militia had yet faced.
The militias may have worked adequately on the frontier where small bands of soldiers
could respond quickly to Indian threats; but as these organizations attempted to form a
real army the weakness of the militia system became apparent. The resistance to central
authority and the refusal of states to have their young men spend long periods of time
away from their homes proved disastrous for the Continental Army. George Washington
complained that the militias "come in, you cannot tell how ; go, you cannot tell when, and
act, you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at
last in a critical moment."17
Despite their poor performance against the British, the militias played an
important role in the Revolutionary War. The Continental Congress did not have the
resources to create an army by recruitment and training. It relied of necessity on the state
militias. Eventually, Congress did begin to raise troops loyal to the central government.
These troops fought alongside the militias. Although poorly paid and even more poorly
supplied, they were effective because they were under a central command and their
organization and command structures were clear. 18

1 7John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, (20 vols.
Washington: U. S . Government Printing Office, 1 93 1 -44), 6: 403 .
18Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 3 5 -44.
17

The creation of a functional United States government after the American
Revolution was a long and arduous affair. The nation's leadership was divided over many
issues, and the new nation's military was among the most fiercely debated subjects. Most
Americans viewed the Revolution as a war fought to overthrow centralized tyranny. The
Articles of Confederation retained the militia system. In fact, the Articles required that
each state "always keep a well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and
accoutered, and shall provide and have constantly ready for use, in public stores, arms,
ammunition and camp equipage." Under the Articles, however, the Congress had very
limited power over the state militia systems. It could not force states to participate in a
war and could not control the militia systems. 19
In writing the Articles of Confederation the framers assumed that the potential
abuse of liberties by a centralized army outweighed the advantages of having one. During
the years the Articles governed the United States, some leaders, notably George
Washington , began to call for a stronger military system. The Congress studied the
matter, and a military committee studied the issue, but the nation ' s leaders took no
concrete action_2°
When the Constitutional Convention met in 1 7 87, in response to the widespread
belief that a stronger central government was needed, the future military structure of the
United States was one of the most important issues debated. Delegates agreed that some
form of militia system was necessary but argued over i ts organization . The centralizers

19Articles of Confederation, Articles 6-9.
20McCreedy, "Palladium of Liberty," 1 8-2 1 .
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argued that to have an effective militia the federal government must exercise ultimate
command. George Washington and Alexander Hamilton favored the creation of a
national militia, composed entirely of volunteers, to serve as an elite corps within the
militia system.21
The mi litary provisions eventually placed into the Constitution were the result of
compromise between the centralizers and their opponents. The centralizers clearly won
more concessions. The Constitution granted the federal government power to rai se a
standing army in peacetime, and made the president commander-in-chief. It further gave
the president power to appoint officers for the federal army, albeit with the consent of the
Senate. The states could not wage war or refuse to send troops when called on to do so.22
The Constitution did not leave the centralizers' opponents empty-handed. The
Constitution placed the power to declare war in the hands of the Congress. It also
permitted the organization of state militias, and granted states the exclusive authority to
appoint militia officers. States needed only to train militias in a manner prescribed by the
Congress. Power over the militias resided basically with the states. The Constitution
permitted Congress to call forth the militias only to "execute the laws of the union, to
suppress insurrection, and to repel invasion." Furthermore, the Second Amendment
stated that the militias were necessary and permitted them the right to "keep and bear
21 Arthur A. Ekirich Jr. , The Civilian and the Military (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1 956), 1 8-31 ; Gaillard Hunt and James B . Scott, eds., The Debates in the
Federal Convention of 1 787 which Framed the Constitution of the United States of
America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 920), 42 1 , 424, 427 , 435 .
22Constitution of The United States ofAmerica, Article 1 , section 8, section 1 0,
Article 2, section 2.
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arms." In the minds of many Americans, the state mi litias would help ensure state
sovereignty against the new federal power. 23
The Constitution created a well-defined, albeit complex, military structure in the
United States. The federal government was to rai se the army from among the general
population and the army was to have no institutional relationship with the states. The
states were to raise the militias, and each militia was to be subject to its respective state
laws and customs. However, the Constitution did require the militias to follow guidelines
set by the Congress, and required the militias to lend their services to the federal
government should the need arise. The provisions in the Constitution regarding federal
use of the militias were vague but were understood to mean that militias would become
active under federal command should the nation go to war or otherwise face a military
crisis. In all other respects, the Constitution left mi litias free to act according to their
states' needs.
After taking office in 1 789, George Washington expressed concern over the
nation's military structure. Recalling the ineptitude of his disorganized army in the
Revolution, he declared that the national government must have a federal force,
preferably a national militia, to deal with foreign threats. In early 1 790, he presented to
Congress a plan to create such a national militia composed of men trained by the states.
Congress, however, demurred. A bi ll to organize the United States military did not pass
until May 1792, and it bore little resemblance to Washington's plan. It created neither a
national mi litia nor a select federal corps. Washington nevertheless signed the bill into

23Ibid., Article 1 , section 8 .
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law. It was titled An Act More Effectually to Provide for the National Defense by
Establishing an Uniform Militia Throughout the United States, and i s commonly known
as the Uniform Militia Act. It ordered the states to organize their mi liti as into di visions,
brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies, and specified the size of each. This
uniformity would ensure that the various states' organizations could efficiently combine
if a general call-up became necessary. The act also created the office of adjutant general
in each state, and required him to report annually to the state's governor on the condition
of the militia. This report was to be sent to the president as well.24
The Uniform Militia Act contained a number of other important provisions. It set
a ratio of infantry soldiers to non-infantry soldiers: a maximum of eleven to one. The
non-infantry was to consist of cavalry and artillery, at least one unit of each per division.
A mi litiaman injured in federal service was to receive a federal pension. A militiaman
called into federal service was permitted to hire a substitute.
Along with the Uniform Militia Act, Congress passed the Calling Forth Act,
which Washington also signed it into law . This gave the president power to call up state
militias w henever he deemed necessary, without the permission of the state's governor. It
also required a federal judge to inform the president through official channels of any
insurrection or invasion. The president could take action only after commanding the

24George Washington, "Message to the United States Senate," in Eileen D. Carzo,
ed. , National State Papers of the United States, Part II, Texts of Documents,
Administration of George Washington, 1 789-1 797 (35 vols., Wilmington: Michael
Glazier, 1 985), 3: 300-308; Public Statutes At Large of the United States ofAmerica,
Second Congress, First Session, Chapter 33 ( 1 792); Richard Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The
Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1 783-1802 (New
York: Free Press, 1 975), 1 29-35 .
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insurgents, again by official means, to cease their disturbance. The Calling Forth Act also
stipulated that no militiaman in federal service could be forced to serve more than three
months in any year. Along with the Uniform Militia Act the Calling Forth Act clarified
the vague terminology of the Constitution. 25
The states modified their laws to comply with the Uniform Militia Act, but state
militia structures changed very little. It is important to note that the two federal laws did
not discuss the commissioning of general officers. In some states the governor or
legislature appointed such officers, but in other states they were elected. Nor did either
act discuss the training of officers or men or the equipping of the militias. Such details
were left to the states.
An insurrection known as the Whiskey Rebellion became the first test of the
Uniform Mi litia Act and Calling Forth Act. In an attempt to raise money to pay
Revolutionary War debt, the federal government in 1 79 1 placed an exci se tax on whiskey.
This tax infuriated the nation's grain farmers and whiskey producers, many of whom
refused to comply. In western Pennsylvania, one of the nation's chief whiskey-producing
regions, full-scale insurrection broke out in the spring of 1 794. After a failed attempt at
negotiation, George Washington in October 1 794 activated the Pennsylvania militia. The
1 2 ,000 militiamen met little resistance, and easily put down the rebellion. Many saw this
successful use of the militia as proof that the federal government did not need a standing

25Public Statutes At Large of the United States ofAmerica, Second Congress, First
Session, Chapter 28 ( 1 792).
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army to ensure domestic tranquility.26
Several campaigns against the Indian tribes further strengthened support for the
state militias. In 1 793, John Sevier led between six and seven hundred Tennessee
militiamen against the Creek Indians and won a significant victory that opened new areas
of Tennessee for white settlement. The next year more than five hundred Tennessee
mi litiamen defeated a force of Creek and Cherokee warriors at the battle of Nickajack.27
Thomas Jefferson, who became President in 1 80 1 , did little to change the militia
system. Jefferson had no formal military experience, and he had strong reservations
about large standing armies. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the militia
system in the United States had taken the form it would carry throughout the antebellum
era. The American people expected this system of volunteer and regular citizen-soldiers
to augment a much smaller federal army.
The first great test of the nineteenth-century American militia system came in
1 8 1 2, when the United States and Great Britain once again went to war. When the
fighting began, the U.S. regular army numbered only seven thousand men. However, the
states had on their rolls approximately seven hundred thousand mi litiamen. During the
war these state militiamen comprised the majority of active troops.28
26For a detailed account see Thomas P. S laughter, The Whiskey Rebellion:
Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press,
1986).
27These two campaigns will be further discussed in Chapter 4.
28 Robert S . Quimby, The U.S. Army in the War of 1812: A n Operational and
Command Study (2 vols. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1 997), 1 : 4;
Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, 4th ed. (Washington:
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Militias performed poorly during the war, for several reasons. During the years
leading up to the war, most states did not obey the militia training stipulations of the
Uniform Militia Act. Consequently, vast numbers of militiamen arrived for duty wholly
unprepared for battle with the British. In many cases the men entered the field of battle,
fired one volley at the British, and then hasti ly retreated. 29
The militiamen frequently did not have arms or other necessary equipment. When
the war began every state was short of military materiel. Militiamen regularly mustered
and rendezvoused without necessary supplies, and some cases men arri ved on the
battlefield without weapons . However, some states refused to send their men unti l guns
and supplies could be procured. The militiamen also lacked adequate weapons training.
The standard musket at the time required twenty-three steps to load and discharge. Few
militiamen had sufficient practice to carry out these steps with any degree of precision. 30
A third problem plaguing militias during the war was bureaucratic and command
conflicts. Because the state militi as by law maintained a dual loyalty to their respective
states and to the federal government, conflicts arose regarding who commanded the men,
how long they were to serve, and where they could be deployed. These problems were
particularly troublesome early in the war. The American strategy called for an invasion
of Canada in numerous places along its southern border, but often the militiamen refused

Government Printing Office, 1 9 1 6), 1 37 .
29Robert L . Kerby, "The Militia System and the State Militias in the War o f 1 8 1 2,"
Indiana Magazine of History 73 (June 1 977): 1 1 7.
30Ibid., 1 1 9.
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to advance. In one instance, on October 1 2, 1 8 1 2, New York militia general Stephen V.
Renssalear led 350 U.S. Regulars and 250 militiamen to attack the Briti sh at Queenstown,
Canada. Although the Americans outnumbered the British three to one, the militiamen
refused to cross into Canada, claiming that they could not be forced to serve in a foreign
country. The regulars resisted Renssalear's command because he was not a United States
officer. This impasse turned a potentially easy victory into a defeat.31
The most serious instance of this sort in the war came in July 1 8 14, when the
British landed 4,500 men thirty miles from Washington D.C. Although 93 ,000
mi litiamen lived within marching distance and were on alert, the American General
William Winder did nothing. As a federal officer, he had no authority to activate the state
militias. When permi ssion finally arrived, Winder could not muster the men in time to
defend the capital. The British captured and partially burned Washington. This remains
one of the most humiliating moments in American military hi story.32
Militiamen did perform admirably on some occasions. The two most notable
instances were the battle of Horseshoe Bend in 1 8 14 and the battle of New Orleans in
1 8 1 5 . In both cases the American soldiers came from a variety of sources, but militiamen
from Tennessee and Kentucky comprised the maj ority of combatants. Although not
better trained than other militiamen, these men were commanded by Andrew Jackson,
who had prodigious leadership abilities. He insti lled a strong fighting spirit in even the
most poorly trained men. These two victories reinforced the belief among many

3 1 Quimby, U.S. Army in the War of 1 8 1 2, 1 : 67-75.
32Ibid., 2 : 659-97 .
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Americans that a militi a system was superior to maintaining a large federal army. This
belief prevai led despite the fact that most militias had been inadequate for the task and
had failed miserably.33
After the War of 1 8 1 2, the militia system in the United States began a slow
transformation and eventual decline. Regular militias faded as the volunteer militias
became more acti ve. Eventually even participation in volunteer companies all but
disappeared. A number of factors contributed to these changes. First, the United States
population grew tremendously throughout the antebellum era. In 1 8 1 0 the population
was just over 7 ,200,000, by 1 860 more than 3 1 ,400,000. As the nation grew , the
American people saw no need to keep mi llions of service-aged men prepared for war.
Doing so was not just unnecessary but impossible. Many states relaxed the muster and
drill requirements.34
Another reason for the decline of militias was the lack of an ever-present enemy.
By 1 820 most eastern Indians were subdued and their numbers decimated, and the Indian
removals in the 1 830's eliminated all threat of Indian uprising in the East. Finally, victory
in the War of 1 8 1 2 coupled with the success of the Monroe Doctrine gave Americans a
sense of national security. Entering the antebellum era, most Americans considered the
militias unnecessary.
The decline of the mi litias did not, however, mean the decline of the militia ideal.

33Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 75-77.
34United States Bureau of the Census, The Statistical History of the United States
from Colonial Times to the Present (Stamford, Conn : Fairfield Publishers, 1 965), 1 3 .
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The War of 1 8 1 2 only reinforced the American belief that citizen-soldiers were the best
means of national defense. Laws regarding militias remained on the books, and volunteer
companies became more active. These volunteer mi litias provided the illusion of citizensoldiery even though most were comprised only of the well-to-do, not common citizens.
In the wake of the war of 1 8 1 2, efforts to reform the militia emerged. On the
national level, John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War in the Monroe Administration, pushed
for widespread changes. Calhoun called for a reduction in the number of rank and file
militiamen, but not in the number of officers, arguing that suitable officers must be ready
to train men in a military crisis. Also during the Monroe administration, William Henry
Harrison, chairman of the House Militia Committee, proposed two constitutional
amendments granting the federal government more authority in militia training and
making military training a significant element in common education. In 1 826, Secretary
of War James Barbour undertook a complete study of the militia system and produced a
report recommending a reduction in the number of militiamen in each state, greater
uniformity among the various state systems, and more federal involvement in militia
training. Although well meaning, these efforts did little to change the nation's militia
structure. States undertook other reforms including reducing the number of militiamen,
providing tax incentives for men to participate, and levying fines on men who refused to
serve.35

35Roger J. Spi ller, "Calhoun's Expansible Army: The History of a Military Idea,"
South Atlantic Quarterly 79 (Spring 1 980): 1 89-203 ; McReedy, "Palladium of Liberty:
The American Militia System, 1 56-5 8 ; John K. Mahon, "A Board of Officers Considers
the Condition of the Militia in 1 826," Military Affairs 1 5 (Summer 1 95 1 ): 90-93.
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Despite their decline in members, until the Civil War the mi litias remained the
backbone of the American mi litary and militiamen participated in many military
campaigns. During the Indian removals of the 1830's, militiamen were used to put down
resistance. Most notably, in 1 832 the Sauk and Fox tribes of Illinoi s, Iowa, and
Wisconsin began resisting. The U.S. government mustered 1 0,000 militiamen from the
region. The resulting Black Hawk War was a disgrace, as the militi amen acted as little
more than an armed mob. Eventually a force composed of militiamen and U.S. regulars
managed to put down the upri sing.36
Militiamen also participated in the Seminole War of 1 835-42. Like the Black
Hawk War, this began as a resistance to Indian removal. This conflict involved all of the
United States armed forces and over 30,000 militiamen from various states. Officers of
the regular army led the militiamen , which improved the militias' overall performance.37
During the Mexican War ( 1 846-48), militiamen comprised more than half the
Americans who served. When the war began, a call for 20,000 volunteers produced
patriotic musters throughout the country. By 1 846, the militia systems in many states
were no longer active, and reviving the militias for the war proved difficult. States lacked
arms and equipment as well as trained officers. However, in some places volunteer
companies had remained active, and many volunteered to serve. For the most part,
militiamen serving in the Mexican War had been active in their local organizations before

36Cecil D. Eby, "That Disgraceful Affair": The Black Hawk War (New York:
Norton, 1 973), 1 74, 1 99.
37Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 78.
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the war began. 3 8
Recruitment for the regular army took place in tandem with the call for militia
volunteers. The militia volunteers were commissioned for twelve months, army regulars
for five years. Not surprisingly, volunteer recruitment was more successful. Regular
army recruitment increased when the Congress reduced the term of service to the duration
of the war and offered a twelve-dollar sign up-bonus.39
It is difficult to determine what proportion of Mexican War soldiers came from
active mi litias. Of the 1 1 5,906 men who served, 42,374 were from the regular army,
60,93 1 were state militia volunteers, and 1 2,601 were militiamen demobilized at the
beginning of the war because they had been recruited illegally. Although all state
volunteers were classified as militiamen, many belonged to militia companies that were
inactive prior to the war, and others joined militia companies hastily arranged when the
war began. It is also quite likely that some active mi litia companies enlisted as regulars
rather than volunteers. Despite the fact that the number of militiamen cannot be counted,
they played a significant role in the war. Militiamen saw action in every major campaign;
and although often criticized, they performed admirably on some occasions. Mi litia
officers such as Albert Sidney Johnston and Jubal Early established distinguished
reputations.40

38Marvin A . Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in
the United States Army, 1 775-1945 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1 955), 73.
39lbid., 76-77.
40 Ibid., 78, 7 1 .
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By the time of the Civil War ( 1 86 1 - 1 865), active militias, both regular and
volunteer, had all but disappeared. Most states stil l maintained laws requiring
membership in the militia. The militia units themselves were nonetheless obsolete. B y
the late 1 850's most states, including Tennessee, had passed laws eliminating the muster
requirements. Without the requirement to muster, mi liti as became paper organizations
only. The most striking evidence of the militi a deterioration is the fact that both the
Union and the Confederacy were overwhelmingly unprepared at the beginning of the
conflict, lacking trained men, adequate arms, and necessary supplies.41
Historians agree that the Civil War resulted in the destruction of sl avery but al so
in a dramatic increase in federal power at the expense of the states. It is not coincidental
that the war thus also resulted in the abandonment of the militia ideal and the belief that
the militias were superior to centralized, professional armies.
Although the militias were functionally defunct, when the war began both sides
once again called on their states to muster their mi liti as into service. In April 1 86 1
Abraham Lincoln cal led for seventy-five thousand militiamen to serve for three months.
The call went out despite the fact most militia companies had not mustered for years.
Other elements of the militia system appeared when the war began. In both the North and
the South, the federal governments issued state quotas for men, an accepted practice
under the militia system. In many cases the men elected their field officers, and men
volunteered and served as cohesive companies. Many groups organized under the

4 1Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, 97-98; Acts of the State
of Tennessee, Thirty-second General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 32 ( 1 857).
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identity of earlier militia companies and certainly a select few companies had been
previously active in the militia. Early in the war many of these companies furnished their
own arms, uniforms, and equipment. Such self-sufficiency was necessary since neither
the Union nor the Confederate government had much to offer. Throughout the war the
Union made the distinction between members of the regular army and the state militia
volunteers. The Confederacy did not have a regular army. All southern soldiers were
classified as state militia volunteers. 42
These mi litia characteri stics disappeared as the war progressed. In both the North
and the South the fact that volunteers were technically militiamen did not carry with it the
expectation that volunteers were to have prior military training. Virtually none did, and
in the North the militia volunteers trained alongside the federal regulars. On both sides
the men were expected to serve as soldiers loyal to a central government, and their
organizational and command structures reflected thi s fact. As the war progressed the
numbers of incoming volunteers declined, forcing both sides to use conscription. Arms,
equipment and uniforms became standardized, and appointed replaced elected officers.
The volunteers became subject to federal laws and regulations, not state militia laws. The
leadership in both the North and the South recognized that victory necessitated a
centralized army subject to the will of a federal government.
After the Civil War the militia ideal effectively disappeared. The acceptance of a
strong federal government made the concept of a strong federal army easier to accept.

42Abraham Lincoln, "Proclamation," in The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies ( 1 28 vols., Washington: U.
S. Government Printing Office, 1 880- 1 901 ) , series 3, 1 : 67-68.
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The fear of a large, powerful federal army oppressing the rights of the people, which
gripped the minds of many coloni al and antebellum Americans, faded away. The national
guards emerged as the successors to the state militias; but guardsmen were not considered
citizen-soldiers. They did not exist to provide protection from the federal government,
and they were in place primarily to assist in state matters. The American public no longer
expected the citizen-soldier to defend the country. The Civil War had proven that a
standing centralized army was best suited to face a national threat.
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Chapter II
A System to Defend a Free People: The Tennessee Militia Laws

Prior to 1 790, the future state of Tennessee was part of western North Carolina.
Once it became a state, Tennessee established a militia system similar to that of North
Carolina but with some notable differences. During the years before the Civi l War, the
Tennessee legislature regularly modified militia laws to adapt to economic and social
changes. An examination of Tennessee militia laws reveals an active organization that
played an important role in the social and political development of early Tennessee.
To understand the development of Tennessee militia laws in the early years of
statehood, one must first examine those of North Carolina. The North Carolina
Constitution of 1 776 provided for a militia system. Since its foundmg as a colony, North
Carolina had maintained a primitive militia. The 1 776 Constitution stated that "The
Senate and the House of Commons shall have power to appoint the generals and field
officers of the militia, and all other officers of the regular army of this state." A notable
element of this provision is recognition of an existing militia. The Constitution of 1 776
did not create the North Carolina militia but rather regulated the manner by which the
officers were appointed; and it recognized that such authority was vested in the legislative
body. 1

1 1776 Constitution of the State of North Carolina in Francis Newton Thorpe, ed.,
The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the
States, Territories, and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of
America (7 vols. , Washington: Government Printing Office, 1 909), 2: 2787-2799.
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In 1 786 the North Carolina legislature codified its militia laws, and this code
provided a framework for the later Tennessee militia l aws. The code structured the order
of battle along traditional military lines. Brigades were to be formed in each district
throughout the state. Each brigade was to be commanded by a brigadier general and
included a brigade major, an aide-de-camp, and a brigade inspector. Each brigade was to
be comprised of several regiments, one regiment per county. Each regiment was to be
commanded by a lieutenant colonel and included an adjutant, a surgeon, and a drum and
fife major. Each regiment was to consist of two or three battalions, each to be
commanded by a major. Several companies would comprise a battalion.2
The company was the smallest unit of the militia, and the 1 786 code strictly
defined its structure. Each infantry company was to be commanded by a captain, and
included three sergeants, three corporals, one drummer, one fifer, and fifty privates.
Cavalry companies included a captain, three sergeants, three corporals, a trumpeter, and
thirty-two privates, while artil lery companies included a captain, three sergeants, three
corporals, two drummers, two fifers, and fifty-two privates.3
The code required service from all free men and indentured servants between the
ages of eighteen and fifty. Some exceptions were made. Exempted from service were
superior court judges, assembly delegates and secretaries, counselors of the state treasury,
the attorney general, ministers of the gospel, ferrymen, branch pilots, inspectors of public

2James Iredell, ed. , Laws of the State of North Carolina (Edenton : Hodge and
Wills, 1 79 1 ), 59 1 -97 .
3Ibid.
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warehouses, justices of the peace, and certain officers who had served in the
Revolutionary War. Those exempted were, however, subject to duty in the event of
insurrection or invasion.4
The duties of the North Carolina militia mirrored those of other state militias.
During war, the North Carolina militia was expected to render military service. The
power to muster the militia into service rested solely with the governor, or an officer
appointed by him. The code stated that the militia was to muster in the event of invasion
or insurrection in North Carolina; however, it included no provision for federal service.
The code did not mention the use of North Carolina militiamen beyond state boundaries,
nor did it mention a maximum length of service.5
When in active service, the militiamen were to receive nominal pay. Infantry
privates recei ved the lowest pay, two shillings six pence per day. Officers received more,
ranging from three shillings for corporals to one pound four shillings for brigadier
generals. Cavalrymen and artillerymen received slightly more than their infantry
counterparts.6
The 1 786 North Carolina code emphasized the peacetime duties of the militia.
For one thing, it required privates in the militia to attend musters. This provision , if
strictly followed, would have been time-consuming. Each regiment and battalion was to
muster twice a year at its respective county courthouse. Each company was to muster

4Ibid.
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
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every two months at a place designated by the captain. At the musters, the troops were to
be trained according to contemporary military standards. The captains were responsible
for such training. The regimental colonel was required to review the troops at least once
per year during a regimental muster. If mi litiamen had actually met as required by l aw,
they would have mustered at least ten times each year.7
The 1 786 code was very specific about arms and equipment. Each infantry officer
was to attend muster with a side arm or spontoon, and each private was to attend with a
musket or rifle complete with sufficient powder, flints, and balls for nine rounds. Cavalry
officers and privates were to be more elaborately equipped. Each was required to muster
with a good horse, a saddle, a bridle, a pistol, a holster, a horseman ' s sword and cap,
shoe-boots and spurs, and a cartouche box with cartridges. Artillery companies were to
be armed like the infantry, except that the non-commissioned officers were to carry
swords instead of guns.
The code was ambiguous concerning the provisioning of arms. It implied, but did
not state directly, that cavalrymen as well as the artillery and infantry officers were to
provide their own arms. Presumably the same was true for artillery and infantry pri vates,
although the code did require the state to provide arms to privates who could not afford
them. State-owned arms were to be purchased with money collected from fines.8
Aside from training, the duties of the officers were l argely clerical. Captains were
to make yearly returns to the regimental colonel of the strength and condition of their

71bid.
8lbid.
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compames. Colonels were to make regimental returns to the brigadier generals, who in
tum were to make returns to the governor. Once a year the governor was to make a report
to the General Assembl y.9
To become a commissioned officer in the North Carolina mi litia, the code
required a freehold of one hundred fifty acres, or a freehold of any size in a town.
Officers were not chosen democratically but rather were appointed. Captains appointed
their company' s non-commissioned officers. The code was vague regarding the
appointment of company officers: it stated that the commissioned officers in each
company were to be chosen by seniority, including the captain, but the appointment of
captains required the approval of the regimental colonel . The General Assembly was to
appoint the commissioned officers for each brigade and regiment. The generals and
colonels were to choose their own staff officers. 10
A l ast element of the North Carolina militia code concerned mi litary justice. A
courts martial was to be held on the day following regimental and battalion musters. The
court was to consist of thirteen members, with the eldest field officer serving as president.
This court was to assess fines, grant militia duty exemptions based on age or disability,
and hear individual grievances. In addition to fining militiamen, the court was authorized
to suspend or cashier men found guilty of violating militia laws. However,
commissioned officers accused of misconduct were to be tried by a separate, general

9Ibid.
10lbid.
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courts martial. 1 1
Most offenses identified in the militia l aw involved neglect of duty. Failure to
attend a muster carried a fine of ten to twenty shi l lings if committed by a private or non
commissioned officer and two to four pounds if committed by a commissioned officer.
The same fines applied if a militiaman appeared for muster unarmed, unless he was
unable to afford a gun. Privates and non-commissioned officers refusing to obey orders
were to be fined twenty to forty shillings. All militiamen, regardless of rank, were subject
to a fine of ten pounds for failure to appear when called into active service. 12
In 1786 the North Carolina Assembly also passed a law applying to its western
territory, which would later become Tennessee. By then a significant number of white
settlers had moved into the territory, sparking conflicts with the Native Americans. In
response, the General Assembly passed "An Act for Raising Troops for the Protection of
the Inhabitants of Davidson County." Under this act 201 men were to be organized into
three companies, each commanded by standard company officers and under the overall
command of a major. Most of these men were to come from Davidson County, in
Tennessee territory. They were to be trained as the commanding officer saw fit and to
serve for two years, and were to arm themselves with a rifle or smoothbore and all
necessary accouterments. However, the law did provide for the men ' s clothing and
required the state to furnish lead and powder when needed. 1 3

1 1 Ibid.
1 2Ibid.
1 31bid., 569-72.
38

According to this 1 786 law, these troops were to receive the same pay and rations
as North Carolina militiamen. However, the first half of their first year' s pay was to be
given in the form of a four-hundred-acre plot of land in the Tennessee territory. The first
half of their second year' s pay was to be an additional four hundred acres. Officers were
to receive two thousand acres each year. The monetary pay for the troops was to be taken
from state taxes assessed on land west of the Appalachians. The rations for the men were
to be provided by the people of Davidson County. 14
An interesting part of this bill involved the use of the militiamen for internal
improvements. The North Carolina leadership saw a need for roads in addition to
military protection in the Tennessee territory. Thus, as part of their duty, the l aw required
these newly organized troops to assemble at Clinch Mountain and cut a ten-foot-wide
road to Nashville. The work was to be supervi sed by a military contractor appointed by
the governor. 15
The first militia law enacted by a Tennessee legi slature was passed during
Tennessee' s brief existence as a federal territory, fol lowing its cession by North Carolina
in 1 790. Legislators entitled this law "An Act for the Relief of Such Persons As Have
Been Disabled By Wounds, or Rendered Incapable of Procuring for Themselves and
Fami lies Subsistence In the Militia Service of This Territory, and Providing for the
Widows and Orphans of Such As Have Died." The territorial legislature, officially
known as the House of Representatives and Council of the Territory of the United States

14Ibid.
1 5Ibid.
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South of the Ohio, passed this law in September 1 794. It was short-lived, however: in
1 795, the legislature suspended it and in the following year repealed it. 16
Tennessee was a federal territory for six years, and during that time the militia
code of North Carolina remained in effect. With a militia system in place, the Tennessee
territorial government needed onl y to enact laws tailoring it to the state ' s unique needs.
The first Tennessee state constitution, adopted in 1 796, contained four references to the
militia. The most significant concerned the militia ideal . Section Twenty-four of Article
XI stated: "The sure and certain defense of a free people is a well regulated militia; and,
as standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to freedom, they ought to be avoided."
This section required the state militia to be strictly subordinated to civil authority. 17
Article VII of the 1 796 Constitution referred to the election of officers. Tennessee
was far more democratic in this regard than North Carolina. Captains and subalterns
were to be elected by the men in their respective companies. The article also stipulated
that field officers be elected by the men subject to duty in their respective counties.
Brigadier generals were to be elected by the field officers of their brigades, and major
generals were to be elected by the brigadier generals and field officers of their divisions. 1 8
The two other references to the militia in the 1 796 Constitution concerned militia

16Acts of the Territory of the United States South of the Ohio, First General
Assembly, Second Session , Chapter 23 ( 1 794); ibid. , First General Assembly, Second
Session, Chapter 1 5 ( 1 795); Acts of the State of Tennessee, First General Assembly, First
Session, Chapter 1 9 ( 1 796).
17 1 796 Constitution of the State of Tennessee in Francis Thorpe, ed. Federal and
State Constitutions, 6: 34 1 4-3425 .
18Ibid.
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exemption and substitution. Section Seven of Article VII required the legislature to
exempt persons who object to military service for religious reasons. Section TwentyEight of Article II permitted the hiring of substitutes. 19
In September 1 797, the state ' s first governor, John Sevier, himself a former North
Carolina militia general , called on the legislature to enact a comprehensive mi litia law .
Sevier reminded the legi slature o f the need for a wel l-trained militia. He also noted that
volunteer companies were being raised, and said that it was in the best interest of the state
to regulate them. 20
The legislature answered Sevier' s request on January 1 , 1 798, with the passage of
a comprehensive militia law. This act, entitled "An Act for the Better Establishment and
Regulation of Militia In Thi s State," codified many standard militia practices common in
Tennessee as well as in other states?1
Thi s law required all free men and indentured servants aged eighteen to forty -five
to belong to the militia. As in North Carolina, the law exempted certain state officers,
ministers of the gospel, and essential workers such as ferrymen. These men could,
however, be cal led to serve in cases of imminent danger.22
The law organized the militia in a manner similar to that of North Carolina. The

19Ibid.
20Robert H. White, et al . , eds . , Messages of the Governors of Tennessee ( 1 1 vols.
to date, Nashville: Tennessee Hi storical Commission, 1 95 2-98), 1: 25-26.
21Acts of the State of Tennessee, Second General Assembly, Second Session,
Chapter 1 ( 1 798).
22Ibid.
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mi litia of each district was to form a brigade commanded by a brigadier general . The
brigades were to be formed into divisions (a higher echelon not used in North Carolina),
each di vision to be commanded by a major general. Each county was to have at least one
regiment to be commanded by a lieutenant colonel ; and each regiment was to be
composed of an unspecified number of companies to be commanded by captains. Each
company was to include one captain, one ensign, three sergeants, two corporals, one
drummer, one fifer, and between forty and eighty privates . Cavalry companies were to
include one coronet, three sergeants, three corporals, one trumpeter, and between thirty
two and forty pri vates. The cavalry companies of each district were to compose a
regiment, and were to be raised by volunteer enli stment. Other militia officers included
two majors per regiment, as well as one adj utant, all to be appointed by the regiment' s
commanding officer; and each brigade was to contain one brigade major to be appointed
by the brigadier general .23
Thi s first comprehensive Tennessee mi litia l aw required two regimental musters
per year, in May and November. Musters were to be held at the regiments' respective
courthouses. The law further required company musters in March, June, September, and
December. Men were to arrive at the muster ground by eleven o'clock armed and dressed
appropriately. Infantry officers were to have a sidearm and privates a rifle or musket.
Cavalry members were to have arms, uniforms, and all necessary equestrian equipment as
well as a good horse "fourteen hands high." At each muster the men were to be trained
by their captain in accordance with Baron von Steuben ' s military manual. Roll was to be

23Ibid.
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cal led and a report on the overall condition of the men present made. Cavalry regiments
were to hold one additional fal l muster. 24
The law called for fines to be levied for a variety of offenses . Commissioned
officers who failed to appear at muster, or who appeared improperly equipped, were to be
fined as much as ten dollars, privates and non-commissioned officers as much as two.
Commissioned officers could be removed from office for ungentlemanly conduct, neglect
of duty, or disobedience and fined as much as twenty doll ars. For failing to answer a cal l ,
commissioned officers could be fined as much as fifty dol l ars, all others as much as
thirty. Substitutes were permitted for enlisted men .25
The l aw further required that a courts martial be held following each regimental
muster. The court was to consist of nine members and the president was to be a field
officer. Aside from ruling on offenses and hearing grievances, the court could grant
exemptions to persons incapable of serving. As with the North Carolina code, the court
was to elect a judge advocate to record the proceedings, to be paid one doll ar per day. All
fines were to be collected by the county sheriff, and were to go toward purchase of arms
and equipment or, if necessary, toward the hiring of substitutes in times of war. A courts
martial could also be cal led after company musters should the captain deem it necessary?6
The law granted the governor authority to call the militia to service in times of

24Ibid. ; Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben, Regulations for the Order and Discipline
of the Troops of the United States (Boston : T. J. and Fleet, 1 787).
25Acts of the State a/ Tennessee, Second General Assembly, Second Session,
Chapter 1 ( 1 797).
26Ibid.
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insurrection or invasion ; officers could muster the mi litia in times of immediate danger.
It made no mention of federal service or service outside Tennessee. However, the law did
dictate that no militiaman be required to serve more than three consecutive months . If
called into active duty, the men in each company were to be divided into ten groups for
rotation. Any substitutes reporting for service were to meet and fol low al l guidelines and
regulations. 27
The law contained a number of minor regulations, onl y two of which merit
di scussion. The first required appropriate returns to be made regarding the strength and
condition of the militia. As in the 1786 North Carolina code, each officer was to give to
his superior officer a yearly return concerning the men under his command. The final and
complete return , fol lowing the chain of command, was to be given to the governor. The
governor was then to present a comprehensive report of statewide militia readiness to the
General Assembly. The second regulation concerned elections. Although a specific
election procedure was absent, the law required contested elections to be decided by a
courts martial. 28
The 1 798 law effectively defined a Tennessee militia structure. It provided only a
basic framework for the militia system, however. A 1 799 report by the General
Assembly concluded that a more detailed militia l aw was necessary. The report also

27Ibid.
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concluded that state finances were inadequate to fund the existing system.29
The absence of specific regulations concerning the organization of the militia into
regiments, brigades, and divisions was the most significant oversight of the 1 798 militia
law . The General Assembly corrected this oversight in 1 803 by passing the first of four
comprehensive militia law revisions that would be enacted up to the time of the Civil
War. In this year the Assembly divided the mi litia into twenty-six regiments, six
brigades, and two divisions. Each county was to have one regiment with the exception of
Davidson County, which was to have two. This 1 803 law divided each regiment into two
battalions. The first division was to contain brigades one through three, organized in
eastern Tennessee, including such counties as Knox, Sevier, Blount, and Roane. The
second division was to contain brigades four through six, organized in the north central
Tennessee counties, then considered to be the western part of the state. 30
Over the next twelve years, the militia grew rapidly. The General Assembly
responded by creating new regiments, but in 1 8 1 5 found it again necessary to reorganize
the militia. The militia law of 1 8 1 5 created fifty-one regiments, almost double the
number of 1 803. Few changes took place in the first division: the Assembly added one
brigade and four regiments to accommodate three new counties in eastern Tennessee.
However, the second division was radically altered, for ten new counties now extended

29Tennessee General Assembly, "Militia Report," box 2, folder 2 ( 1 799), RG 60
unprocessed, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville (hereafter TSLA). This
report was prepared by a committee, the members of which are unknown.
30Acts of the State of Tennessee, Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1
( 1 803).
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westward between Knoxvi l le and Nashvi l le. The General Assembly established two or
three regiments in each of these counties and added two new brigades. The new counties
of the second di vision comprised what is today south-central Tennessee.3 1
Between 1 8 1 5 and 1 826, the state and the mi litia continued their rapid growth.
During these years, pioneers settled much of what is now West Tennessee. In 1 8 10 the
state' s population was 26 1 ,727. Ten years later it had increased to 422,823, and by 1 830
the population had reached 68 1 ,904. In 1 826 the General Assembly again rewrote the
militia l aw to adjust to this expansion. The new l aw created ninety-five regiments and
fourteen brigades, and added a third division to include the westernmost portion of the
state. Other than creating a fourth brigade and nine regiments to accommodate the four
new counties in East Tennessee, the Assembly changed l ittle concerning the first division.
Similarly, the Assembly made few changes to the second division. In the new third
division, the General Assembly created three brigades for eighteen new counties. Each
county would contain one regiment except Madi son, which would have two.32
By 1 836, the militia system had once again grown too l arge for its structure. In
this year the General Assembly did not rewrite the entire militia l aw, but did pass
legislation changing the regimental and battalion numerical designations and adding
forty-one new regiments, bringing the total to one hundred thirty-six. This legislation
brought the total number of brigades to twenty-two and created a fourth division. The

3 1 Ibid., Eleventh General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 3 ( 1 8 15).
32U.S . Census Bureau, Statistical History of the United States, 13; Acts of the
State of Tennessee, Sixteenth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 69 ( 1 826).
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Assembly organized these four divisions geographically. The first division comprised the
twenty-six easternmost counties, including the towns of Knoxville and Chattanooga; the
second division comprised thirteen counties in the north-central portion of the state and
included the city of Nashville; the third di vision comprised fifteen counties in the southcentral portion of the state; and the fourth division comprised the westernmost sixteen
counties, including Memphis.33
The final overhaul of the militia law occurred in 1 840. In that year, the General
Assembly added sixteen regiments, nine of which were assigned to seven new counties
created in West Tennessee. No new brigades or divisions were created at this time. Over
the next twenty years the General Assembly continued to make minor additions and
adj ustments to the militia law and to add various regiments, but made no more major
changes. In 1 844, the last regiment was added to the system. It was the 1 62nd, of Giles
County.34
The laws defining composition of the militia did not change significantly dunng
the antebellum era. Each revision of the mi litia law continued to require able-bodied free
men and indentured servants between the ages of eighteen and forty-five to serve. The
militia l aws made no mention of blacks or women. The General Assembly continued to
add exemptions. A 1798 law exempted superior court judges, the secretary of state,
treasurers, attorneys general, ministers of the gospel, ferrymen, j ustices of the peace,

33Ibid., Twenty-first General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 2 1 ( 1 836).
34Ibid., Twenty-fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 56 ( 1 840) ; ibid.,
Twenty-fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 94 ( 1 844).
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postmen, and certain Revolutionary War veterans. By 1 840 the list included the
comptroller, sheriffs, j ailors, operators of gri stmills, tollgate operators, religious
objectors, public school commi ssioners, and firemen.35
In 1794 the Territorial Assembly created Blount College in Knoxville, and article
four of the act creating it exempted the president, vice-president, professors, tutors, and
students from militia duty. Students and faculty may appear logical choices for militia
exemption , but the General Assembly resisted further attempts to exempt educators and
their pupils. In fact, in 1 805 some members of the Assembly attempted to revoke the
exemption status for B lount College. Some legislators supported educational exemption,
but they failed in their attempts to expand it. In 1 803, the Assembly rejected a bil l that
would have granted exemption to Greeneville and Davidson colleges. In 1 805 a bil l
failed that would have granted exemption to all college faculty and students. A similar
law failed to pass the General Assembly in 1 829. Public school commissioners were
eventually granted exemption, but with the exception of B lount College this privilege did
not extend to higher education .36

35Ibid., Second General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 798); ibid. ,
Twenty-third General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 56 ( 1 840);
36Acts ofthe Territory of the United States South of the Ohio, First General
Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 8 ( 1 794); Tennessee General Assembly, "A Bill to
Repeal the Law Which Exempts Certain People from Militia Duty," box 7, folder 1 5
( 1 805), RG 60 (unprocessed), "A Bill to Exempt the Members of Greeneville and
Davidson Colleges from Militi a Duty," box 6, folder 1 0 ( 1 803), RG 60 (unprocessed), "A
Bill to Exempt Certain Persons From Militia Duties," box 8, folder 9 ( 1 805), RG 60
(unprocessed), "A Bill Exempting Students, Scholars, Teachers, Tutors, Professors, and
School Masters From Militia Duty," box 85, folder 4 ( 1 829), RG 60 (unprocessed), all at
TSLA.
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In 1 8 17, the General Assembly considered exempting certain workers,
specifically persons employed at iron works and furnaces. Although the bill passed the
state Senate, it failed in the House of Representatives and was never reintroduced. In
1 82 1 , a bi ll failed which would have exempted court clerks and other public officers.
The justification for the bill was that militia duty slowed government work. The next
year, the General Assembly failed to pass a bi ll based on the same argument that would
have exempted county trustees. The final unsuccessful militia exemption bi ll failed the
General Assembly in 1 847 ; it would have exempted road overseers.37
Twice the General Assembly considered granting certain privileges to militiamen,
but in both cases the bil ls failed. In 1 843 the House of Representatives permanently
tabled a bill exempting volunteer cavalry members from jury and road duty. In 1 846 the
house military committee recommended against house bill 168, granting certam
exemptions to militiamen. The text of this bill has not survived, but its introduction in
the House indicates that interested parties continued to press for special militia
privileges.38

37Tennessee General Assembly, "A Bill to Exempt Mechanics or Certain
Workmen Therein Named From Attending Militia Musters," box 1 9 , folder 3 ( 1 8 17), RG
60 (unprocessed), "A Bill to Exempt Certain Officers from Militia Duty," box 22, folder
5 , ( 1 8 2 1 ), RG 60 (unprocessed), "A Bill Exempting Certain Persons from Militia Duty,"
box 22, folder 6 ( 1 822), RG 60 (unprocessed), "A Bill To Exempt Overseers of Roads
from the Performance of Military Duty," House Bills of the Twenty-seventh General
Assembly ( 1 847), RG 60 (unprocessed), all at TSLA.
38Tennessee General Assembly, "A Bill Exempting Cavalry Volunteer Companies
In This State From Serving On Juries and Working On Public Roads," House Bills of the
Twenty-fifth General Assembly ( 1 843), RG 60 (unprocessed), "Report of the Committee
On Military Affairs," Miscellaneous Reports of the Twenty-sixth General Assembly
( 1 846), RG 60 (unprocessed), both at TSLA.
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The General Assembly often granted special consideration to specific groups due
to hardships. Many people li ved in areas where travel to and from musters was difficult.
The legislature responded to these difficulties in two ways. In some cases it exempted
individuals living in remote regions from muster. For example, in 1 824 militiamen
residing on Crow and Paint creeks in Marion County were exempted from battalion and
regimental musters. More often the Assembly allowed militiamen in remote areas to
muster separately. Occasionally men were reassi gned to more convenient regiments or
battalions. In 1 82 1 the Assembly granted the men in Captain Nimrod Funk' s company of
Anderson County residing on Cumberland Mountain the right to muster separately from
the remainder of their regiment and to be commanded by a subaltern. In 1 822 it created a
third battalion in Rhea County to accommodate men living south of the Tennessee River.
At almost every legislative session militia companies and regiments presented petitions
requesting special treatment for mustering due to hardships. The Assembly considered
many bills addressing these issues; like the bills granting exemptions to persons in certain
professions, however, many of these were rejected. 39
The legi slature made a variety of changes to the militia laws throughout the
antebellum years to manage the explosive growth of the militia, or to make the militi a
operation more efficient and useful. The duties of the companies did not change
significantly, however. Laws required the men to muster at specified times, and to appear

39Acts of the State of Tennessee, Fifteenth General Assembly, Second Session,
Chapter 1 34 ( 1 824); ibid. , Fourteenth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 74
( 1 82 1 ); ibid. , Fourteenth General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 1 55 ( 1 822). For
numerous accounts of exemption denials see RG 60, TSLA, passim.
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ready for service when called. The companies were also mustered, either officially or
unofficially, to work on roads and act as slave patrols.
The most common and most time-consuming militi a duty was mustering.
Throughout the antebellum era, the General Assembly modified the frequency of the
company, battalion, and regimental musters. The 1 798 law required regimental musters
at the county courthouse on the l ast Thursday of each May and November. Additionally,
each company was to muster in March, June, September, and December. In 1 80 1 , the
Assembly replaced the spring regimental muster with a battalion muster. In 1 803, it
granted the commanding officers of the regiments and battalions the pri vilege of choosing
the location of the muster. The county courthouses continued to be the most frequent
places for musters and one regimental and one battalion muster per year remained the
rule. As militia membership increased, the specific days for regimental and battalion
muster were changed; but every militiaman could expect to attend a battalion muster
sometime in April or May and a regimental muster sometime in October, November, or
December. 40
Unlike the regimental and battalion musters, the company musters were changed
often during the antebellum era. In 1 80 1 the General Assembly reduced the number of
musters for regular militia companies to three per year and granted captains the authority
to select the muster location. The rule was changed in 1 803 to require companies to
muster every other month excluding January and February. The frequency of musters

40Acts of the State of Tennessee, Second General Assembly, Second Session,
Chapter 1 ( 1 798); ibid., Fourth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 80 1 ); ibid.,
Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803).
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reached a peak in 1 8 1 1 . In that year, the legi slature passed a law requiring companies to
muster once a month, excluding January and February, bringing the total number of
musters (including regimental and battalion) required to twelve.4 1
The 1 8 1 1 law reflected the increased tension between the United States and Great
Britain. Even with war looming, however, militi amen resisted the dramatic increase in
required musters. Militia units bombarded the Assembly with exemption requests after
the law passed. Once the war ended in 1 8 1 5 , the General Assembly reduced the company
musters to four per year. Two years later it reduced them to two per year and placed them
immediately before the spring battalion muster and the fall regimental muster. In 1 8 1 9,
the Assembly increased the number to four, but allowed those before the battalion and
regimental musters to count as two of the four. During the previous year Tennessee
troops participated with Andrew Jackson in his military campaign in Florida, and thi s
campaign action likely influenced the Assembly's decision to increase the number of
regular company musters. In 1 823 the legislature again reduced company musters to two
per year. In 1 84 1 , the General Assembly abolished the requirement for militia training in
the springtime. This 1 84 1 act ended battalion muster, and reduced company musters to
one per year.42

41Ibid., Fourth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 80 1 ); ibid. , Fifth
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803); ibid. , Ninth General Assembly,
Second Session, Chapter 28 ( 1 8 1 1 ) ; ibid., Ninth General Assembly, Second Session,
Chapter 28 ( 1 8 1 1 ).
42Ibid. , Eleventh General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 1 8 ( 1 8 1 5); ibid. ,
Thirteenth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 20 ( 1 8 1 9); ibid., Twelfth General
Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 20 ( 1 820); ibid. , Fifteenth General Assembly, First
Session, Chapter 6 1 ( 1 823); ibid, Twenty-fourth General Assembly, First Session,
52

Political pressure is the most obvious reason for changing muster requirements.
Privates in the regular militia resisted frequent muster, and in times of peace considered
most militia activity burdensome. In 1 8 1 5 , when companies were still mustering once a
month, 1 3 1 petitioners termed the militia law "oppressive" and asked the Assembly,
"would not a muster once in every two or three months serve every purpose [?]"
Conversely, many militia officers pressured the legislature to require frequent musters,
arguing that they were necessary to keep the militia well trained. In 1 823 , after the
Assembly had reduced the number of company musters to two per year, thirty officers of
the Seventeenth Regiment (Wilson County) asserted that at least four per year were
needed, otherwise "what is learned at the one is lost long preceding the next muster."43
The volunteer militia companies usually operated under the same rules as the
regular companies. The volunteer militi a was not a separate system from the regular
militia. The very first militiamen in Tennessee were volunteers, who during the early
settlement years formed themselves into loosely organized groups. Governor John Sevier
recognized the existence of volunteer companies in his 1 797 address to the General
Assembly. The 1 799 militia Jaw did not expressly recognize volunteer companies. When
they were formally recognized in the 1 803 revision, they were required to operate under
the same rules as the regular militia. Under the 1 803 law each regiment could raise a

Chapter 5 1 ( 1 84 1 ).
43Citizens of Greene County, Tennessee, to the General Assembly, 2 1 - 1 8 1 5- 1
(September 1 8 1 5), RG 60 Petitions, TSLA; officers of the Seventeenth Regiment of
Tennessee Militia to the General Assembly, box 5 5 , folder 5 ( 1 823), RG 60
(unprocessed), TSLA.
53

volunteer company of light infantry. The law authorized the regimental field officers to
appoint men to raise such a company, which was to contain between thirty and sixty
privates and was authorized to elect its own officers. In 1 807 the legislature authorized a
company of volunteer riflemen to be raised in each county, to consist of between forty
and sixty privates.44
Militia laws indicate subtle but important differences between the volunteer
militia and the regular mi litia. Volunteer privates were required to have uniforms, but the
laws never required uniforms for regular militia privates. Thus, it is likely that volunteers
were wealthier than regulars. The 1 803 militia law revision dictated that each private in
the volunteer light infantry wear a blue coat laced with white, a round hat with one side
turned up, and "white small clothes." The Assembly allowed the volunteer riflemen to
choose their own uniforms. In 1 8 1 1 the Assembly granted the same privilege to the
volunteer light infantry, but stipulated that the uniforms must be different from those of
rifle companies in the same regiment. In 1 8 1 5 , the legislature revoked the right of the
volunteer light infantry and riflemen to choose their own uniforms and instead established
uniforms for both groups. Riflemen were to wear a long black hunting shirt and
pantaloons, fringed with yellow, and a round cap. In the cap, officers were to have a red
plume and all others a black plume. Light infantrymen were to wear a blue hunting shirt,
pantaloons, and a round cap, also with red plumes for officers and black plumes for
others. In 1 8 2 1 , the Assembly rejected a bill to grant the companies the right once again

44Ibid. , Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803); ibid. , Seventh
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 0 1 ( 1 807).
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to choose their own uniforms. That same year a larger militia bil l passed the Assembly
that included that provision.45
Although the choice of uniforms may appear trivial , volunteers considered it
important. A rifle company from the Eleventh Regiment (Sevier County) complained in
1 82 1 that the uniforms were "inconvenient, unsoldierlike, and too much resembling the
dress of the aborigians [sic] of this county." The men requested permission to choose
their own uniform that would be "calculated to [display] the military pride which is so
necessary in every soldier." Other volunteers expressed similar sentiments. In the 1 826
militia law revision the Assembly once again established a standard uniform for
volunteers. However, the law went one step further by allowing volunteer companies to
make independent uniform requests. From that time until the demise of the militia
system, volunteer companies regularly requested and received unique uniform
privileges. 46
Volunteer companies required more dedication and resources from their members
than regular companies. However, from the earliest days volunteer companies enjoyed

45Ibid., Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803); ibid., Seventh
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 0 1 ( 1 807); ibid. , Ninth General Assembly,
First Session, Chapter 93 ( 1 8 1 1 ) ; ibid., Eleventh General Assembly, First Session,
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46Volunteer Rifle Company o f the Eleventh Regiment to the Tennessee General
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wide popularity. Until after the Mexican War, volunteer units, their members exempt
from regular militia duty, never lacked for enlistments. By the 1 820s nearly every
regiment in the state contained at least one volunteer company. Between 1 80 1 and 1 833,
the General Assembly officially recognized twenty-three volunteer companies, but
ancillary records identify many more. By 1 8 1 5 participation in the volunteer militia had
become so popular that the legislature prohibited any man from leaving a regular
company to join a volunteer company if doing so would reduce his regular company to
fewer than sixty-four men. In 1 820, the Assembly reduced this number to sixty. Also in
1 8 1 5 , the Assembly required all privates in the volunteer infantry to serve a minimum of
fi ve years. In 1 827 volunteer companies were required to muster four times per year,
instead of the two times required of the regulars. In that year too, volunteer companies
were prohibited from exceeding one hundred men. The Assembly also rejected a bi ll to
allow any volunteer company to be formed provided it contained forty men. Clearly the
Assembly was concerned about the popularity of the volunteer companies and was
committed to controlling volunteer enlistment numbers within the regimental structure of
the militia system.47
In 1 827 the legislature did permit the volunteer companies in the Fourth, Fifth,
and Ninth brigades to form themselves into three independent volunteer regiments. Each
company in these regiments had to contain at least forty men, to be uniformed and

47Ibid., Eleventh General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 1 8 ( 1 8 1 5); ibid. ,
Thirteenth General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 3 1 ( 1 820); ibid., Eleventh
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 1 8 ( 1 8 1 5); ibid., Sixteenth General Assembly,
Extra Session, Chapter 1 8 ( 1 827); Tennessee General Assembly, "A Bill to Amend the
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equipped in a "handsome military manner." The Assembly stipulated that these volunteer
regiments be governed by the same rules as the regular militia. In addition to these new
volunteer regiments, three volunteer arti llery companies were created. These three were
formed in Shelbyville in 1 822, and Paris and McMinnville in 1 827.48
Volunteer companies enjoyed unique privi leges to reward their extra dedication
to the military needs of the state. Some companies were granted the right to draw up their
own by-laws and, more importantly, to collect their own fines. The fines were for the
exclusive use of the company. In 1 840 the Assembly extended the pri vilege to collect
fines to all volunteer companies.49
A greater privilege extended to the volunteer companies was the exclusive use of
state arms. The state held a very limited number of weapons and other military items, and
thus distributed them with great care. In 1 8 1 2 the General Assembly passed a law
dividing the arms between the two divisions then existing. The major generals were to
distribute them equally among the various regiments, only one company per regiment
being eligible to receive them. The company in each regiment was to be chosen by lot.
This regulation was revised in 1 82 1 to require that public arms be distributed exclusively
among uniformed volunteer companies. The company captains were to give bond for the

48Acts ofthe State of Tennessee, Seventeenth General Assembly, Private Acts,
Chapter 1 36 ( 1 827); ibid. , Sixteenth General Assembly, Extra Session, Chapter 1 8
( 1 827); ibid., Fourteenth General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 2 1 4 ( 1 822); ibid.,
Sixteenth General Assembly, Extra Session, Chapter 1 89 ( 1 827); ibid., Seventeenth
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 3 1 ( 1 827).
49Ibid., Twenty-third General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 56 ( 1 840).
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safekeeping of the weapons. 5°
This second law fai led to stipulate the manner of choosing which volunteer
companies received the guns, an omission corrected in an 1 826 law granting the governor
the power to choose. The next year, the Assembly further defined the procedure of arms
distribution . The weapons were to be held in the care of the quartermaster general , who
was to distribute them to volunteer companies on the governor' s orders. The governor
would then call on one of the two state treasurers to pay expenses associ ated with the
distribution. In an 1 83 1 law the General Assembly required any company with arms to
attain certification by its regimental colonel that they were being properly maintained. 5 1
The General Assembly did not neglect the cavalry when enacting militia law . All
cavalry members were volunteers. The 1 798 law called for the raising of one cavalry
company per county, a requirement changed the next year to one per regiment. Thus,
each county might now host more than one cavalry company. In the 1 803 mi litia law
revision, the General Assembly further defined cavalry regulations. The various cavalry
companies in each brigade were to comprise one cavalry regiment, commanded by a
lieutenant colonel, and the regiment was to hold muster each fall . As with the infantry,
each regimental muster was to be followed by a courts martial . Each cavalry company
was to muster three times per year and also attend musters of their infantry counterparts.

50Ibid., Ninth General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 3 1 ( 1 8 1 2); ibid. ,
Fourteenth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 55 ( 1 82 1 ) .
5 1 Ibid., Sixteenth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 6 9 ( 1 826); ibid. ,
Nineteenth General Assembly, First Session , Chapter 72 ( 1 83 1 ).
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All other appropriate militia regulations applied to cavalry companies. 52
Requiring every cavalry company in a brigade to muster at a central location was
difficult for many members, and in 1 807 the Assembly dropped the requirement.
However, it was reinstated in 1 809. In that year, the Assembly also required cavalry
regiments to divide themselves into two squadrons, each squadron to muster every fall .
In 1 8 1 1 the Assembly reduced the regimental muster requirement to every other year, but
in 1 8 1 2 reversed itself, re-establishing the once-per-year requirement. It also increased to
four the number of company musters, but ended squadron musters. In 1 8 1 5 cavalry
company musters were reduced to three per year. 53
The General Assembly never placed significant restrictions on membership in
cavalry companies; the company captain received all requests for membership, and he
held the power to accept or reject such requests. Nevertheless, the Assembly did consider
cavalry membership a serious obligation. In 1 8 1 2 , it prohibited cavalry privates from
withdrawing from their company without permission from a courts martial. In 1 826, it
required cavalry privates to serve at least five years. The same requirement had been
placed on the volunteer infantry companies in 1 8 1 5 . Although the cavalry companies,
like the volunteer infantry, were eligible to receive state arms, the state did not own

52Ibid., Second General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 798); ibid. , Third
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 42 ( 1 799); ibid. , Fifth General Assembly, First
Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803).
53Ibid., Seventh General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 0 1 ( 1 807); ibid. ,
Eighth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 89 ( 1 809); ibid., Ninth General
Assembly, First Session, Chapter 93 ( 1 8 1 1 ) ; ibid., Ninth General Assembly, Second
Session, Chapter 78 ( 1 8 1 2); ibid., Eleventh General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 1 8
( 1 8 1 5).
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horses or equestrian equipment. This effecti vely restricted cavalry participation to men of
means. The law required members not properly equipped to be fined. The additional
muster responsibilities further restricted cavalry membership to the wealthier citizens of
the state.54
Cavalry companies received the same privileges enjoyed by the volunteer infantry
companies. In 1 8 1 5 the General Assembly granted cavalry companies the right to choose
their uniforms, the onl y condition being that they be blue. The Assembly also granted in
1 8 1 5 a more important and far-reaching cavalry privilege, stipulating that when called
into service the cavalry units were to be commanded by their own officers.55
The militia laws spelled out the duties of all militia officers. Unlike other aspects
of the system, the duties of officers changed little over time. On the company level , the
1 803 militia law was the most important enactment. Under its provisions the captain was
the commanding officer of the company and the only company officer with specific duties
assigned to him by the law. In addition to training and disciplining the men at company
muster, the law required him keep accurate records of the strength and condition of his
company, and produce a report for the regimental colonel once a year. The law also
required the captain to accept new members into his company, oversee discharges, and
read the militia law to his men once a year. The 1 798 law requiring a captain to divide
his company into ten groups for rotation during active service was changed by the 1 803

54Ibid. , Ninth General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 28 ( 1 8 1 2); ibid., Ninth
General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 78 ( 1 8 1 2); ibid., Sixteenth General
Assembly, First Session, Chapter 69 ( 1 826).
55Ibid., Eleventh General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 1 8 ( 1 8 1 5).
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law : now it was four groups instead of ten. The 1 8 1 5 revision further required the captain
to divide his men into groups based on tours of duty. In the event a company was called
into active service, men not having previously served a tour were to comprise the first
group. The 1 8 1 5 revision also assigned company lieutenants and ensigns the
responsibility to assist the captains in the exercising and disciplining of the men during
musters.56
Responsibility for drilling and training the men during regimental musters fell to
the regimental colonel. He was also responsible for keeping all regimental records and
sending reports to his brigadier general . Although expected to dril l and train his regiment
on muster day, the colonel was not officially assigned this duty until 1 8 1 5 . He was never
required to train the men alone, but rather shared this duty with various other officers. In
1799 the General Assembly instructed the regimental colonels to appoint one regimental
major to attend each muster and to assist in the training of the men. The maj or was also
to share responsibility for training at the battalion muster. The 1 803 law required the
brigade major, also known as the brigade inspector and appointed by the brigadier
general, to attend the various regimental musters and to inspect and train the men. For
such duty he was to be compensated by the state. The General Assembly relieved the
brigade major of this obligation in 1 8 1 7 and assigned the responsibility to the regimental
adjutant. In 1 824 the Assembly granted the regimental colonel the right to choose his

561bid., Second General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 798). Ibid., Fifth
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803); Ibid., Eleventh General Assembly,
First Session, Chapter 1 1 8 ( 1 8 1 5).
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own assi stant for training the men. 57
The adj utant in each regiment had an important role in all aspects of its operation.
Appointed by the colonel, the adjutant worked as an administrative assistant. In this
capacity he assisted the colonel with keeping all regimental records and submitting all
reports. He assisted the brigade major in battalion drills and assisted, officially or
unofficially, at regimental drills. The 1 8 1 2 law required the adjutant to attend muster for
each company in the regiment at least once per year.58
The duties of the militia general s were largely clerical. The law required them to
maintain all necessary records and produce the annual reports on their brigades. They
were permitted to appoint their own staff officers to assist them. Brigadier generals were
required to attend muster for each regiment at least once every two years for the
inspection of the troops. The major generals' responsibilities regarding their divisions
were very similar to those of the brigadier generals, but major generals were not required
to attend musters.59
The state adjutant general, appointed by the governor, assisted the governor in all
clerical and operational functions of the state militia system. He received and processed
all reports regarding the strength and condition of the militia, and he issued all orders

57Ibid., Eleventh General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 3 ( 1 8 1 5); ibid. , Third
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 22 ( 1 799); ibid., Fifth General Assembly, First
Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803); ibid. , Twelfth General Assembly, First Session , Chapter 1 20
( 1 8 17); ibid., Fifteenth General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 7 ( 1 824).
58Ibid., Ninth General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 28 ( 1 8 1 2).
59Acts of the State of Tennessee, Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter
( 1 803).
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given by the governor. He was responsible for producing the annual report on the
strength and condition of the mi litia, which the governor presented to the General
Assembly.60
Six other positions in the militia system merit di scussion. The quartermaster
general, appointed by the governor, supervised the safekeeping and administration of the
public arms. The law charged him with distributing these arms to approved companies
and maintaining armament records. The quartermaster sergeant functioned as the
regimental counterpart to the quartermaster general. The law required each regiment to
have a judge advocate, who directed all courts martials. The regimental drum and fife
major trained his unit' s musicians. This officer attended musters and received payment
for his services. The surgeon and the surgeon' s mate satisfied the medical needs of the
regiment. The law said little about these two positions except that both men were to
attend muster.61
All officers, regular and volunteer, were required to attend muster in uniform,
with arms and other necessary equipment. However, in 1 839, the Assembly lifted this
requirement for captains and their subalterns. Unless specific exceptions had been
granted, officers' uniforms were to be the same as the officers' uniforms in the United

60 1 796 Constitution of the State of Tennessee in Francis Thorpe, ed. Federal and
State Constitutions, 6: 34 14-3425 ; Acts of the State of Tennessee, Fourth General
Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 80 1 ).
6 1Acts of the State of Tennessee, Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1
( 1 803).
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States Army.62
The law furthermore required officers to attend drill muster for their own training.
In 1 80 1 , the General Assembly mandated that all regimental officers attend a drill muster
the day before the regimental muster and imposed a ten dollar fine on absentees. In 1 803
it revised this stipulation, requiring officers in infantry regiments to meet the Monday
preceding regimental muster to be drilled by the brigade major; a fi ve dollar fine was
levied on any officer absent or unarmed. In 1 8 1 7 the Assembly relieved the bri gade
major of the job of drilling and assigned this responsibility to the regimental adj utant. An
1 826 law required a drill muster the day before the spring battalion muster, to be overseen
by the regimental adj utant. That law also required a once-per-year county drill, under the
supervision of the brigade major, to take place at the county courthouse. This drill was
abolished three years later, but then reinstated in 1 838. In 1 84 1 the Assembly abolished
the spring battalion muster and the battalion dri ll .63
The election of officers reflected the democratic spirit that permeated the
Tennessee militia system. The 1 796 Constitution required company and regimental
officers to be elected by their respective militiamen. Generals were to be elected by field
officers. The General Assembly specified the election process in 1 803. Company

62Ibid., Twenty Third General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 56 ( 1 839).
63Ibid., Fourth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 80 1 ); ibid., Fifth
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803); ibid. , Twelfth General Assembly,
First Session, Chapter 1 20 ( 1 8 17); ibid. , Sixteenth General Assembly, First Session,
Chapter 69 ( 1 826); ibid., Eighteenth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 17 ( 1 829);
ibid. , Twenty-second General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 57 ( 1 838); ibid.,
Twenty-fourth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 5 1 ( 1 84 1 ).
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elections were to be supervised by three judges appointed by the county sheriff. These
men were to report the results to the regimental colonel, who in tum reported them to the
governor. The candidate with the most votes was to be declared the winner and was to be
granted the commission. The winning candidate did not need to receive a true majority to
win, only a plurality. In the event of a tie the election judges would cast the deciding
vote. The law required that regimental officers be elected in a similar manner. The
county sheriff w as to advertise regimental elections thirty days beforehand and the polls
were to remain open for two days. In the event of a tie the sheriff was to cast the deciding
vote. The 1 836 law required the sheriff to advertise company elections ten days in
advance .. 64
Elections for brigadier generals were to be advertised for forty days prior to the
vote, and polling w as to take place throughout the bounds of the brigade. In the event of
a tie, the winner was to be decided by lot. Maj or generals were elected in a similar
manner, with all field officers and brigadier generals eligible to vote. The votes were to
be counted by the governor in the presence of the secretary of state. In the event of a tie,
the governor was to cast the deciding vote. Tennessee' s new Constitution of 1 835
empowered all militiamen to vote for generals. The militia law reflected this change in
1 836. 65

641bid. , Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803); ibid. , Twenty
first General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 2 1 ( 1 836).
65Ibid., Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803); ibid., Twenty
first General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 2 1 ( 1 836); 1 835 Constitution ofthe State
of Tennessee, Article VIII , Section 1 , in Francis Thorpe, ed. Federal and State
Constitutions, 6: 3437.
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In 1 803 the General Assembly required all elected officers to serve three-year
terms; they were not permitted to resign except for reasons of hardship. In 1 8 1 5 the
Assembly lengthened the term of service to five years for commissioned officers and
reduced it to two years for non-commissioned officers. In 1 836 the term limit was again
altered, requiring regimental officers to serve six years. Also at this time the Assembly
set the term of office for generals at eight years, but permitted them to resign after five.
All vacancies were to be decided by a special election held under generally the same rules
as standard elections. Disputed elections were to be decided by a courts martial .66
A final matter addressed in the militia laws was militia justice. A variety of
different courts martials was used to administer fines and resolve disputes. The 1 797
militia law defined the basic structure of the company, battalion, and regimental courts
martials, and this structure changed little over the course of the antebellum era. In all
three cases the courts martial took place the day after muster and resolved admini strative
issues and administered fines.67
Special courts martials could be called to resolve significant issues, notably for the
trial of high-ranking officers accused of misconduct. These could be called at all levels
of the militia structure. The general courts martial was the highest special militia court.
Called into session by the governor, it consisted of a major general , who acted as the
presiding officer, and twelve other field officers, two of whom were to be brigadier

66Acts ofthe State of Tennessee, Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1
( 1 803); ibid., Eleventh General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 3 ( 1 8 1 5); ibid. , Twenty
first General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 2 1 ( 1 836).
67Ibid., Second General Assembly, Second Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 797).
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generals. The di visional courts martial , presided over by a brigadier general, consisted of
the presiding general and twelve other field officers, two of whom were to be colonels .
The brigade courts martial , also presided over b y a brigadier general , was the lowest-level
special militia court. It consisted of the presiding brigadier general and twelve field
officers, one of whom was to be a colonel. When special courts martials were called, the
court officials and the witnesses were to be compensated for their efforts.68
The levying and collecting of fines constituted a small but contentious section of
Tennessee militia law. Men could be fined on the company, battalion, or regimental
level. In 1 803 the General Assembly stipulated that a sergeant in each company was to
collect all fines. He was to pass this money to the judge advocate, who in tum was to
deposit it with the regimental colonel. The colonel was to use these funds to purchase
arms and equipment. In 1 8 1 5 the Assembly reassigned the duty of collecting fines to the
county sheriff, a move that drew loud criticism. One group of petitioners in 1 8 2 1 asked
the Assembly to appoint a provost marshal or some other military official to collect fines,
arguing that allowing the sheriff to do so combined the civil and military tribunals of the
state, and was thus inappropriate. The Assembly in 1 823 again altered the collection
procedure, requiring the company captains to collect fines. In 1 826 it reversed course,
directing the sheriffs once again to collect militia fines. Because collecting fines required
extra work, the collection agents were to be compensated for their efforts.69

68Ibid., Eleventh General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 3 ( 1 8 1 5).
69Ibid. , Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 803); ibid., Eleventh
General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 3 ( 1 8 1 5); unidentified petitioners to the
Tennessee General Assembly, 1 74- 1 82 1 - 1 ( 1 82 1 ), RG 60 Petitions, TSLA; Acts of the
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The laws governing the Tennessee militia system were similar to those of other
states. They embodied the basic tenet of the militia ideal : that citizen soldiers could, with
proper training and leadership, provide for the common defense without threatening the
liberties of the populace. Although some historians have argued that America' s militia
system was inefficient and inept, Tennessee militia laws created a system that state
lawmakers considered worthy and dependable. State laws also reflect the changing needs
of the state throughout the antebellum era. Prior to 1 830 militia matters were of great
importance and consumed a sizeable portion of legislative time and effort. There were
myriad laws enacted and numerous bills, petitions, special requests, and correspondence
considered by committees and by the legi slature as a whole. After 1 830 the General
Assembly paid considerably less attention to the militia, focusing instead on i ssues such
as schools, internal improvements, trade, and banking. Little militia legislation appeared
after 1 845. The General Assembly abolished all muster requirements in 1 857, thus
turning the militia into a paper organization. The details of the abolition of the militia
will be discussed in chapter fi ve.70
It is important to note that although militia laws clearly defined the system' s
organization and operation, those laws do not reflect how ardently or casually the citizensoldier of early Tennessee followed those regulations. The laws reflect what the militia
was envisioned to be, not what it actually was. They do, however, provide a starting

State of Tennessee, Fifteenth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 6 1 ( 1 823); ibid.,
Sixteenth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 69 ( 1 826).
7 0Acts of the State a_{ Tennessee, Thirty-second General Assembly, First Session,
Chapter 32 ( 1 857).
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point for examining the system, a system that for seventy-five years played a significant
role in the state ' s development.
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Chapter III
A Tool for Survival: The Militia During the Pioneer Years

The Tennessee pioneers of the early 1 770s accepted a tremendous risk when
moving into what was then Indian territory. Not only did these families face the typical
hardships associated with establishing homes in a wilderness, but i mmediately on arrival
they also faced hostilities with the Indians. Defense was a top priority, and militi a
participation became an established and necessary part of life.
In 1 763 , immediately after the French and Indian War, King George III issued a
decree prohibiting migration of colonial subjects west of the Appalachian crest. This
territory included the vast area that would become Tennessee. Some colonists ignored
the proclamation, the fertile lands west of the seaboard settlements being an irresistible
lure for the land-hungry. A proclamation from a distant monarch could not stop the tide
of migration. In 1 768 the dominant Indian tribes in the region, notably the Cherokee,
signed with the colonists the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, which ceded the Indians' claim to
much of what is today East Tennessee. Two years later, at Lochaber, South Carolina, the
Cherokee ceded even more land. 1

1James G. M. Ramsey, The Annals of Tennessee to the End of the Eighteenth
Century Comprising Its Settlement, as the Watauga Association, from I 769 to 1 777; a
Part of North- Carolina, From 1 777 to 1 788; the State of Franklin, From 1 784 to 1 788; a
Part of North- Carolina, From 1 788 to 1 790; the Territory of the U. States South of the
Ohio, From 1 790 to 1 796; the State of Tennessee, From 1 796 to 1 800 (Charleston:
Walker and James, 1 85 3 ; reprint, Kingsport, Tennessee: Kingsport Press, 1 926), 7 1 ;
Archibald Henderson, The Conquest of the Old Southwest (New York: The Century
Company, 1 920), 1 9 1 -92; The State Records of North Carolina (30 vol s . , Winston, North
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These treaties resulted in a wave of white settlement into the Tennessee territory.
Over the next few years four distinct settlements emerged. One was north of the Holston
River centered around a place known as Long Island, near present-day Kingsport; the
second was the Watauga settlement, near present-day Elizabethton; the third was in
Carter' s Valley, near present-day Rogersville; and the fourth was the Nollichucky
settlement, near present-day Erwin. Settlers generally ignored treaty boundaries. Three
of these settlements were beyond the lines set by the treaties of Fort Stanwix and
Lochaber. Only the Long Island settlement was located within the agreed-upon
boundaries.
Recognized borders and centralized governments allowed the eastern colonies to
codify militia laws. Procedures for commissioning officers, orders of battle, and day-to
day military operations were consistent throughout each colony. In the Tennessee
territory, however, the lack of clearly defined boundaries and the extreme isolation
required mi litias to operate independent of a central command. Military decisions were
made by local communities and their officers. These officers held official ranks in the
militias of either Virginia or North Carolina. Because there was no colonial law under
which Tennessee militias functioned, membership participation was informal, but
expected. Virtually every able-bodied man belonged to the militia. As portions of
Tennessee became a part of North Carolina, that state brought the existing communities
under the umbrella of its militia laws. However, local communities continued to exercise
a great degree of autonomy.

Carolina: M.I. and J.C. Stewart, 1 896- 1 907), 4: 3 14.
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The settlers of the four early Tennessee settlements had no illusions regarding the
potential for military conflicts with the Indians. It is no coincidence that the founders and
leaders of each community were men with military experience. These seasoned leaders
began military preparations on arrival , and they and their families played a crucial role in
the militi a establishment of Tennessee. The North Holston settlement was led by the
Shelby family. Its head was Evan Shelby, a native of Wales who had emigrated to the
colonies as a teenager in 1735. Shelby served as a captain during the French and Indian
War. At North Holston he served as a colonel in the Virginia militia until 1 779, when a
new boundary line placed North Holston in North Carolina. North Carolina promoted
Shelby to the rank of general ; he was the first man to carry that rank in the region.
Shelby ' s son, Isaac, also played an i mportant role both as a community leader and as a
militiaman. When the Shelbys moved to North Holston, the state of Virginia
commissioned Isaac a lieutenant in the militi a. During the 1 770s Isaac engaged in a
variety of militia activities and rose through the ranks. He also served as a member of the
Virginia legislature. In 1 779, when the new boundary placed his residence in North
Carolina, that state commissioned him a colonel. He helped organize the county of
Sullivan, and during the 1780s he led militiamen against the British as well as the Creek
and Cherokee Indians and served in the North Carolina legislature. He eventually settled
in Kentucky and became that state' s first governor. He led Kentucky troops during the
W ar of 1 8 1 2 , and in 1 8 1 8 President James Monroe offered him the post of Secretary of
War, which he declined. Three of Evan Shelby ' s other sons (Evan Jr. , Moses, and
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James) also participated actively in the militia.2
The founder and early leader of the Carter' s Valley settlement was John Carter.
Details of Carter' s past are few, but he was well educated and probably from a prominent
Virginia family. He almost certainly had a military background. Soon after spearheading
the Carter' s Valley settlement he moved to the Watauga area, where in 1 772 he chaired a
committee of five men designated by the settlers to oversee local government based on
the laws of Virginia. In 1 776 the people living south of the Holston River applied to
North Carolina for annexation as the Washington District, and they appointed Carter to
the rank of colonel in the local militia.3
Jacob Brown, a native of South Carolina, founded the Nollichucky settlement. In
1 776 the people of Washington District appointed him a militia colonel, and during the
Revolutionary War he served as a captain and a major. In 1 7 8 5 he was killed in a hunting
accident.4
James Robertson was the principal founder of Watauga, the most prominent of the
four original Tennessee settlements . Robertson was born in 1 742, and lived in both
Virginia and North Carolina before moving to the Tennessee frontier in 1 770. Along
with John Carter, he served as a member of the five-man committee that oversaw the

2Moore and Foster, Tennessee the Volunteer State, 1 769- 1 923, 4: 230; Lyman C.
Draper, King 's Mountain and It 's Heroes: History of the Battle of King 's Mountain,
October 7th, 1 780, and the Events Which Led To It (Cincinnati : Peter G. Thompson,
1 88 1 ; reprint, Marietta: Continental Book Company, 1 954), 4 1 5- 1 6.
3Moore and Foster, Tennessee the Volunteer State, 2 : 86; Ramsey, Annals of
Tennessee, 106- 107, 145 .
4Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 145 ; Draper, King 's Mountain, 424.
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local Watauga government in its early years. During the 1 770s he served as a militia
captain in campaigns against the Indians, but spent later years as an Indian agent, and
even briefly li ved among them. In 1 780 he helped found Nashville, and eventually
became a militia colonel for the newly-created Mero District. In the 1 780s North
Carolina promoted Robertson to brigadier general , and he remained active as a militia
leader well into the 1 790s. Robertson ' s brother, Charles, also migrated with him to the
Tennessee frontier and played an active role in the mi litia.5
Through the 1 770s most settlers in the Tennessee territory resided in or near one
of the four main settlements, but in the 1780s settlement began to expand beyond these
areas. Settlers created towns and carved counties out of the frontier. The earliest
Tennessee counties were very large, but they were divided as their population grew. As
with the four early settlements, men with military backgrounds founded the early towns
and counties. These same men became the early territorial and state leaders. With Indian
hostilities a regular component of pioneer life, military preparation was always a high
priority.
The founding of Watauga demonstrates the role of military men in creating early
Tennessee settlements. In 1 769, following the treaty of Fort Stanwix, a small number of
settlers moved to this region near the Watauga River. James Robertson spent a brief
period there in early 1770, and returned later in the year with a group of families to form a
permanent settlement. The Watauga settlement was not technically within the boundary
of either North Carolina or Virginia, and thus in 1 772 the settlers created the Watauga

5Moore and Foster, Tennessee the Volunteer State, 2: 223-24.
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Association, which was to be the basi s of local government. The settlers elected thirteen
commi ssioners, eight of whom, including John Sevier and James Robertson, can be
identified as militia leaders. Sevier, Robertson, Charles Robertson, Zachary Isabell, and
John Carter, all militia leaders, were chosen as the local court.6
When petitioned, the state of Virgini a refused to annex the Watauga Association
because of its distance from the established Virginia border. In August 1 776, the
Wataugans petitioned North Carolina for annexation. North Carolina accepted and the
region fell into that state ' s jurisdiction as the Washington District. The petition to North
Carolina was signed by 1 23 male Wataugans. Twelve of the original thirteen
commissioners, including the militia leaders, signed at the top. In the petition the
Wataugans discussed organizing themselves into a militia, electing officers, and posting
militiamen for protection . They also expressed loyalty to the revolutionary cause, and
pledged military assistance. The petition makes reference to militiamen then guarding the
settlement at outposts and most likely does not contain the names of those on active duty.
The petition nevertheless gives a glimpse into the military strength of the Wataugans and
demonstrates the militia' s prominence in the lives of early Tennessee settlers.7
Nashville is an example of a Tennessee town founded by military leaders. In
1 779 James Robertson led a few hundred settlers by land to a point in Middle Tennessee
known as French Lick, the site of present-day Nashvi lle. The settlers arrived in 1 7 80,
built a fort, and planted corn. Two oCRamsey, Annals of Tennessee, 107, 1 34-3 8 . her

6Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 1 07,
7Ibid., 1 3 8-39
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groups, led by John Donelson, a militia colonel, and John Blackmore, a captain, also
embarked for French Lick in 1 779, traveling by river. They arrived at French Lick in
1 7 80, months l ater than the Robertson party.8
In April 1 780 Richard Henderson, a Virginia militia colonel , arrived at the
settlement. Henderson had surveyed land in the Tennessee territory and was a close
associate of Robertson and Donelson. In May 1 780 the three men wrote the Cumberland
Compact, named for the Cumberland Valley where they were located. Signed by the 256
white male settlers, this document laid the foundation for the local government. The
militia provisions in the document made each male over sixteen liable for military
service, and gave the government the power to impress horses if necessary.9
When the Cumberland Compact was written, the settlement consisted of eight
sub-settlements, known as stations, which retained the right to elect their own officers.
At the center of each station the settlers built a fort, which could be used for protection
and community gatherings. Life for the early Nashville settlers was very harsh. Constant
Indian warfare intensified the difficult tasks of clearing and planting land, building
homes, and establishing a community. The Indians were still a problem in 1 783, when
North Carolina organized the region into Davidson County. 10

8"Early Account of French Lick Settlement," folder 5, John Haywood Papers,
TSLA; John R. Finger, Tennessee Frontiers: Three Regions in Transition (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 200 1 ), 82-83.
9Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 202; Moore and Foster, Tennessee the Volunteer
State, 1 : 1 09- 1 3 .
1 0 John Carr, Early Times in Middle Tennessee (Nashville: E. Stevenson and F.A.
Owen, 1 857; reprint, Nashville: Parthenon Press, 1 958), 7; Moore and Foster, Tennessee
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As was the case with the early settlements, military leaders assumed the civil
leadership in the early Tennessee counties. Sumner County, established about 1 7 8 5 ,
demonstrates this fact. The earliest records are o f its court i n 1 7 8 7 . The seven
magistrates were Daniel Smith, David Wilson, George Winchester, Isaac Lindsey,
Wi lliam Hall, John Gardin , and Joseph Keykendall. David Shelby was the county clerk.
Edward Douglass and Isaac Bledsoe were soon added as judges. All but Lindsey, Gardin ,
and Keykendall are known to have been mi litia officers. Sullivan County, established in
1 779, counted among its earliest leaders generals George Maxwell and George Rutledge,
and colonels David Looney and Isaac Shelby. Shelby served as justice of the peace as
well as colonel-commandant. After Tennessee became a U.S. territory in 1 790, Governor
William Blount appointed many militia officers to the county offices. For example, in
Washington County, created in 1 790, three of the four magistrates appointed by B lount
were militia officers, one of whom was Charles Robertson . ' '
Throughout the 1 770s, 1 7 80s, and 1 790s the Tennessee militia remained active in
military pursuits. Thus, positions of leadership in the militia were not merely ceremonial.
The militi a participated in a variety of campaigns against the Indians, notably against the
Creek and the Cherokee; and Tennessee militiamen fought in the American Revolution,
against both the British and the Indians. In most cases these men were led by the
"founding fathers" of Tennessee.
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The military acti vity of the militia during Tennessee' s early years fel l into four
general categories: minor and major Indian engagements, actions in the Revolutionary
War, and service as escorts or guards in hosti le and remote areas. Minor skirmishes with
Indian tribes occurred regularly in most Tennessee settlements until either the native
population was forced out of the area or its numbers were decimated. Minor skirmishes
required action by a single militia unit, and the muster duration was a few hours or days at
most. Maj or engagements involved multiple mi litia units mustered from several areas,
even from beyond Tennessee, and the musters could last several weeks or months.
Tennesseans also participated in campaigns beyond their own borders.
During the Revolutionary War Tennesseans served in various colonial military
organizations. As a cohesive unit the Tennessee militia fought in a variety of actions,
notably the battle of King' s Mountain. When the militiamen fought as a unit they were
usually led by their own senior officers.
Finally, Tennessee militiamen served as escorts for travelers and as guards in
frontier forts. As settlers traversed the region in the early years, militiamen often
protected them. For further protection militiamen occupied a variety of small forts and
blockhouses established along the main routes into the wilderness. S uch escort and fort
duty did not become a common occupation of the militia until the 1 790s, and in some
cases Tennessee militiamen shared this duty with federal troops.
The first notable military confrontation between Tennessee militiamen and
Indians occurred in 1 774. In fall 1 773 eighty settlers led by Daniel Boone traversed the
Cumberland Gap on their way to Kentucky. During this migration Shawnee Indians
79

attacked them, forcing a postponement in their journey. The next year violence erupted
throughout western Virginia between whites and Indians, most by Shawnee. The whites
were angry over the attack on Boone' s party; the Shawnee were angry over white
encroachment into what they considered their territory. This conflict became known as
Lord Dunmore's War and involved militiamen from many frontier regions. It lasted less
than a year, and ended in victory for the settlers. 12
When fighting began Evan Shelby raised a company of fifty men, and in August
1 774 the company joined a contingent of four regiments of colonial militiamen led by
General Andrew Lewis. Lewis was an experienced frontier fighter from the French and
Indian War. The men marched to the small settlement of Point Pleasant, Virginia, and on
October 1 0 a battle began when James Robertson and Valentine Sevier (a son of John
Sevier), while hunting, encountered a large body of Indian warriors. The resulting battle
of Point Pleasant became the decisive engagement of Lord Dunmore ' s War. 1 3
The battle was a hard-fought victory for the militiamen . When Robertson and
Sevier discovered the Indians, they fired at them and quickly retreated. The Indians then
advanced on the militiamen and the two sides clashed in a battle lasting the entire day.
Shelby' s company of Tennesseans played a crucial role. Toward evening Shelby' s son
Isaac, then a lieutenant, led the Tennesseans and two other companies behind the Indians
and attacked from the rear. Surprised and confused, the Indians retreated. Thi s bold
move made heroes of Evan and Isaac Shelby, as well as the other volunteers from the

1 2Henderson, Conquest of the Old Southwest, 203- 1 5 .
1 3Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 1 1 3- 16.
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Tennessee territory.14
The white victory in Lord Dunmore ' s War resulted in the Shawnee' s relinquishing
virtually all land claims in the Ohio River Valley. To the settlers living in the Tennessee
territory the results were far more personal. The conflict not only created the region ' s
first local heroes , but also gave the pioneers the opportunity to fight together as
Tennesseans. Participation in Lord Dunmore ' s War was a first step for Tennesseeans in
forming a regional identity.
The American Revolution began shortly after Lord Dunmore ' s War. When it
began, Tennessee settlers quickly declared loyalty to the revolutionary cause. The settlers
were anxious to rid themselves of British interference in their quest for more land.
Because North Carolina annexed most of the region in 1 776, Tennessee militiamen,
although in most respects autonomous, technically became members of the North
Carolina militia. 1 5
In spring 1 776 the settlers began military preparations. By this time the Carter' s
Valley, Nollichucky, and Watauga settlements had become unified, and residents
appointed John Carter and Jacob Brown militia colonels. Families on the westernmost
frontier withdrew and the militiamen began to reinforce the more remote forts.

1 4Ibid.
15Ibid., 145 ; Peter Force, ed., American Archives: Consisting of a Collection of
Authentic Records, State Papers, Debates, and Letters and Other Notices of Public
Affairs, the Whole Forming a Documentary History of the Origin and Progress of the
North American Colonies; of the Causes and Accomplishment of the American
Revolution; and of the Constitution of Government for the United States , to the Final
Ratification Therof (9 vols . , Washington : M. St. Clair Clarke, 1 837- 1 853), series 4, vol.
6: 1 535.
81

The settlers did not fear a British attack. Rather, they believed the British would
incite the Indians, who viewed the conflict as an opportunity to regain lost land. In May
the Tennesseans learned of a planned attack by six or seven hundred Indians, primari ly
Cherokee. Encouraged by the British, the Native Americans intended to drive the whites
from the frontier by attacking Watauga and North Holston simultaneously. The
Tennesseans intensified their military preparations and appealed to Virginia for
gunpowder and lead. Virginia sent modest quantities of both. Some one hundred
Virginia militiamen marched to North Holston, that settlement still being recognized as
within the boundary of Virginia. 16
On July 20, 1 776, the Indians attacked. At North Holston two hundred militiamen
had gathered for defense. Six captains, at least three of whom (James Shelby, John
Campbell , and William Cocke) were Tennesseans, Jed the combined Tennessee and
Virginia forces 17
The militiamen at North Holston were anxious to engage the Indians. In early
July they had assembled west of the main settlements at a small fort known as Heaton' s
Station. Fearing the Indians would bypass the fort and attack the less protected frontier
settlements, the men moved further west to seek out the enemy. On July 19 scouts for the
militiamen discovered a large number of Indian warriors near a place known as Island
Flats. The next morning the militia troops set out to meet the Indians. They first
encountered twenty of them, and attacked. The Indians fled and the militiamen pursued,

1 6Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 1 50-5 1 .
17Ibid., 1 52-55 .
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but halted after a short distance. Against the wishes of the rank and file, the militia
officers, influenced by Wi lliam Cocke, chose to return to Heaton ' s Station. Before the
men could return, the Indians attacked en masse. They attempted to surround the
militiamen but were unsuccessful, and the militiamen withdrew to a defensive position.
Believing the whites were in retreat, the Indians charged, only to be repulsed with heavy
casualties. The Indians then retreated. Although the battle lasted only ten minutes one
eyewitness estimated that the Indians suffered forty dead out of roughly two hundred
engaged. Only five militiamen were wounded, and none was killed. 18
Although the militiamen apparently fought bravely, battle accounts do not
mention any use of firearms by the Indians. This, along with the casualty figures and the
short duration of the battle, suggests that the militia engaged a poorly armed opponent.
Furthermore, there appears to have been little or no hand-to-hand fighting.
The whites also successfully repulsed an attack on the Watauga settlers. On July
20 the Cherokee advanced on a small fort west of Watauga known as Gillespie ' s Station.
The militiamen and settlers near the station had earlier withdrawn, along with other
settlers, to Fort Lee, near the center of the Watauga settlement. The following day
approximately two hundred Indians, some with firearms, attacked Fort Lee. In the fort
were approximately one hundred fifty settlers, including forty militiamen led by James
Robertson and John Sevier. After spending the day futilely attempting to the fort, the
Indians withdrew . They remained nearby in the woods, however, laying siege to the fort
for twenty days. North Holston sent one hundred militiamen to relieve the Watauga

18Ibid.
83

settlers, but they arrived after the Indians abandoned the siege. In the attack on Fort Lee
the settlers killed an unknown number of Indians; the whites suffered no casualties.
During the siege the Indians killed two militiamen and captured a boy, whom they later
executed. 19
Two smaller contingents of Indians attacked the Carter' s Valley settlement and
other settlements scattered through a region known as Clinch Valley. At Carter' s Valley
the settlers withdrew to a nearby fort and the Indians retreated without attacking. At
Clinch Valley the Indians split into small parties and destroyed as much white property as
possible. Most of the whites in Clinch Valley had withdrawn to the nearby forts, but a
few were attacked and killed?0
These Indian attacks were part of a much larger campaign encouraged by the
British and waged throughout the southwestern frontiers of the American colonies. The
colonists responded with a counteroffensive against the Cherokees. Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia agreed to coordinate their forces in subduing and
punishing the Cherokee. In July 1 776, before the Indian attacks on the Tennessee settlers,
the Virginia government had begun to muster a force of over one thousand to be
commanded by Colonel William Christian. Three hundred North Carolina militiamen
joined this contingent. The combined force marched to Long Island, and on September
2 1 met a small contingent of North Carolina militiamen at the newly constructed Fort

1 9Ibid., 1 56-58, 1 69.
20Ibid. , 1 59.
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Patrick Henry, situated on the bank of the Holston River.: "
A t Fort Patrick Henry the men engaged in minor fighting with Indians located in
the surrounding woods, and one militiaman was kil led. Soon the men in the fort were
joined by a small group of Tennessee militiamen under Evan Shelby. Colonel Christian
had information of a large body of Cherokee warriors in the vicinity, and on October 1 the
men left the fort to find them. The combined militia forces crossed the Holston near
Long Island, and within a few days were joined by two additional companies of
Tennessee militiamen under the command of James Robertson and John Sevier. The
further addition of three companies of Tennesseans recruited near Long Island brought
the total number of militiamen to eighteen hundred. The Tennesseans formed themselves
into a battalion under Evan Shelby but Christian retained overall command. During the
next few days the men moved forward into Cherokee territory, and at the Nolichucky
Ri ver found an abandoned Indian encampment. They continued to move forward,
expecting to engage the Indians at the French Broad River, but discovered that the Indians
had again withdrawn. The militiamen marched through the area of present day Maryville,
and crossed the Little Tennessee River on October 1 8 . Again they expected to engage the
enemy, but found their encampments abandoned. The Indians had retreated so quickly
that they left most of their supplies behind.22
By this point the Cherokee had become deeply divided over how to face the

2 1 Ibid., 1 66-69; "Report of Colonel Christian," Virginia Magazine of History, 1 7
( 1 909): 52-56.
22American Archives, series 5 , vol . 2: 540. Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 1 66-69.
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militiamen. Most feared severe retribution if they did not make peace. Knowing this,
Christian sent his men to destroy the villages led by hostile chiefs. These men met little
resistance, for most of the warriors were absent. The men made a special effort to destroy
the two villages responsible for the execution of the boy captured during the siege at
Watauga. In mid-November several Cherokee leaders negotiated peace with Christian.23
Not all of the Cherokee warriors agreed to end the hostility. A small contingent,
known as Chickamaugas and led primarily by Dragging Canoe (who had led the July
attack on North Holston and Watauga), continued to harass the settlers. In spring 1 777 a
number of minor incidents forced the militiamen to remain vigilant. In one instance
Chickamaugas shot and scalped a white settler. James Robertson and nine militiamen
pursued and engaged these attackers but were forced to retreat. The settlers believed that
most Cherokee did not support this guerrilla activity, and signed a formal peace treaty
with the main body of Cherokees in July 1 777. Under the terms of this treaty the
Cherokee agreed to live peacefully, promised to pursue those Cherokee that continued to
be hostile, and surrendered more land. Although the Cherokee were defeated and
demoralized, this treaty did not end hostilities. Rather, it prompted a new surge of white
settlement, which only increased tension between the two peoples.24
In spring 1 777 Tennesseans prepared stronger defenses. A contingent of Virginia
militiamen remained at Fort Patrick Henry. At Watauga, the settlers concentrated at two
locations, and the militia fell under the command of James Robertson. Four hundred

23Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 1 66-69.
24Ibid., 1 70-74.
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Tennessee militiamen under the command of Evan Shelby and Anthony Bledsoe (also a
Tennessean) were stationed further west.25
These increased defenses temporarily ended fighting between the Tennesseans and
the Indians, but the Tennessee militia remained active. In 1 777 Indians began to attack
white settlements in Kentucky. On July 4 two hundred assaulted Boonesborough and
thereafter surrounded in a siege that lasted unti l September. Twice East Tennesseans sent
militiamen to aid these Kentuckians, forty the first time and one hundred the second. It is
not known which militiamen participated in the Kentucky campaign; but when they
returned, their stories of fertile land to the west served as a catalyst for further white
migration and likely encouraged the settlement of Nashville.26
In East Tennessee, hostilities with the Indians temporarily abated after 1 777, but
in 1779 Virginia and North Carolina launched a maj or expedition against the
Chickamaugas, who had established five towns along the Holston River in what is today
the northeastern portion of the state. On April 1 0 three hundred fifty militiamen under
Evan Shelby and one hundred under Virginia colonel John Montgomery embarked down
the Holston in canoes to engage the Chickamaugas and destroy their towns. When they
reached the town of Chickamauga they encountered five hundred warriors. The warriors
fled and the militiamen pursued, killing forty. The militiamen then burned the towns, and

25Ibid.
26"Account of Events in Kentucky," Lyman Draper Papers, 48 J 1 2, Wisconsin
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returned home by land. 27
In 1 7 80 militiamen from Tennessee saw their first action against the British in the
Revolutionary War. In February of that year, North Carolina called for two hundred men
from the Tennessee territory to join a two-thousand-man campaign into South Carolina.
One hundred men were to come from Washington County and one hundred from the
newly-created Sullivan County. The officers of Washington County agreed to send the
men. Sullivan County did not act immediately because Isaac Shelby, colonel for the
county, was in Kentucky. Before Shelby could return to muster his men, the British
captured Charleston, and an urgent call went out for all available militi amen. When
Shelby returned on June 16, four hundred Tennesseans set out to rendezvous with a large
contingent of other southern militiamen under the command of North Carolina colonel
Charles McDowell. The Tennesseans were under the direct command of Shelby and
Major Charles Robertson. John Sevier remained in Tennessee to command the
militiamen guarding against Indians. The men under Shelby and Robertson arrived at
McDowell ' s camp, located along the Broad River in North Carolina, in late July.28
After capturing Charleston, the British, under the command of General Charles
Cornwallis, swept north through South Carolina. A contingent of Redcoats and Tories
mustered in Tryon County, North Carolina and marched south to join Cornwalli s ' s

27John Haywood, The Civil and Political History of the State of Tennessee From
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troops, pausing to capture Thickety Fort, a small patriot outpost. Learning of the fort ' s
fall , McDowell dispatched the Tennesseans, along with two hundred Georgians, to
reclaim it. The men surrounded the fort and, following negotiations conducted by future
Tennessee senator William Cocke, the fort surrendered without firing a shot.29
After this victory, McDowell sent the militiamen to observe the movements of
two thousand Tories under British colonel Patrick Ferguson. On August 1 a large number
of Ferguson ' s men attacked the militiamen at Cedar Spring. The militiamen repulsed the
loyalists who then retreated; the militiamen pursued for two miles. When reinforced, the
Tories resumed their attack. The militiamen retreated in the face of these superior
numbers and Ferguson pursued them for five miles. The militiamen ' s losses were ten or
twelve kil led or wounded?0
The final military action of this campaign occurred a few days after the fight at
Cedar Spring. McDowell sent three hundred mounted riflemen , many of them
Tennesseans, to join an American force for an attack on a contingent of Tories at
Musgrove' s Mill. Isaac S helby commanded the riflemen, who departed on August 1 7 .
The next day near Musgrove' s Mill the men encountered a patrol o f loyalists and fired on
them. Both sides quickly made preparations for battle. The Tories, commanded by
British Colonel Alexander Innis, had superior numbers and decided to attack the
militiamen. Shelby organized his men for defense on a ridge, where they hastily stacked

29Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 2 1 3 - 14.
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logs and brush as breastworks. A small contingent of militiamen moved forward of this
defensive line, and skirmished with the enemy. After thi s brief fight, the loyalists,
believing the militiamen ill-prepared, attacked. Wi lliam Smith, a militiaman from
Watauga, severely wounded colonel Innis as he topped the ridge. The momentum of the
battle shifted and the Tories retreated. The militiamen, sensing a decisive victory,
pursued, ki lling several British officers. The battle lasted roughly one hour, and the
militiamen lost only six or seven killed. The Tories, however, lost sixty-three killed,
ninety wounded, and seventy taken prisoner.31
Shelby and his subordinates hoped to remain in the area to engage more Loyalist
and British troops. However, when the Continental Army suffered a major defeat at
Camden, North Carolina, McDowell, fearing destruction by the advancing redcoats,
ordered the Tennesseans to go home. Colonel Ferguson pursued for more than forty-eight
hours and more than fifty miles, but the Tennesseans avoided capture. Later in life Isaac
Shelby wrote that during this retreat his men did not even stop to prepare meals . They
subsisted on green com and peaches. The Tennesseans also refused to release their
prisoners. By the end of the ordeal the men ' s faces and eyes were so bloated and swollen
that they could barely see.32
The most celebrated participation in the Revolutionary War by Tennessee
militiamen was the King ' s Mountain campaign. During the retreat from Ferguson ' s
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forces, Isaac Shelby concluded that the militiamen from Tennessee should try to join with
their North Carolina colleagues to stop Ferguson ' s advance. When the Tennesseans
arrived at Gilbert Town, near present-day Rutherfordton, North Carolina, Shelby
discussed this plan with Charles McDowell, who agreed. The Tennesseans were sent
home for the time being, however, for their commissions had expired.33
Ferguson and his forces proceeded largely unopposed into North Carolina, and he
made his headquarters at Gilbert Town . They pursued McDowel l and his men , who were
eventually forced to retreat to Watauga. This episode marked a low point for the patriot
cause in southern states. No significant concentration of patriot troops existed south of
Virginia, and the southern state governments were in turmoil . South Carolina governor
John Rutledge was even forced to operate in exile from Hillsborough, North Carolina.34
The Tennessee settlements, however, were still beyond Ferguson ' s grasp. On
October 4 he sent a message to Isaac Shelby demanding a surrender, stating that if the
Tennesseans did not "desist from their opposition to the British arms . . . he would march
his army over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay their country waste with fire and
sword." Although the Appalachians offered some protection, the Tennessee settlements
were not out of reach for the British. Among the loyalists in Ferguson' s command were
several Americans familiar with the routes through the mountains. Isaac Shelby and John
Sevier concluded that the settlers should take the offensive and attack Ferguson before he

33Samuel Cole Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary War (Nashville:
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34Ibid., 1 39-40.
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could reach Tennessee. They requested assistance from the militia of Washington
County, Virginia, then under Colonel William Campbell, and the Virginians agreed to
participate. Charles McDowell ' s force and other militia refugees from eastern North
Carolina also joined the campaign?5
The militia leaders assembled their men at Sycamore Shoals, in Watauga, on
September 25. A surge of patriotism swept the Tennesseans, and able-bodied men from
all over the region volunteered. When the muster day arrived an enormous crowd
gathered to celebrate. The force included four hundred Virginians under Campbell , four
hundred eighty Tennesseans under Shelby and Sevier, and one hundred sixty North
Carolinians under McDowell. Many more Tennesseans volunteered, but they were
required to remain behind to guard against Indians. The attack force departed the next
day and crossed the mountains to the east. On September 30 three hundred fifty North
Carolinians under Benjamin Cleveland joined them. 36
One problem faced by these forces was the lack of a commanding officer. They
had been assembled outside the direction of the Continental Army or any of the state
governments. The colonels elected William Campbell to command, and dispatched
Charles McDowell to meet with General Horatio Gates of the Continental Army for
further instruction. Gates never acted on the matter. Campbell remained in charge.37

35Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 223-28 ; Isaac Shelby, "Battle of King's
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State Records of North Carolina, 14: 663-64.
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Pursuing Ferguson was difficult. At one point the militiamen were forced to
change course after two of their number disappeared and were feared to be spies for the
British. Also, Ferguson moved rapidly throughout the region. On October 6 the
militiamen found Ferguson' s trail and began rapid pursuit. Learning he was positioned at
King' s Mountain, those best equipped pushed ahead of the main group. These men were
j oined shortly by four hundred militia under North Carolina colonel James Williams.
Once again the men divided themselves. Nine hundred of the best equipped traveled
throughout the night, arri ving at King' s Mountain on the morning of the October 7. Most
of the remaining militiamen arrived by noon .38
Ferguson chose King's Mountain (really a large hill) believing that atop it his men
would have a superior defensive position. The militiamen surrounded the hill and
attacked at three o' clock in four columns. The Tennesseans under John Sevier were on
the north side, those under Isaac Shelby on the south . The battle was ferocious; in many
cases smoke completely obscured the soldiers' vision. As the battle progressed, the
militiamen slowly closed their circle around the enemy. Ferguson ' s men frequently
charged the militiamen as they advanced up the hi ll. These charges failed to stop the
advance, and eventually the militiamen gained a foothold on the plateau. Against the
advice of his officers, Ferguson refused to surrender. When he concluded that defeat was
i mminent, he and several officers attempted to escape, but were shot and ki lled by John
Sevier' s men. After Ferguson' s death Captain Abraham DePeyster assumed command

38Wil liams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary War, 1 49-54; Draper, King 's
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and surrendered. 39
Ferguson ' s force was estimated between nine and eleven hundred strong, almost
all of them American loyali sts. The militiamen numbered about fifteen hundred,
including a few who arrived shortly after the battle. It is likely that all the Tennesseans
participated. Between one and two hundred of Ferguson ' s men were killed, the same
number were wounded, and approximately six hundred were taken prisoner. A few
escaped. An official report by William Campbell, Isaac Shelby and Benjamin Cleveland
stated that the militiamen suffered twenty-eight ki lled and sixty-two wounded. The most
prominent Tennessean killed was Robert Sevier, a captain and brother of John Sevier.40
The day after the battle the militiamen began to return home taking the prisoners
with them. The march was very difficult, as the men had little to eat and were slowed by
their wounded. At one point the militiamen insisted on a court martial for many of the
Tories, whom they accused of atrocities against Patriot families. Thirty or so were
convicted and sentenced to death, but after nine executions John Sevier and Isaac S helby
called an end to the affair.41
Once home the Tennesseans received a hero ' s welcome. As with Lord
Dunmore ' s War, the King's Mountain campaign gave the settlers an opportunity to act
together as Tennesseans, helping to create a distinct regional identity. For the remainder
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of their lives the King' s Mountain veterans were revered by their friends and neighbors,
and some used their fame to further social and political ambition .
The battle was an important victory for the struggling United States, forcing
Cornwallis to retreat back to South Carolina and reducing British support in the South.
Soon after the Tennesseans returned, American General Wi ll iam Davidson called on
western troops to assist in attacking Cornwallis as he retreated. The Tennessee militia
leadership agreed to send three companies, all from the Watauga. Davidson' s plan was
soon abandoned, however, and the Tennesseans never mustered.42
Immediately after the return from King's Mountain, hosti lities erupted between
whites and Cherokees. The Indians were angered by the unabated encroachment of white
settlers, and the British encouraged them to fight. Through traders, the settlers learned of
an impending attack. John Sevier wasted no time before calhng out the militia to subdue
thi s threat. In December two militia companies under Sevier's command, approximately
one hundred men, began moving southwest to strike the Cherokee before they could reach
the main white settlements. More were called up and were to fol low Sevier once they had
prepared. On the evening of December 1 4, while camped near the French Broad River,
militiamen discovered a party of Cherokee warriors camped nearby. They fired on them,
but then retreated. The next morning Sevier' s men were joined by more militiamen, and
the combined force crossed the river.43
On the morning of the December 1 6 the mil itiamen located the Cherokee and won

42Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary War, 1 8 1 .
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a swift victory. Sevier sent a small number of men forward to provoke an attack; they
then retreated, and when the Cherokee advanced they were met by the main body of
Sevier' s men. The militiamen quickly closed on the Indians from three sides, and after a
brief fight the Indians retreated. The militiamen killed twenty-eight Cherokee and
wounded an unknown number. Three militiamen were wounded, but none was killed.
This encounter became known as the battle of Boyd' s Creek.44
After the battle the men camped near the creek and on December 22 Colonel
Arthur Campbell, a relative of William Campbell, arrived with one hundred Virginia
militiamen. Also on that day, Major Joseph Martin , a Virginian and that state ' s agent to
the Cherokees, arrived with three hundred men from Sulli van County. On December 24
this combined force of seven hundred fifty men moved further into Indian territory. Over
the next several days the militiamen engaged in minor skirmi shes, burned several
Cherokee villages, and killed twenty-nine Cherokee while suffering no casualties of their
own . On January 1 , 1 7 8 1 they returned home.45
In March Sevier once again led an expedition against the Cherokee, this time
against those living near the Nolichucky River in what is today Greene County. One
hundred thirty men mustered and set out, eventually destroying between fifteen and
twenty villages and killing fifty warriors. One militiaman was killed and one wounded on
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45Ibid., 265-67 ; James Sevier, "Memoir of John Sevier," American Historical
Magazine 6 ( 1 90 1 ) : 4 1 -42.
96

this expedition.46
In July 1 7 8 1 the whites signed a second peace treaty with the Cherokee, but it had
little impact on the behavior of either side and in 1 782 violence again erupted. In
September Sevier assembled two hundred fifty militiamen at Big Island on the French
Broad River. They marched south, fought a brief, victorious battle against the
Chickamaugas at Lookout Mountain near present-day Chattanooga, and in early
November returned home.47
In 178 1 , as Sevier was leading the militiamen against the Cherokee, other
Tennesseans were once again confronting the British. Nathanael Greene, who had
assumed command from Horatio Gates, learned of a new Briti sh expedition into North
Carolina led by General Cornwallis. In early February the Tennessee settlers sent
between one hundred and one hundred thirty men to join Greene' s army. Major Charles
Robertson commanded these troops. On March 1 5 the two armies met at the battle of
Guilford Courthouse near what is today Greensboro, North Carolina. Greene
outnumbered Cornwallis, but Cornwallis had the advantage of commanding British
regulars. The British won the battle, but at a high cost: Cornwallis lost one quarter of his
two-thousand-man force. He had hoped to continue north into Virginia, but now found
his army too weak to do so. Thus, he retreated south to Wilmington.48
By mid- 1 78 1 the Americans patriots were on the verge of victory. The British had
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been driven out of most of the South, but they still held Charleston and some of northern
South Carolina, and they were being reinforced. On June 22 Nathanael Greene wrote
Isaac Shelby requesting one thousand riflemen. Once again the British had begun
marching north, and Greene hoped to stop them quickly. On July 29 seven hundred
mounted Tennessee militiamen set out for Greene' s camp, but stopped on August 3 , when
they received news that the British had begun to retreat toward Charleston. The
Tennesseans did not wish to march so far, and they feared a long campaign.49
On September 1 6 Greene once again wrote Shelby, informing him that the British
had been driven back to Charleston and were on the verge of defeat. At the same time,
Cornwallis was trapped at Yorktown, Virginia. Greene requested as many riflemen as
possible, and ordered them to march to Charlotte, North Carolina, where they could
intercept Cornwallis if he attempted to retreat south. Shelby and Sevier acted quickly,
raising six hundred men in two days. While marching to Charlotte, the men learned of
Cornwalli s ' s surrender at Yorktown, and they therefore marched into South Carolina and
joined with General Francis Marion to help defeat the remaining British forces in the
South . Near Charleston they joined a detachment of Marion ' s men marching on a nearby
British fort. The British surrendered only after Isaac Shelby threatened to kill every man
inside if they did not. One hundred fifty Briti sh soldiers near the fort also surrendered.
On their return to Marion ' s camp the men learned of a larger British force a few miles
away; Marion sent his troops to meet this force, but the Redcoats retreated without a
fight. The Tennesseans remained in South Carolina until their sixty-day commissions

49lbid., 2 1 7- 1 8 .
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expired. 5°
When the war ended in 1783 militia activity in East Tennessee temporarily
subsided, but tension between the Cherokees and settlers remained high. The increasing
encroachment of settlers on Cherokee land and the whites disregard of Cherokee
complaints fueled the unrest. In one instance in 1783 the North Carolina General
Assembly sought to buy the Cherokee land as far south as the French Broad River, but
then took the land before the Cherokees agreed to the purchase; the goods promised by
the state never arri ved, and the Cherokees were never compensated. By the 1780s the
boundary agreements between the Indians and the Tennessee settlers held little more than
symbolic value, as the whites practically ignored them. Settlers routinely established
homesteads well beyond the agreed-upon borders, and ignored Indian complaints.
Furthermore, in 1782 the North Carolina General Assembly gave generous land grants in
Tennessee to Revolutionary War soldiers, further increasing the number of whites in the
terri tory. 5 1
Immediately after James Robertson and other leaders established their settlement
at French Lick in Middle Tennessee, Indian hostilities began. By May 1 780 Indian bands
had killed several settlers. The settlers formed small groups of militiamen for defense
and constructed forts, but they could not prevent the attacks. Among those killed were
John Donelson and James Robertson ' s son, John, a militia captain. In 1 7 8 1 the Indians

50Isaac Shelby, "Report," in Williams, Tennessee During the Revolutionary War,
2 1 9-23.
5 1 State Records of North Carolina, 24: 420.
99

began attacking the settlers' forts in much larger numbers. By April of that year only
Eaton ' s Station and French Lick Fort remained. 52
A low point for the Middle Tennessee settlers came on April 4, when some two
hundred fifty Indians attacked French Lick Fort. Throughout the day the Indians attacked
but could not take the fort. The settlers lost six ki lled and two wounded, and the Indians
lost about forty killed. The next day the Indians attacked again, but failed to di slodge the
settlers.53
After the failed attacks on Eaton ' s Station and French Lick Fort the Indians of
Middle Tennessee began to wage a guerri lla war against the settlers. The settlers
responded with a well-armed and vigilant militia. Militiamen guarded settlers as they
worked in the fields, and escorted them as they traveled. Many settlers wished to
abandon the region, a move staunchly opposed by James Robertson, who dissuaded them
by appealing to their desire for the region ' s bountiful land. The presence of hostile
Indians along all passages out of the region also discouraged the settlers from leaving. 54
When the Revolutionary War ended in 1 783 a new influx of whites poured into
the Cumberland region, and in doing so established it as a permanent settlement. The
settlers signed a boundary treaty with the Chickasaws in January 1 786, but other tribes,
notably the Cherokee and Creek, declined to legitimate the settlers' presence. Small

52Carr, Early Times in Middle Tennessee, 1 3 ; Edward Swanson, "Narrative," folder
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skirmishes between settlers and the remaining Indians multiplied in 1 786, with dozens
kil led on both sides. The white leadership decided to mount a campaign against the
Cherokee and appealed to the North Carolina government for assi stance. It was at this
time that the state passed the law organizing 20 1 men to defend Davidson County. B y
June 1 787 the state militiamen had not arrived, and James Robertson and Anthony
Bledsoe, also a militia colonel, separately requested permission from Governor Richard
Caswell to mount a campaign against the Cherokee and Creeks using the local militia.
They did not wait for Caswell ' s response. After writing the governor, Robertson raised
1 30 Cumberland militiamen for the campaign. 55
The men departed in mid-June and headed toward the Creek village of Coldwater,
led by two Chickasaw guides. Once they had located the village they attacked, surprising
the villagers, who rapidly retreated toward a nearby creek. Several Indians were killed as
they attempted to escape in canoes or by swimming. After the inhabitants fled, the
militiamen destroyed the vi llage. On the return trip they engaged in a brief skirmish with
Indians. One militiaman was ki lled and eight wounded; these were the only white
casualties of the campaign. The Indian dead numbered between twenty and fifty.56
The militiamen sent by the North Carolina General Assembly began to arrive in
late July 1 787. Major Robert Evans commanded them. The Cumberland settlers, eager
to resume their daily acti vities, welcomed them. The presence of these outside

55Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 463-65 ; Iredell, Laws of the State of North
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mi litiamen also freed the local troops to take a more active role in preventing Indian
violence. James Robertson detached militi amen to patrol outside the Cumberland
territory and to protect settlers on the outskirts. He also sent patrols to capture or kill
hostile Indians. One such patrol, led by Captain John Rains, was di spatched in 1 78 8 with
orders from Robertson to ki ll all Indians found east of the line dividing the Cherokee and
Chickasaw land. On this expedition Rains's men ki lled four Creek men and took a boy
hostage who was later exchanged for a white hostage held by the Creeks. The men also
seized guns, deerskins and other Indian goods.57
In East Tennessee the years immediately fol lowing the Revolutionary War saw
relative calm between the Indians and the whites, although chaos reigned politically. In
1 784 East Tennesseans attempted to secede from North Carolina and form the state of
Franklin, but the plan collapsed by 1 789. The only militia activity related to the rise and
fall of Franklin came in February 1 788 when John Tipton, a North Carolina colonel and
bitter opponent of Franklin ' s governor Sevier, seized several of Sevier' s slaves by court
order. An infuriated Sevier raised 1 50 militiamen, marched to Tipton' s house, and
demanded his surrender. Tipton refused, and sent to Colonel George Maxwell in Sullivan
County for help. Maxwell raised 1 80 men and marched to Tipton ' s aid. When Maxwell
arrived, Sevier' s men fled. Later that year Sevier was arrested and sent to jail at
Morganton, but was soon released and never charged with a crime. 58
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In 1 788 violence once again erupted in East Tennessee. In May, Cherokee killed
eleven members of the Kirk family at their house twelve miles south of Knoxville. In
response, John Sevier raised several hundred militiamen and proceeded along the Holston
and Tennessee rivers, burning some Cherokee villages and killing an unknown number of
Indians. The Cherokee responded by attacking settlers living outside Knoxville. A
number of militia companies were raised, one of which lost seventeen men to a surprise
attack while they were gathering apples. During the summer John Sevier led several
hundred militiamen deep into Cherokee territory. They engaged the Cherokee in a
number of smal l skirmishes, but returned home without fighting any major
engagements. 59
Later that year, in response to Indian attacks on frontier stations, 450 East
Tennessee militiamen rendezvoused at Knoxville' s James White Fort. Colonels Robert
Love, Daniel Kennedy, and George Doherty commanded them. The men marched to a
pomt where the Tennessee River meets the Cumberland Mountain and there they engaged
a number of Cherokee and Creek warriors. The militiamen had intended to destroy a
nearby Indian village but returned home without doing so.60
On the September 2 1 , 1 78 8 , two hundred Creek and Cherokee attacked S herrell ' s
Station on the frontier. John Sevier and forty militiamen who were nearby drove off the
attackers. The number of Indian casualties is unknown; no militiamen were hurt. On
October 1 7 three hundred Creek and Cherokee warriors attacked and overran Gillespie' s

59Haywood, The Civil and Political History ofthe State of Tennessee, 1 94-200.
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Station on the Holston River, which was occupied primarily by women and children .
Twenty eight whites were ki lled. The Indian chiefs Bloody Fellow, Categiskey, John
Watts, and Glass left behind a note accusing the whites of starting the conflict between
the two peoples, and ordering the settlers to leave the region or suffer more attacks.61
In 1 790 the state of North Carolina ceded Tennessee to the United States, marking
an end to the region ' s pioneer era. During its first two decades Tennessee saw significant
White settlement and development, made possible by a vigilant and often aggressive
militia. Despite the success of the settlers in carving their homes out of the wilderness,
Tennesseans ended their pioneer years much as they had begun them, struggling to create
prosperity out of difficult smToundings, and relying on the militia to ensure their survival.

61Ibid. , 5 1 8- 1 9.
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Chapter IV
Expanding Power and Influence: The Militia's Role in Creating a State

North Carolina ceded the Tennessee territory to the United States in 1 790. The
U.S . in tum created the Territory of the United States South of the Ohio River. By then
the region was rapidly developing as pioneers poured in, establishing towns and
settlements in what are today East and Middle Tennessee. The Cumberland settlements
were considered the western edge of the frontier. A census in 1 795 counted 77,262
settlers, 66,649 of whom were free whites. When Tennessee achieved statehood in 1 796
it contained eleven counties, each with active militias . '
William Blount became the territorial governor and remained in that office unti l
statehood. One of the few early Tennessee leaders with little milit1 a experience, B lount
was not elected by the people of Tennessee, but rather appointed by George Washington.
He was well-known among the nation ' s leaders in Phi ladelphia and he used his political
influence for the benefit of the territory. He was a capable administrator. By 1 790,
administrative acumen was more important for a territorial governor than military
experience. Blount worked to establish the necessary institutions in preparation for
statehood, placing a priority on organizing a well coordinated territorial militia. Without
a territorial militia law, he relied on that of North Carolina. He issued commissions to
officers, thus legitimizing their positions. During his administration, the generally

'Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 648 .
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autonomous militia units effectively relinquished their independent status. Blount fused
them into a cohesive, albeit amateur, military organization under the centralized
command of the territorial government.2
During the territorial period and early years of statehood, the militia served as a
framework on which Tennessee' s bureaucratic institutions could be built. During the
1 790s the population grew rapidly, yet most of Tennessee was still rugged wilderness.
Having no other means to oversee this increasing population from migration to
settlement, the state turned to the militia, the one institution to which almost every man
belonged. In addition to defense, the state was concerned with tax collection, voting, and
road building, and the militia became important in each of these acti vities.
The first bureaucratic use of the militia was for tax collection . The regular
militias in each county were di vided into captains' companies based on geography, and
this structure was useful for tax collection because each company had a list of the men
within its boundaries. In 1 794, the territorial Assembly passed an act designating the
captains' companies as the basi s for tax collection. Each county court was to appoint a
justice of the peace for each company. These justices were to maintain a list of all men
within the boundaries of each captai n ' s company, often referred to as a captain ' s district,
and were to create a list of the property in their district. The company members were to
meet at a designated time to provide this information . Taxes were levied on free males
age twenty-one to fifty, slaves age ten to fifty, stud horses, town lots, and parcels of land

2William H. Masterson, William Blount (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1 954; reprint, New York: Greenwood Press, 1 969), 177; Finger, Tennessee
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exceeding one hundred acres. The sheriff was to collect the taxes. Although the militia
companies were the framework for tax collection, the militiamen were not the only
taxpayers. All citizens were subject to taxation. Men outside of taxable (and thus militia)
age and single women also paid taxes on their taxable property, excluding themselves.3
Knox County provides an example of this tax collection system. Tax records
from 1 796 show that the companies used for collection included those under the
command of captains Campbell, Crawford, Beard, Gillespie, Flenneck, Stone, and
Mannefee. The number of taxpayers in each district is listed under the respective
captain ' s name, the number ranging from two in Flenneck' s company to twenty in
Beard's. Only li sts of delinquent taxpayers exist for Stone' s and Mannefee' s companies,
the number being ten and eleven, respectively. Beginning in 1 804 Knox County records
are more complete, and they reflect the rapid growth of East Tennessee during the early
years of statehood. In that year, taxes were collected in twelve captains' districts, the
number of taxpayers in each company numbering between thirty-seven and seventy· fi ve.
Again the taxpayers are listed under the company captain ' s name.4
The militia structure also proved useful for elections. The first militia election
law, passed by the General Assembly in 1 796, called for election of colonels and majors
at the county courthouses on the first Thursday and Friday of August. All militiamen
were eligible to vote. In 1 797 the General Assembly passed a Jaw directing that the

3Acts of the Territory of the United States South of the Ohio, First General
Assembly, First Session, Chapter 3 ( 1 794).
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state ' s congressional representatives also be elected at the courthouses on the first
Thursday in August.5
In many cases elections for state and national offices as well as for militia officers
were held on muster days. This was not stipulated in the state ' s laws, but other evidence
demonstrates that this was the case. When the General Assembly granted citizens in a
remote area of a county the right to muster separately, it included permission to hold
elections at that same time. In 1 797 the Assembly granted the citizens on the eastern end
of Carter County the privi lege of holding general musters as well as elections for
governor, members of the General Assembly, and representatives to the U.S. Congress at
an alternate location to be determined by the sheriff. In 1 799 the same privilege was
granted to inhabitants of Grainger County residing north of the Clinch River.6
Once muster days began to be used for voting, musters often became social affairs
for all county residents. County-wide muster days became common after 1 800. This
trend can be seen in the 1 798 militia law requiring cavalry companies to muster at their
respective county courthouses on the third day of the fall session of superior court. Not
only would cavalry members have the opportunity to take care of court business, but they
could also enjoy the attention of other citizens visiting town. Parades, fairs, and political
meetings tended to organize around muster days.7

5Acts of the State of Tennessee, First General Assembly, First Session , Chapter 1 2
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An important element in the growth of Tennessee was the building of roads.
Roads were especially important to the militias, for speedy movement was critical to
defense. The state did not rely on the militias exclusively to bui ld roads, but the mi litias
were involved. In 1 784, the North Carolina General Assembly passed a law empowering
the county courts to summon all taxable males from ages sixteen to fifty to work on
public roads. In Tennessee these were the same men belonging to the mi litia. The law
also exempted men on road duty from musters. Laws requiring all able-bodied men to
work on roads existed in Tennessee well into the antebellum era.8
When North Carolina sent militiamen to the Cumberland settlements in 1 786, part
of their duty was to cut a road from the lower end of Clinch Mountain to Nashville. The
men were unable both to bui ld the road and provide adequate protection to the
settlements. In 1 787, the Assembly, at the urging of the Tennessee representatives,
reassigned the road duty to the local militia. The militia officers of the counties included
in the road duty were to appoint men to survey the best route to follow. The militia
regiments were then to be divided into several groups, which would rotate their labor
duties until the road was built. Local militiamen also built a road from B ledsoe's Lick to
the Nashville-Clinch Mountain road.9
Once it was independent from North Carolina, Tennessee did not alter the road
work requirement for white men. The militiamen continued to work on roads in either a
direct or indirect manner. In 1 794, the territorial Assembly passed a law providing for the
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construction of a road from Fort South West Point (near Kingston), to the Cumberland
settlements, to be paid for by a lottery. This fort was first occupied by militiamen and
later by federal troops. Militia leaders were also designated as the commi ssioners of the
road, responsible for siting and cutting it. Evidence suggests that these officers used
militiamen to construct thi s road: in a 1795 letter to James Winchester, Captain Sampson
Williams discussed working on the road with his company, and promised to have it
completed in time for Winchester' s upcoming trip to Nashville.10
Road work was indirectly connected with the militia in two failed pieces of
legislation considered by the General Assembly. In 1 805, a bill failed that would have
replaced muster duty with road duty for persons exempted from the militi a for religious
purposes. In 1 8 1 5 , the Assembly rejected a bill that would have authorized county courts
to exempt road inspectors from militia duty. 1 1
Although the militia was used for non-military purposes, it also remained active in
campaigns against the Tennessee Indians. In the late 1 7 80s militiamen began protecting
travelers and manning forts and blockhouses on the frontier, and they continued these
tasks throughout the 1 790s. By this time, white movement throughout Tennessee was
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common. The most frequently traveled path was between East Tennessee, near
Knoxville, and the Cumberland region. Violence between the Indians and whites
continued during this period, but troops assigned to frontier protection and escort duty
rarely engaged in hostilities.
The first Tennessee militiamen used to protect travelers were mustered in
Davidson and Sumner counties in 1 7 8 8 . These one hundred men, under Colonel George
Mansco and Maj or James Kirkpatrick, set out on September 1 0 and escorted twenty-two
famil ies to Knoxvil le. On October 1 0, the men returned to Nashville with an unknown
number of families. Both trips occurred without incident. 1 2
In the 1 790s, Governor Blount persuaded the federal government to assume
responsibility for protecting the Tennessee frontier. The government subsequently sent
arms, military equipment, and some federal troops into Tennessee. The government also
assumed the expense of paying not only those federal troops but also the local militiamen
for their services. The federal troops and militiamen manned the forts and blockhouses,
and were to be reinforced whenever Indian violence threatened. In September 1 792, nine
Cumberland stations contained between fourteen and twenty men each. In December of
that year, seven Knox County stations contained between four and fourteen men; two
were vacant. 1 3
William Blount believed that i f Tennessee was to grow and prosper, Indian
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resi stance to white settlement must be quashed. He was willing to sign treaties, but he
doubted that treaties would secure peace. Rather, he believed that permanent peace could
be established only through white military victory. He sought to defeat the Indians
decisively, and the final major campaigns against the tribes in Tennessee occurred under
his administration.
When he assumed office, Blount understood that the Indians of Tennessee could
not be defeated without federal assistance. He worked to coax the federal government to
join Tennessee in a war against the Indians. He was often frustrated in these attempts but
never relented in hi s efforts. He had good reason to believe that the federal government
would cooperate, for conflicts with various Indian tribes remained common throughout
the western frontier and the U.S. government deemed the Indian presence a hindrance to
westward expansion. In 1 79 1 , President Washington sent a two-thousand-man army,
comprised of both federal regulars and militiamen, against Shawnee and Miami Indians in
southern Ohio. Two hundred Tennessee militiamen were included in this force. The
campaign, commanded by General Arthur St. Clair, was poorly organized and ended in a
disastrous defeat on November 4 of that year, but it did demonstrate Washington' s
willingness to secure a western frontier open for white settlement. 1 4
In 1 79 1 , Blount was contending with four tribes : the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw,
and Chickasaw. These tribes did not wish to fight the whites, but were angered by the
continued white settlement on their land. The Indians frequently expressed a desire for
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peace, contingent on a halt to white encroachment. In fact, in 1 790 President Washington
met with Alexander McGillvray, a Creek chief, and signed a peace treaty. 15
When Blount assumed office, the Cherokee were the largest and most powerful
tribe in Tennessee. They were divided on how to act toward the whites: many sought
peace and cooperation , but the Chickamaugas, who still comprised a large portion of the
Cherokee population, remained hosti le. In July 1 79 1 , Blount negotiated the Treaty of the
Holston between the United States and the Cherokees, guaranteeing peace between the
two nations and establishing clear boundaries. After the treaty was signed, a party of
Cherokee chiefs traveled to Philadelphia, where they signed more treaties promising an
annual federal payment to the Cherokees. Blount did not, however, expect peace to
ensue. On January 5 and 6, 1 792, he wrote to James Robertson and Daniel S mith (a
militia general and early settler) noting that President Washington would soon, on the
advice of the Congress, consider the issue of war with the Cherokees. He also remarked
that federal troops were soon to arrive and that some federal arms had already arrived and
more were expected, including a brass cannon . 16
Anticipating a war with the Cherokees, Blount hoped to pacify the other three
tribes. In his January 5 letter to Robertson he expressed hope that he could arrange a
meeting with the Creeks to discuss peace. He also recommended gifts to be given the
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Choctaws and Chickasaws as peace offerings at a meeting to be held the following
summer, including fifty rifles, one thousand pounds of gunpowder, two thousand pounds
of lead, clothes, blankets and other items. 17
On February 1 , citizens in Tennessee County petitioned Robertson, by then a
brigadier general, asking that the militia be called out to protect them from Cherokee
violence. Robertson called a council of militia officers and, without Blount ' s approval ,
ordered out one hundred militiamen to protect the county. When Blount learned of the
call-up he approved it and expressed hope that this threat to settlers would prompt
President Washington to initiate a wider Indian campaign. He instructed Robertson to
increase the number of active militiamen to 1 52, and to form them into two companies.
They were to serve for three months and follow the regulations of the 1786 North
Carolina militia law . 1 8
In May 1 792, Blount met with the Cherokees and discussed maintaining peace.
Thi s meeting was notable because John Watts, one of the most influential Cherokee
chiefs and the one most sympathetic to the Chickamaugas, arranged it. Dragging Canoe
had died earlier that year, and most of the Chickamaugas looked to Watts as their new
leader. At the meeting Blount was greeted by two thousand Indians, given a grand
reception , and assured by Watts that the Cherokee no longer wi shed for war with the
whites. But peace was not to be. In September 1 792, between three and six hundred
Creeks and Cherokees attacked the Cumberland settlements. John Watts led this attack,
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supported by fellow Cherokee chiefs Glass and Bloody Fellow . The attack was a surprise
but Blount and the militia responded quickly. Blount ordered the mustering of militia
throughout the territory, including the brigades commanded by James Robertson and John
Sevier. Robertson commanded in the Cumberland region, and Sevier in the east. On
September 30, the Indians attacked Buchanan ' s Station, which contained only fifteen
militiamen and a few families. They were repulsed, John Watts being wounded in the
attack. In November, fifty-six Cherokee, Creek, and Shawnee warriors attacked forty-two
militiamen under Captain Samuel Handley, who were marching to the Cumberland
settlements from Knoxville. The militiamen fled, suffering only three casualties. Captain
Handley was captured, however, and held prisoner for several months . In December
Handley, under duress, wrote a letter calling on Governor Blount to enter into peace
talks.19
Although Blount was seeking an opportunity to defeat the Indians, he did not
welcome these attacks, for he believed Tennessee was unprepared to fight a major Indian
campaign. The territory had no money and few military supplies. Moreover, Blount did
not believe he had the legal authority to wage a war against the Indians without
Congressional approval, for the newly ratified U.S. Constitution granted Congress the
exclusive right to declare war. Citing this constitutional restraint, Blount ordered the
militia officers not to advance onto Indian land. Rather, the militiamen were to act
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defensively, attacking only those Creek and Cherokee warriors found within the
boundaries of the white settlements?0
Blount was optimistic, however, that the federal government would intervene in
the conflict. In an October 27 letter to James Robertson, he asserted that Congress would
"no doubt . . . do what the dignity of the government requires and redress the sufferings of
their frontier citizens." Blount had two agents, David Allison and Richard Findlenston,
in Philadelphia pressing for federal intervention. The federal response was not, however,
what Blount had hoped. The government sent two thousand muskets, one cannon, and a
large quantity of ammunition, all of which arrived in February 1 793, but did not commit
to a major campaign. George Washington preferred negotiation, and on February 8 he
expressed hope that the Cherokee chiefs would travel to Philadelphia to discuss peace.
Hi s message was not delivered until mid-April. In February, a frustrated Blount sent
General James Winchester to Philadelphia, where he was expected to meet with George
Washington and other leaders and "complain loudly of everything that deserves to be
complained of."21
After the attack on Captain Handley' s company, the violence temporarily abated,
only to resume in spring 1 793. Blount made overtures for peace, and at a meeting with
John Watts on April 5, was able to appease the Cherokees with Washington' s invitation
to Philadelphia. The Creeks, however, continued hostilities. On April 28 between thirty
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and seventy Creek warriors attacked Greenfield Station, two and a half miles north of
Buchanan' s Station. The Indians killed one settler, but retreated when local militiamen
arrived. On June 7, Blount himself departed for Philadelphia to meet with the president
and discuss federal involvement in the conflict. He left Daniel Smith as the acting
governor. On June 1 7, while in transit, Blount wrote to Smith, saying "A vigorous
national war only can bring the Indians to act as they ought, and that I hope we shall have
this fall." In Philadelphia, national leaders received Blount well, but he did not persuade
them to commit the nation to a larger military campaign.22
On June 1 2, violence with the Cherokees again erupted when Captain John Beard,
against orders, crossed the Tennessee river into Cherokee territory and attacked a village
wherein resided Hanging Maw, a respected chief friendly to the whites. The militiamen
killed between ten and fifteen Cherokees and wounded Hanging Maw and his wife.
Within thirty minutes of the attack two hundred Cherokee warriors were mustered.
Beard's company retreated, leaving the territory around Knoxville largely undefended.
Fearing an i mmediate attack, Daniel Smith wrote to several Cherokee chiefs and appealed
for peace. He reminded them of the invitation to meet with President Washington. The
chiefs reluctantly agreed to peace, but called for punishment of Captain Beard. Beard
was courts martialed; but because of public support for his actions, the court acquitted
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him.23
In August, fear of a Cherokee attack prompted Smith to muster militiamen
throughout the territory. James Robertson ordered several companies to patrol the area
around Nashville. In East Tennessee, where the threat was perceived to be the greatest,
militiamen reinforced stations around Knoxville. These militiamen included a
detachment under John Sevier at Ish ' s Station, east of the city. In late August, Cherokee
and Creek warriors began to attack houses and stations on the frontier. On the twentyninth, they attacked Henry' s Station, in East Tennessee, and killed one officer. On
September 24, one thousand Cherokee and Creek warriors set out to destroy Knoxville.
Descending from the northwest, they plundered and destroyed houses along the way.
Because most of the militia was in the field, Knoxville had only forty militiamen. Under
the command of James White, who was a militia general and one of the founders of
Knoxville, the men prepared for an attack. Once near the city the Indians opted not to
attack, but they did raid the house of Alexander Cavet, killing fifteen and taking one
prisoner. 24
The reaction to the attacks came swiftly. On August 30, colonels George Doherty
and James McFarland raised 1 80 men and, against orders, marched west into Cherokee
territory, destroying six villages. Also, John Sevier at Ish' s Station raised between six
hundred and seven hundred men and, with the consent of Daniel S mith, invaded the

23 "Correspondence of James Robertson" (October 1 897), 367-68; Ramsey,
Annals of Tennessee, 577-78.
24 "Correspondence of James Robertson" (October 1 897), 369-70; Ramsey,
Annals of Tennessee, 578-82.
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Cherokee territory to the south . These troops destroyed the vi llage of Estanaulee and
pursued the Indians into Georgia. There they defeated a small force of Indians and
burned the village of Etowah?5
After Sevier' s campaign into Georgia, the Cherokees and Creeks returned to their
homes. When B lount returned, he approved of Smith ' s actions, but began to reduce the
number of active militiamen. He hoped to keep several companies active but had very
limited funds from the federal government. On December 6, he ordered the discharge of
all active militia within the Mero District (Middle Tennessee), effective at the end of the
month. On December 1 3 , he began a two-week meeting with Cherokee leaders, who
assured him that Cherokee violence against whites would end and that they would
pressure the Creeks to cease hostilities. Blount and the Cherokee chiefs also agreed to
exchange prisoners and to hold a second meeting in June 1 794. Blount did not leave the
meeting optimistic. He told James Robertson that the "want of power in the hands of the
chiefs" would make deli vering on these promises unlikely.26
By 1 794, rumors had begun to circulate that Spain, then in possession of the
Louisiana Territory, was secretly encouraging the Creeks and Cherokees to attack
Tennesseans. For several years the Spanish government had felt threatened by the
increasing American settlement of western lands, and had enlisted the help of the Indians
to contain this expansion. Through trade with the Spanish the Indians had acquired

25Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 578-79, 583-88.
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weapons and other supplies, and the Spanish government turned a blind eye toward
Indian attacks on white settlements. Blount did not believe that the Spanish were directly
encouraging Indian attacks, but he feared that such rumors would increase tensions
between whites and Indians. In January, he ordered James Robertson to muster
militiamen in the Mero District; but the number had to be small due to lack of funds.27
In February 1 794, sporadic attacks on the settlers in the Mero District prompted
Blount to again muster the mi litia throughout the territory. He declared, "[I]t now
appears by the most unequivocal of all proofs that the Indians are for war and not peace."
He revoked his order of December 6, and ordered James Robertson to do whatever
necessary to protect the citizens. He still had few funds to pay the militiamen, however,
and had yet to receive federal support for an invasion of Indian territory. Thus he also
ordered Robertson to observe the "utmost economy" in using the militia. He also sent
James White to Philadelphia to lobby the Congress for federal support . B lount' s efforts
were opposed by James Seagrove, the U.S. agent for Indian affairs in Tennessee.
Seagrove believed that the Creeks and Cherokees wished for peace, and he correctly
identified white encroachment as the main cause of hosti lities. Seagrove did not hesitate
to convey his opinion to the leadership in Philadelphia.28
As had been the case earlier, the federal government sympathized with the plight
of the Tennesseans, but the War Department did not agree to an invasion of Indian

27"Correspondence of James Robertson" (July 1 898), 278-80; Durham, Before
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territory. Rather, it authorized mustering militiamen to assume defensive positions within
white territory. It also sent to Tennessee six cannons and a large quantity of ammunition.
The Congressional Committee on Indian Affairs assessed the situation and recommended
that the president be given sole power to approve offensive operations; it also
recommended that any unapproved invasion of Indian territory be treated as a criminal

Occasional Indian violence occurred during the spring of 1 794, and pressure to
invade the Indian territory grew, but Blount refused to condone an invasion without
federal support. The whites placed considerable blame on fi ve lower Cherokee towns in
the southeastern part of the territory, especially Nickajack. By summer, Blount h ad
received reports that warriors from these towns were planning an invasion. He appealed
once again to the federal government, but in late July received an order from the War
Department barring him from offensive operations, with specific instructions not to attack
the five lower towns. By this time, however, the outcry for action against the Indians had
grown too loud to ignore. The order not to invade only served to increase public anger.30
Blount reluctantly agreed to ignore federal orders and authorized an attack on
Nickajack and the other lower towns . James Robertson, who took charge of organizing
the campaign, did so informally. Militia units throughout the territory rendezvoused near
Nashville, with little written evidence of the intended expedition . Blount kept his

29Ibid., 295-96; "The Correspondence of James Robertson," American Historical
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30"Correspondence of James Robertson" (October 1 898), 353-54; Ramsey, Annals
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involvement vague by sending militiamen from East Tennessee to James Robertson to
"receive [their] orders," with no further explanation. A few Kentucky militiamen
rendezvoused as well ; Blount permitted their participation with some apprehension.31
The expedition set out on September 7 under the command of Major James Ore.
Approximately 550 militiamen participated, including Andrew Jackson, then a private.
On September 1 3 , they attacked the towns of Nickajack and Running Water and surprised
the Indians, who put up only minimal resistance. The troops destroyed both towns and
killed more than fifty Indian warriors, while losing only three wounded and none killed.32
After the battle, Blount informed Robertson that the event was an embarrassment
and demanded a full report. Robertson submitted his report on October 1 . In it he
explained that the invasion was a pre-emptive strike against the lower Cherokees, who he
claimed were planning an attack. Nickaj ack and Running Water had served the Indians
as gateways to white territory, he claimed, and the militia had destroyed the towns to
make invasions more difficult. Blount needed Robertson ' s report to justify the campaign
to Congress and the President, and to fend off accusations that the governor was
complicit in it. Privately Blount was pleased with the outcome of the campaign, asserting
that the destruction of these towns would ensure the cooperation of friendly Cherokees
and make a surprise Indian invasion less likely. No puni shment was ever handed down as
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a result of the Nickaj ack expedition, but soon after it James Robertson offered to resign
his commission as brigadier general. His offer was rejected.33
The Nickajack campaign was the last significant expedition by the Tennessee
militia against the Indians prior to the War of 1 8 1 2 . While it differed little in purpose and
outcome from others during Tennessee' s frontier years, it marks a significant political
turning point for the state. The planning and execution of the Nickajack campaign reflect
Tennessee' s growing political ties to the federal government. The new U.S. Constitution,
the establi shment of Tennessee as a federal territory, and the political maturity of
Tennessee effectively eliminated the militia leaders' freedom to act on their own .
Tennessee' s lack of congressional representation, however, prevented any advantages
these closer ties with the federal government could have created.
After the Nickaj ack campaign, Blount mustered one company of infantry under
the command of Captain Nathaniel Evans to patrol the areas between the Tennessee River
and the Mero District most frequented by Indians. In November, he met with the
Cherokee leadership and both parties agreed yet again to live in peace, and to exchange
prisoners. Also in November, B lount learned of a possible invasion of Cherokee land by
the Kentucky militia. He wrote its colonel, William Whitley, urging him to prevent it,
and threatened to warn the Cherokees in advance if the invasion was not canceled.34
The peace agreement with the Cherokees did little to reduce hostility between the
whites and the Creeks . Creek violence continued into l ate 1 794. In November, fifty

33"Correspondence of James Robertson" (October 1 898), 359-63 .
34Ibid., 366-72.
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Creeks attacked the families of Colonel Isaac Titsworth and his brother John along the
Red River, killing ten . The local militia pursued but did not engage the attackers. Also in
November, forty Creek warriors attacked several families living at a station near
Clarksville in Middle Tennessee, including that of Valentine Sevier. Sevier survived, but
several whites were killed, including one of his sons. The number of Creek casualties is
unknown.35
Both attacks took place in the Mero District. Blount called for more militiamen in
Mero to muster, but invading Indian territory was prohibited by order of the Secretary of
War. Nevertheless, Blount still hoped that the plight of the Tennesseans would not be
ignored. On December 4 he wrote, "I cannot suffer myself to doubt but the present
session of Congress will order an army in the course of next spring or summer, sufficient
to humble if not destroy the Creek nation."36
Blount remained optimistic about a federal campaign against the Creeks, but the
government took no action. In March 1 795, he received a letter from Secretary of War
Timothy Pickering informing him that Congress would no longer allow offensive
operations against the various Indian tribes and chastising him for attempting to provoke
a conflict. Pickering was particularly troubled by Blount's recent attempts to promote
war with the Creeks, noting that such a war might encourage other tribes to attack the
Creeks as well. He also criticized Blount for permitting white Tennesseans to settle on
Indian land, asserting that doing so violated Indian sovereignty and was the primary cause
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of Indian-white conflict. He instructed Blount to remove all illegal white settlements and
maintain peace with the tribes.37
After receiving this letter Blount no longer pushed for an Indian war. In 1 795,
Indian violence declined significantly. In that year a peace treaty was negotiated with the
Chickasaws, by which that tribe received a generous allotment of goods , including six
howitzers and a significant supply of ammunition, all from the federal government. Thi s
treaty was likely negotiated by James Robertson, then the acting United States
representative to the Chickasaws, and Colonel David Henley, the United States War
Department agent in Tennessee. The Creeks also moved toward peace, although a formal
treaty was not negotiated at that time. In June 1 795, Isaac Titsworth traveled into the
Creek nation to retrieve his daughter and a slave, both of whom had been taken prisoner
during the attack in 1 794. The Indians released the two without hesitation, and Titsworth
reported to Governor Blount that most of the Creek leaders and warriors were resolved to
avoid further conflict with the whites.38
Militiamen remained on frontier duty, but their numbers were reduced. James
Robertson ended his tenure as brigadier general on August 5, 1 795. With peace
established, Blount turned his attention to road-building, and travel became more
frequent. In October, he stated to one group of travelers, "You with the families with you
on your way to Nashville . . . may pass without the least apprehension of inj uries. I have
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now to recommend to you and to other travellers and people of all descriptions to treat the
Indians of every description wherever found, as friends."39
During Tennessee' s six years as a federal territory, the U.S. government assumed
the militia expenses. Prior to 1 790, Tennessee militiamen had received little or no
monetary compensation for their services. Many campaigns against the Indians had been
informally organized, and in a number of cases militiamen participated to ensure their
very survival on the frontier. In some cases the militiamen received land, as was the case
with the 1 788 muster to protect Davidson County. But for the most part, early Tennessee
militiamen fought solely to secure their stake in the territory, and they understood that the
informal nature of their acti vities precluded their receiving any money for their efforts. In
his nearly twenty-year career as a Tennessee militia leader, John Sevier was compensated
only once--for the Etowa campaign, which was his last.40
Once the militia assumed frontier and guard duties, the number of active
militiamen represented only a small proportion of the eligible men in the territory. No
longer fighting for the survival of the white settlements, these men expected to be paid for
their services. The U.S. War Department assumed the militia expenses and also procured
the provisions for the men on duty.
David Henley was the federal agent responsible for meeting the needs of the
militiamen . All federal funds used for militia purposes first went through him. To

39"Correspondence of James Robertson" (April 1 899), 1 75-77 ; "The
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procure rations he contracted with a local merchant who, for a fee, acquired the necessary
provisions and had them distributed. To pay the militiamen, Henley required an
authorization from the governor, which included a detailed account of which companies
were to be paid and the time served. Once Henley recei ved the authorization, he gave the
money to the militi a paymaster for distribution. The men' s pay was meager. In 1 795
privates were paid $6.66 per month ; officers were paid slightly more, depending on
rank.4 1
In most cases Henley relied on one man, John Gordon, to provide the rations.
Gordon was also a militia captain. Each year the two men negotiated an extensive
contract which was forwarded to the War Department. Henley paid Gordon after
delivery, and he required Gordon to receive certification of delivery from the
commanding officers of the men receiving the provisions. The location of the men
determined the amount Gordon received, but it was usually between eight and twelve
cents per ration. Officers received two or three rations each per day, and noncommissioned officers and privates received one ration each per day.42
Each ration consisted of one pound of bread or flour, one pound of beef or threefourths of a pound of pork, and half a gill (two ounces) of liquor. One quart of salt, two
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quarts of vinegar, two pounds of soap, and one pound of candles were included in every
one hundred rations. The task of provisioning was not only arduous but also expensive.
For example, in the Mero District between January and June 1795, nineteen detachments
served tours of duty, each for approximately one month. For them Gordon acquired
2 1 ,820 rations at a cost of $ 1 ,767 .20. Tennessee militiamen were usually well supplied,
but the system was not perfect. In August 1 796, Martin Ashburn, commanding at South
West Point, complained that the fort had not been supplied and his men had exhausted
their provi sions, including the beef he had purchased privately. In that same year David
Campbell wrote a similar complaint to Henley from Fort Grainger.43
The process of paying the militiamen was poorly defined and often resulted in
conflict between the territory and the War Department. At issue was the federal
responsibility to Tennessee militiamen not mustered into service under the expressed
authority of the War Department. Ideally, the governor would muster the men with the
War Department's permission. After the term of service, the commanding officers would
issue a return to the governor with the names of the men and their time served. The
governor would then direct David Henley to arrange payment. When the process worked
smoothly the men were usually paid within six months of their discharge. Quite often,
however, Tennessee militiamen mustered without pre-approval by the War Department.
In such cases, the federal government was reluctant to pay them, and frequently did not.
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Daniel Smith ' s muster in August 1 793 is one example. Because of the impending Indian
attack, Smith mustered without approval . Three years later, 1 50 men from Sullivan
County who had served in the campaign sti ll had not been paid despite frequent requests.
The same was true for the men who served under John Sevier in the same campaign.44
The most contested of these controversies grew out of the Nickaj ack expedition of
1 794. Because the expedition was in direct violation of federal orders, the War
Department refused to pay the men. John Sevier became Tennessee' s first state governor
in 1 796 and took a personal interest in resolving the matter. He appealed to Tennessee' s
congressmen, and they procured support for payment b y federal leaders. However, the
War Department claimed not to have received the necessary paperwork, which David
Henley was responsible for sending. Henley endorsed the Tennesseans' claim and
declared that he had filed the paperwork, but said it had since been lost. By June 1 798
the men still had not been paid, and Sevier once again turned to the state' s congressmen,
who for the next two years attempted to procure payment. No records indicate that the
men were ever paid. 45
When Tennessee became a state in 1 796, Wi lliam Blount was elected to the U.S.
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Senate. (He was impeached and removed from office the following year for attempting to
incite the Creek and Cherokee Indians against the Spani sh .) As the first state governor,
John Sevier placed a high priority on maintaining a vigilant military presence on the
frontiers. Recognizing that fear and mi strust prevailed on both sides, he did not place
much faith in the peace then prevai ling between the Indians and the whites. Sevier was
faced, however, with a federal government increasingly reluctant to maintain frontier
protection .46
In June 1 796, soon after Sevier assumed office, the War Department informed
him that the U.S. government would withdraw support for militia frontier duty in
Tennessee. The tours for the militiamen called by Blount as wel l as those of the small
number of U.S. regulars in Tennessee would expire by the end of the summer. At issue
was not the principle of maintaining frontier guards, but rather the funding of such posts.
Because Tennessee was no longer a federal territory, the U.S . government no longer
accepted responsibi lity for its militia expenses. Sevier sent letters to James McHenry,
Secretary of War, asking him to continue the support, claiming that a lack of frontier
guards would embolden the Indians to commit crimes in the white settlements. McHenry
was not moved by Sevier' s pleas.47
Sevier maintained mi litiamen at the frontier posts despite having no funds to pay
them. In October 1 796 he turned to William Blount, who by then had assumed his office
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in the Senate, suggesting that B lount confer with the President on the matter. Blount' s
political connections proved fruitful. In January 1 797, two companies of U.S. regulars
arrived in Tennessee by order of the War Department. President Washington also gave
Sevier assurance of federal support for the retention of Tennessee militiamen currently
serving guard duty, and Sevier promptly issued the necessary orders.48
After the two federal companies arrived, Sevier wrote Tennessee' s congressmen
and the War Department asking for four more. This request was not honored. In fact, the
President did not hold true to his promise to support the Tennessee militiamen, and
funding for them was ended. Sevier grudgingly disbanded the Tennessee troops in June
of that year. However, federal regulars remained on duty in Tennessee for several more
years, and Sevier continued to press for more support throughout his first two terms in
office.49
The relationship between whites and Indians in Tennessee during the second half
of the 1 790s was tense, but violence was only sporadic. Tennessee' s leaders focused on
establishing necessary institutions, developing internal improvements, and increasing
white immigration. Unlike his predecessor, Sevier hoped to avoid conflicts with the
Indians. He used the militia to gather intelligence and to undertake minor military
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excursions. Lacking a significant frontier force, Sevier frequently relied on diplomacy to
maintain peace. He wrote letters to Indian chiefs calling for peace between the two
peoples. He was quick to compliment the tribes, yet he also reminded them of the
destruction they had suffered in years past. These indirect threats of mi litary action
helped prevent minor events from becoming major confrontations. Violence declined
also because by the late 1 790s the tribes had been severely weakened, and many Indians
were dependent on white trade and support.50
Personally, Sevier despised the Indians and thought them entirely unfit for
civilized culture. On July 20, 1796, he wrote to the Cherokees saying "I hope we shall
have no disputes, and the chain of friendship and peace will always be bright and clear
between us." That same day he noted to James McHenry "It is a well known fact and
shameful ly obvious, that all the erratic tribes are accustomed and habituated to
licentiousness and educated to a vagrant, lawless, debauched and immoral life; and
nothing but a sufficient conviction of being chastised shall ever deter those itinerant
nations from their common desperate and rapacious practices."51
Sevier' s first Indian conflict during his initial term of office occurred in April
1 796 in East Tennessee north of the fork in the Little Pigeon River. Three whites were
searching for horses that had been stolen from them, presumably by Indians, when they
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engaged four Cherokees in a brief skirmish. The whites wounded one Indian in the
encounter, and took two guns. Rather than muster the militia, Sevier informed the
commander at the nearby Tellico blockhouse to avoid conflict. Sevier feared that an
outbreak of violence would discourage white migration. He apologized to the Cherokees
and promised to return the two guns. 52
The most significant test of the delicate peace between the two peoples began in
1 797 as a result of international events. Jay's Treaty, signed between the United States
and England in 1 795, led to a deterioration of relations between America and France. An
undeclared naval war between the two nations erupted in 1 797 . Tennesseans worried that
the French would incite the Indians against them. 53
Sevier began to express concern in early 1 797. He was convinced that the Indian
tribes would tum against the United States if supported by France. In January and
February several whites and Indians were kil led in skirmishes, and both sides began to
assume a more militant posture. It was during this time of heightened tensions that
Tennessee lost federal funding for militia guard duty and received, in Sevier' s opinion,
far too few federal troops for the task. In March, Sevier ordered the brigadier generals to
hold the state ' s militia regiments in readiness. Sevier's correspondence with the Indians
urged them to ignore calls for war against the United States, asserting that the European
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powers cared little for either red or white Americans. B y June 1 798 Sevier had come to
believe that a full-scale war between the U.S. and France was inevitable, but he was
incorrect. Neither the U.S. nor France desired a wider conflict, and by 1 800 the naval war
had ended and tensions between the whites and Indians eased.54
The possibility of a major war with France played an important role in the
development of the Tennessee militia, for it made the leadership aware of the
shortcomings of the system. Although effective in frontier campaigns, the Tennessee
militiamen lacked both the training and equipment to face professional armies like those
of the European powers. Moreover, by the late 1790s the number of militia-age men in
the state exceeded that necessary to fight a frontier war. Recognizing these facts, the
state ' s leadership began to restructure the system.
When naval hostilities began between the United States and France, the patriotic
surge usually associated with the beginning of war did not happen in Tennessee. Rather,
many Tennesseans were frustrated by the federal government' s inability to negotiate with
the European powers. In February 1797, Sevier told William Blount that "The reports of
a probability of a war with the French . . . excites [sic] apparently much indignation
among many here against the measures of the American government." The U.S .
Congress passed an act directing the states to hold 80,000 militiamen i n readiness,
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Tennessee' s quota being 806. Sevier had already issued orders to the state' s brigadier
generals to ready the militia, and he now began to write specific regiments calling for the
men to arm and equip themselves. 55
Through this process Sevier learned of the inadequacies of the militia system.
Rogersville, for example, contained a strongly patriotic regiment but its leader told the
governor that the men were "not equipt as might be expected from an independent
people." In 1 798, Governor Sevier began to support the recruitment of a regular army
should war with France commence. Like all his fellow Tennesseans, Sevier believed in
the militia ideal, but he understood that in its present condition the militia was incapable
of defending against a French invasion56
The possibility of war with France made Sevier a champion of militia reform.
The centerpiece of his effort was his 1 797 call for the state to adopt its first
comprehensive militia law. This law was passed in 1 798, but Sevier did not consider it
adequate. In December 1 798 and again in September 1 80 1 , he called for refinements to
the law. His primary concern was the lack of training and equipment. In 1 80 1 , the
General Assembly responded by passing a law requiring more frequent musters, but little
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was done to furnish the militia with equipment57
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the role of the Tennessee militi a had
changed. During the eighteenth century the militia helped secure white settlement, and
was an integral part of Tennessee' s economic and political development. By 1 800, the
militia had been transformed from an informal group of frontier fighters into a welldefined military agency, albeit one in need of improvement when compared to
professional armies.
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September 1 80 1 , ibid., first series of administrations, box 1 , folder 1 3 ; Acts ofthe State of
Tennessee, Fourth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 ( 1 80 1 ).
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Chapter V
Volunteers at Work and Play: The Many Roles of the Antebellum Militiamen

Tennessee militiamen participated in all maj or antebellum conflicts, notably the
War of 1 8 1 2, the Seminole wars, and the Mexican War; and the militia system was sti ll
the framework for Tennessee volunteers at the beginning of the Civi l War. However,
militiamen were active in other military and non-military pursuits during these
antebellum years. The militia was in fact a key infrastructure-bui lding institution in the
antebellum era.
Immigration increased and the population grew rapidly after Tennessee achieved
statehood. In 1790 the state' s population was 35,69 1 . By 1 800 it was 105 ,602, and in
1 8 10 it was 26 1 ,727. This rapid increase did not abate during the antebellum years. In
1 830 the population was 68 1 ,904 and in 1 850 it was 1 ,002,7 1 7. The militia system was
forced to adapt to the changing social , political, and economic landscape of the state.
Most notably, the number of militia-age white males became too great for the state' s
needs for all but the most serious conflicts. Also, the state did not have the ability to keep
this entire militia-eligible population trained and equipped. Thus the regular militia,
although not abolished, became a paper organization with no expectations of military
preparedness placed on it. 1
The number of volunteer militiamen grew rapidly until the mid- 1 840s. In 1 8 1 2

1U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical History of the United States, 1 3 .
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the state reported 29, 1 83 active militiamen to the U.S . government. Thi s was the first
year Tennessee made such a report. By 1 8 1 9 the number had grown to 36, 1 46. B y 1 840,
the last year Tennessee reported, the number had almost doubled to 7 1 ,252. 2
Keeping this many men armed and equipped was a difficult task, and the state' s
record i n doing s o is mixed. As the primary training tool, musters were an i mportant
militia activity. As the counties grew, citizens sought opportunities to gather and develop
a sense of community. The spring battalion musters and fall regimental musters were
well suited for this. Thus, muster days became social as well as military affairs. On
muster day large crowds arri ved early in the morning at the muster ground, usually near
the county courthouse. People of all ages attended, both whites and blacks. The
militiamen would gather in their respective companies at eleven o' clock to practice
maneuvers. Because of the festive atmosphere, the men received little genuine military
training. Typically, they simply paraded for the crowd, usually to the music of patriotic
songs. After the training, community members spent the day enjoying themselves with
activities that included dancing and frontier sports such as shooting and axe throwing.
Men often paid taxes on muster day and also voted if necessary; and communities and
towns sometimes held plebiscite meetings to determine the public ' s view of a particular
political issue. 3

2American State Papers: Military Affairs

l:

330-34, 2: 534-37.

3Samuel Cole Williams, Beginnings of West Tennessee in the Land of the
Chickasaws (Johnson City, Tennessee: The Watauga Press, 1 930), 227-29; Emma I.
Williams, Historic Madison: The Story of Jackson and Madison County Tennessee
(Jackson, Tennessee: Madison County Historical Society, 1 946), 1 00- 1 0 1 ; Jackson
Southern Statesman (Jackson, Tennessee), 9 July 1 83 1 .
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Fighting was also a common component of muster day. Sometimes the men
fought each other in organized matches with participants representing various
neighborhoods or companies. These fights were refereed, but had few rules other than the
prohibition of weapons . Men also fought each other to settle personal disputes. In
Fayetteville militiamen designated a specific area for fighting, and named it the "war
office."4
Sometimes the muster-day celebrations collapsed into drunken brawls. In 1 825 ,
in the town of Covington, fighting broke out on a muster day when men from Virginia
began to belittle men from North Carolina. Scattered fights began among a few men, but
soon the fighting was widespread. The men destroyed a small "whiskey house," and
began to throw bricks at each other. The sheriff tried unsuccessfully to stop the melee.
Finally, onlookers persuaded the two sides to cease and desist.5
A battalion muster during the mid 1 820s at Hurricane Hi ll, in Tipton County,
ended similarly. The men gathered at eleven o' clock and paraded unti l noon . They then
stopped to eat lunch and enjoy the remainder of the day. During the afternoon a group of
men approached a pie stand, roughed up the vendor, and stole some of his pies.
Onlookers intervened and fighting broke out among about a dozen men. After a while the
two largest men in the crowd began to fight, drawing the attention of all present. The two

4Williams, Beginnings of West Tennessee, 229; History (d' Tennesseefrom the
Earliest Time to the Present; Together with an Historical and a Biographical Sketch of
Giles, Lincoln, Franklin, and Moore Counties (Nashvi lle: Goodspeed Publishing Co.,
1 886; reprint, Easley, South Carolina: Southern Historical Press, 1 979), 769.
5Memoirs of James Norman Smith , 4 vols., B arker Center for American History,
Di vision of Texas History, University of Texas, Austin, 2: 1 56-5 8 .
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men stopped fighting only when one proclaimed himself too drunk to continue.6
Not surprisingly, the social activities of Tennessee muster days mirrored those of
other western states. In Kentucky citizens often used militia musters to celebrate
community mi lestones, such as the repeal of a tax or the opening of a canal . In some
cases Kentucky muster days included theatrical performances by the militia men.7
Revelry may have overshadowed the military aspect of muster days, but
Tennessee militiamen were stil l expected to keep themselves prepared. The diligence of
the men in doing so varied among the companies and regiments throughout the state. In
1 8 1 0 an observer severely criticized the Smith County regiment in the local newspaper,
the Carthage Gazette. In a satirical call for militia improvement, the author described a
muster and noted severe shortages of equipment and a general lack of enthusi asm. He
depicted the captain of one of the companies as "hump shouldered, big bellied, round
headed, and his face quite spiritous." The captain's uniform and equipment, the writer
continued, were entirely inadequate, with "pantaloons [that] reach from the ankles to the
breast suspended by a leather string, [and] his legs thrust into a pair of boots resembling
fire buckets." Of his sword the author noted that "from the brown appearance [it] must
have been made in the year A.D. one." The lieutenant was similarly dressed and had no
sword, but rather carried a stick with a knife tied to the end.8

6Joseph S . Wi lliams, Old Times in West Tennessee (Memphis: W . G . Cheeney,
1 876), 1 3 1 -33.
7Harry S . Laver, "Rethinking the Social Role of the Mi litia: Community-Building
in Antebellum Kentucky," Journal of Southern History 68 (2002) : 786-87.
8 Carthage Gazette (Carthage, Tennessee), 16 March 1 8 1 0.
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The author was equally critical of the privates, noting that few had arrived at
eleven o' clock, and that by one o' clock twenty-five were present and twenty absent. Of
those present, fifteen were armed with "whips, sticks, umbrellas, com stalks, and brush
wood." At parade time it was difficult for the unit to assemble because "not a few of the
men were busy at a stump whereon was placed a keg of phlogi sticated water." Others
were playing cards. The author also lampooned the company' s pitiful attempts at
marching, performing maneuvers, and firing the few weapons present.9
The antebellum militia as a whole lacked the equipment, training, and enthusiasm
expected of a well-prepared military organization. However, a few companies and
regiments were earnest in keeping prepared. The tenth regiment, located in Knox County,
is one example. The regiment maintained accurate courts martial records for the years
1 820 to 1 83 5 . During these years absenteeism was low. For example, at the regimental
muster held in September 1 826, none of the ten companies present had more than six
absentees. At the dril l muster held prior to the regimental muster only three officers were
absent. The extent to which the men of the regiment armed themselves varied from
company to company. At the 1 829 regimental muster, the number of men without arms
ranged from fifteen in Captain Price' s company to only two in Captain Belieu's. At some
musters more than twenty men were without arms. 10
The tenth regiment was diligent in fining its members for absenteeism and for

9Ibid, 1 6, 23 March 1 8 1 0.
10Courts Martial Book of the Tenth Regiment, Tennessee Militia, Grace Coi le
Armstrong Collection of the Robert Armstrong Papers, Tennessee Historical Society
Collections, TSLA.
141

mustering without arms. The fine for privates was usually one dollar for the former
offense and fifty cents for the latter. Officers were fined slightly more, but never more
than three dollars for a single infraction . Men could be excused from fines, and often
were. 1 1
Although the professionalism of the militia units varied, the state attempted to
maintain brigade inspections as required by l aw . In 1 809 brigade inspector William
Shelton inspected five companies. He spent three days with each company, traveled over
330 miles, and was paid $70.50 for his efforts. The next year he inspected six regiments,
spending three days with each, and was paid $92.50. In the same years Basil Shaw
conducted a similar round of inspections of the fourth brigade. Brigade inspections were
irregular, but they continued until at least 1 828. In that year six brigades were
inspected. 1 2
Few records exist that document the frequency or professionalism of the company
musters. Being smaller in scope, these gatherings were not typically social occasions for
the community at large. However, some companies were noted for their exceptional
skills and thus almost certainly held regular musters. For example, the Hickory Guards
and the Jackson Guards, both located in Jackson , were noted for their military prowess.
A company in Covington was recognized by an observer as "a fine drilled company."
Other well-trained companies can be identified in the arms distribution receipts and other

' ' Ibid.
12Brigade Inspector receipts, box 9, folder 25 ( 1 809), box 10, folder 3 ( 1 8 1 0), box
1 0, box 80, folder 2, ( 1 828), all in RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA.
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surviving state records. 13
The extent to which the militia was armed is one important measure of the
professionalism of the organization . The earliest surviving militia return documenting
arms, which dates from 1 799, lists the men and arms for Jefferson and B lount counties.
Jefferson County had 307 guns for 490 men, for an armed rate of 62.6 percent, and
Blount County had 377 guns for 524 men, for an armed rate of 7 1 .9 percent. An 1 80 1
brigade return from the Mero District shows similar rates. James Winchester commanded
this brigade which comprised nine infantry regiments and one cavalry regiment totaling
4,438 privates and 452 officers. The arms included 2,667 rifles, 6 1 9 muskets, and 177
pistols. Thus 70.8 percent of the regiment' s soldiers possessed a firearm. If all officers
were armed, which is likely, 67.8 percent of the privates had weapons. 14
By 1 8 1 2 the proportion of armed men had declined. Of 29, 1 83 men listed in the
1 8 1 2 state militia return, 48 . 1 percent ( 14,045) possessed a firearm. During the War of
1 8 1 2 the shortage of firearms forced the state to impress arms from private citizens. Of
the 36, 146 men reported in 1 8 1 9, 1 6,633, or 46.0 percent, possessed a firearmY
Returns from the 1 820s show rates similar to those of 1 8 1 2 and 1 8 1 9. In 1 822 the

1 3Williams, Beginnings of West Tennessee, 228-29; Jackson Southern Statesman,
3 1 August 1 833; Memoirs of James Norman S mith, 2: 1 56.
14 1 799 Militia Return, John Sevier Papers, first series of administrations, box 2,
folder 4; 1 80 1 Brigade Return, ibid. , box 2, folder 6.
15 1 8 1 2 Militia Return of the State of Tennessee, Governor Willie Blount Papers,
box 1 , folder 9, TSLA; 1 8 1 9 Militia Return of the State of Tennessee, Tennessee
Adjutant General ' s Papers, box 7, folder 4, RG 2 1 , TSLA; Tennessee General Assembly,
"A Bill to Provide for the Payment of Arms Pressed During the Late War," box 22, folder
10 ( 1 82 1 ), RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA.
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ninth brigade had 5 ,376 men and 2,554 firearms for an armed rate of 47 .5 percent. The
1 822 and 1 823 regimental returns from within this brigade did not vary significantly from
this rate. An 1 827 return from a regiment attached to the ninth brigade shows 325
firearms for 664 men, for an armed rate of 48.9 percent. The only surviving return from
this era that does not show the proportion of armed men at or near 50 percent is an 1 830
return from a regiment also attached to the ninth brigade; this regiment had 327 firearms
for 274 men . The last known return is for the third division in 1 837, and suggests a
dramatic drop in the number of armed militiamen. It shows 5 ,374 firearms for 1 9,830
men, for an armed rate of only 27 . 1 percent. 16
The state strove to keep the militiamen armed by supplying them with stateowned firearms . Most came from the federal government. An 1 808 federal law
appropriated two hundred thousand dollars per year to purchase arms for the states.
Tennessee' s arms distribution was poorly managed until 1 826. Before that year the state
did not maintain records of the federal arms shipments, which were themselves sporadic,
or of the distribution of the arms among the militiamen. In 1 826 the General Assembly
granted the governor sole authority to determine the companies receiving state arms, and
the distribution process became more efficient. Governor William Carroll then
distributed the state weapons without delay. In 1 827 he ordered the delivery of 1 ,9 2 1

16Return of the Ninth Brigade for the Year 1 822, Tennessee Adjutant General ' s
Papers, box 25 , folder 1 7 ; Return of a Regiment Attached to the Ninth Brigade for the
Year 1 822, ibid. ; Return of a Regiment Attached to the Ninth Brigade for the Year 1 823,
ibid. ; Return of a Regiment Attached to the Ninth Brigade for the Year 1 827, ibid. ;
Return of a Regiment Attached to the Ninth Brigade for the Year 1 830, ibid. ; Return of
the Third Division Tennessee Militia for the Year 1 837, ibid.
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state-owned arms to thirty-six companies in twenty-one counties. Through the 1 830s the
state distributed arms to a select few companies each year. 1 7
The companies chosen t o receive state arms were expected t o be the most
professional and best-trained within the militia system. However, many companies
received arms because of personal or political connections. Friends of the governor
frequently sent requests, asking for arms as a personal favor. Arms requests often
included reminders of the political benefits the governor would reap should he comply.
In the election year of 1 829,

J.

H. Bills, a friend of Governor Sam Houston, wrote on

behalf of a company in Hardeman County. After asking for the guns, he reminded the
governor, "the time is at hand when you will be expected in the field." In June 1 839 a
friend of Governor Newton Cannon wrote the governor asking for arms for the
Washington Guards in Winchester. The captain, John Slatters, could not immediately
post bond for the weapons, but the governor was assured that Slatters was solvent, and
would do so as soon as possible. With the gubernatorial election only a few months
away, the governor was also told, "your prospects are as good if not a little better in this
county than they were."1 8
When the arms were not distributed they were kept in storage i n three cities:
Knoxville, Nashville, and Jackson. The arms at Knoxvil le and Nashville were for the

17 Public Statutes at Large of the United States ofAmerica, Tenth Congress, First
Session, Chapter 55 ( 1 808); Acts of the State of Tennessee, Sixteenth General Assembly,
First Session, Chapter 69 ( 1 826); Arms Deli vered to Volunteer Companies, 1 827,
Tennessee Adjutant General ' s Papers, box 25, folder 1 7 .
1 8J. H . Bills to Sam Houston, 1 0 Apri l 1 829, Tennessee Adjutant General ' s
Papers, box 8 , folder 8 ; unknown correspondent to Newton Cannon, 1 7 June 1 839, ibid.
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first and second di vi sions, respectively, and those at Jackson were for the third and, after
1 836, the fourth. The arms were typically stored improperly, and many remained in
boxes for years without maintenance. In Nashville they were stored at the penitentiary, in
Jackson and Knoxville in warehouses. In the 1 840s the General Assembly became more
concerned with the condition of the arms. In 1 843 it passed a resolution calling for the
proper upkeep of the weapons stored in Nashvi lle. In 1 846 it passed an act requiring
proper upkeep of those at Knoxville. In 1 854 and 1 85 8 it passed similar acts respecting
weapons stored throughout the state. 1 9
During the 1 830s the federal government sent Tennessee several thousand arms
because of Tennessee' s participation in the Second Seminole War and the Indian
removals. Those not distributed were stored at the three state arsenals. In 1 840 an
assessment ordered by Governor James K. Polk revealed over 8,700 arms in storage,
more than 6,000 of which were in Nashville. Most were rifles and muskets. The
assessment also revealed vast quantities of accouterments such as swords, holsters, and
flints. From a similar assessment Polk discovered that the state possessed more than
9,000 arms given to it by the federal government. These were either among those in
storage or held by volunteer companies. For the remainder of his term Polk freely passed

19Tennessee General Assembly, "A Resolution to Have Repaired the Arms Stored
at the Penitentiary," box 1 03 ( 1 83 1 ), RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA; Acts of the State of
Tennessee, Twenty-Fifth General Assembly, First Session, Resolution 28 ( 1 843); Acts of
the State o{ Tennessee, Twenty-Sixth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 98
( 1 846); Acts of the State of Tennessee, Thirtieth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter
266 ( 1 854); Acts of the State of Tennessee, Thirty-Second General Assembly, First
Session, Chapter 8 1 ( 1 858).
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these weapons to the volunteers.20
Gun ownership has traditionally been viewed as a critical element of frontier life
in America. Although some recent studies have questioned the extent to which preindustrial Americans were armed (notably Amzing America by Michael Bellesiles),
statistics on the number of guns possessed by the antebellum Tennessee militiamen
support the traditional belief. While the proportion of militiamen with arms declined
over the course of the antebellum years, at any given time many thousands of firearms
were in the hands of the state ' s citizen-soldiers. Thus guns, although expensive and not
universally owned, were a common feature of militia membership and participation.21
As the professionalism of the individual mi litia companies varied, so did the
social and economic status of the volunteer militiamen . The militiamen described in the
Carthage Gazette and the pte thieves at the Hurricane Hill muster were clearly not
community leaders. However, some companies contained men of means and status. In
these companies the officers especially tended to be educated and prosperous, although in
most cases not wealthy. The Tennessee Guards, located in Carrol l County, during the
1 840s had among its officers First Lieutenant Isaac Hawkins, a lawyer with a small
amount of real estate. His brother John, also a lawyer, served as a sergeant and was a
member of the thirty-fourth General Assembly. Also among the Tennessee Guards was

20John McGavock to James K. Polk, 14 June 1 840, Tennessee Adjutant General ' s
Papers, box 3 5 , James K . Polk Letter Book, p . 22, TSLA; Jacksfield Mackling to James
K. Polk, 9 November 1 840, ibid., p. 23 ; W. Caswel l to James K. Polk, 8 January 1 84 1 ,
ibid, p . 25; For examples of Polk' s distribution orders see Letter Book, 1 839- 1 84 1 ,
James K . Polk Papers, box 5 , TSLA.
2 1Bellesiles, Arming Anzerica, 5 - 1 6 .
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Second Lieutenant Joshua Richardson, a Gibson County lawyer who served in the
thirtieth General Assembly. Officers of cavalry companies were, in some cases, wealthier
and more prominent. John Sneed, captain of the Eagle Guards during the 1 840s, was a
Memphis lawyer who later served in the General Assembly, as state attorney general, and
as a Tennessee Supreme Court justice. James N. Smith was a lieutenant in a Maury
County cavalry company during and after the War of 1 8 1 2, during which time he
acquired sizeable land holdings. He was a friend of James K. Polk, who at one time tried
to persuade Smith to run for the General Assembly. In the 1 820s Smith became wealthy
as a cotton merchant in Covington.22
By examining participants in the Mexican War, information on the age and
economic status of the volunteer militiamen can be determined. Among the records from
the antebellum wars those from this conflict are the most complete. For this study, 24
volunteer companies mustered in 1 846 were examined. The names of officers and many
of the rank and fi le were located in surviving muster rolls and newspapers. The 1 850
census was then used to determine their age, occupation , and economic status. Only men
who can be identified with near-certainty in the census data were included.
Fifty-two officers from the 24 volunteer companies were examined, as well as 59

22Robert M. McBride and Dan M. Robison, eds., Biographical Directory of the
Tennessee General Assembly (46 vols., Nashville: Tennessee State Library and Archives,
1 975-99), 8: 2 1 , 45-A: 8; Joshua W. Caldwell, Sketches of the Bench and Bar of
Tennessee (Knoxville: Ogden Brothers, 1 898), 389; United States Bureau of the Census,
seventh census, 1 850, Manuscript Returns of Free Inhabitants, Tennessee, Carrol County,
174, Gibson County, 2044; Nashville Whig (Nashville, Tennessee), 9 June 1 846;
Republican Banner (Nashvi lle, Tennessee), 10 June 1 846; Memoirs of James Norman
Smith, 2: 1 5 , 126-27, 3 : 1 8 .
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rank-and-fi le from 4 companies--the Harrison Guards, the Polk Guards, the Nashvi lle
B lues, and the Avengers. The officers were on average older and more prosperous than
the rank-and-file. The average officer age was 32. 1 , with the median being 3 1 . The
average age and median age of the captains alone was 3 5 . Among the rank-and-file the
average age was 22.8 and the median age 26. With regard to occupations, in 1 850, 23
officers (44 percent) and 23 rank-and-file (39 percent) were farmers, making it the most
common line of work. The other men engaged in a variety of occupations, although the
officers were more likely to hold white-collar positions and the rank-and-file were more
likely to be artisans. Twenty-one officers held white-collar occupations, mostly in law,
banking, or medicine. Only 5 of the rank-and-fi le were white collar men: four were
merchants and one was a clerk. Twelve of the rank-and-file and 2 of the officers were
artisans. Officers were more likely to own land, and their holdings were of greater value.
In 1 850, 29 of the officers (56 percent) owned land. Twelve of these landowners were
farmers. The average land value of the farming officers was $2,300. The average l and
value of the 1 7 non-farming officers was $4,542. Among the rank-and-file, 1 6 (27
percent) owned land. Ten of the landowners were farmers, and their average land value
was $ 1 ,055 . The 6 non-farming rank-and-file landowners had an average land value of
$6, 1 50. Sixteen officers and 6 rank-and-file owned real property valued at or above
$2,000. 23

23Mexican War Muster Rolls, RG 1 59, TSLA; Republican Banner, 5 , 20, 29 May,
3, 10, 22 June 1 846; Nashville Whig, 20, 28, 30 May, 4, 9, 20 June 1 846; Tri- Weekly
Nashville Union (Nashville, Tennessee), 28 May, 1 1 June, 1 846; United States Bureau of
the Census, seventh census, 1 850, Manuscript Returns of Free Inhabitants, Tennessee,
Carroll, Claiborne, Cocke, Davidson, Fayette, Gibson, Gi les, Grainger, Greene, Grundy,
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These statistics reveal volunteer militiamen, especially the officers, to be for the
most part substantial members of their communities. All had respectable occupations,
and a few were wealthy. As might be expected, the officers tended to hold higher-status
positions, and those in white-collar occupations were more prosperous. Among the
farmers, the distinction in land value between the officers and the rank-and-file is not
surprising given the age difference between the two groups.
A leadership role in the state militia was useful for social and political
advancement. The most striking example of this is the rise of Andrew Jackson, who as a
young, ambitious lawyer recognized the political advantage of militia command. He
joined the militia in the early 1790s and served in the 1 794 Nickajack campaign . In 1 802
he narrowly defeated John Sevier for the post of major general. Jackson' s military
background was insignificant when compared to Sevier' s, but Jackson understood the
political nature of the position and for many years had cultivated friendships with militia
leaders. Jackson ' s winning of the generalship was perhaps his most brilliant political
move. He had already served in the U.S. House of Representatives and in the Senate, but
neither office gave him as much respect and admiration as that of the state' s militia
leader. The post commanded the loyalty of Tennessee' s most affluent and politically
active men. It also gave Jackson the opportunity to play a leading role in the War of

Haywood, Henry, Hickman, Jefferson, Knox, Lawrence, Lewis, Lincoln, Macon,
Madison, Marshal l, Maury, Perry, Rhea, Roane, Robertson, Rutherford, Shelby, Smith,
Stewart, Sumner, Tipton, Washington, and Wi lson counties.
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Jackson ' s rise to fame through the militia was imitated by many of the state ' s
antebellum leaders. Combat experience was especially useful for any man seeking social
or political advancement. Service in the War of 1 8 1 2 helped elevate an entire generation
of enterprising Tennessee leaders, while the single brigade that participated in the Second
Seminole War produced three governors, four congressmen, and eight members of the
General Assembly. Prominent men coveted the rank of colonel, and those leading the
better-trained regiments commanded extraordinary public respect and expected
appropriate recognition. In some instances militia leaders retained their posts while
serving in other high offices. Future Governor Newton Cannon, for example, served as a
militia colonel during his two terms in the U.S . House of Representatives between 1 8 1 9
and 1 823. 2 5
The new roles assumed by the volunteer militia in the years following statehood
reflect the necessities of the growing state. One of these new roles was as a peacekeeping
and quasi-police force. Thi s role emerged during the first administration of John Sevier.
One task he gave militiamen was guarding jails. In October 1 796, Sevier ordered eight
militiamen from two companies to guard the Knoxville jai l . He repeated thi s act in April
1 797, with ten militiamen commanded by a subaltern . Mi litiamen did not guard jails as a
regular duty, but rather did so on occasions when an extra law enforcement presence was

24Ramsey, Annals of Tennessee, 6 1 6- 1 7 ; Robert V. Remi ni, Andrew 1ackson and
the Course ofAmerican Empire, 1 767-1821 (New York: Harper & Row, 1 977), 1 1 9-20.
25Moore and Foster, Tennessee the Volunteer State, 1 : 4 1 6 ; Memoirs of James
Norman Smith, 2: 1 5 1 -52.
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needed. In one instance Sevier ordered militiamen near Jonesborough to guard several
criminals who had been apprehended after participating in an attempted jail-break. Sevier
also used militiamen to apprehend criminals. In 1 799 he ordered ten mi litiamen to search
for a murder suspect presumed to be hiding along the Tennessee River.26
In some counties militiamen were used for law enforcement before the civil
authorities and courts were established. In the early years of Lincoln County militiamen
formed vigilance committees that arrested and tried offenders. Militiamen also
administered punishment, which was usual ly public whipping. These committees lasted
until the War of 1 8 1 2. 27
Although the militia laws clearly defined how militiamen were to be mustered,
when needed for a local matter the militiamen sometimes organized without approval
from the governor or senior militia officers. In such cases they carried out the local
military or law enforcement task informally. They were usually not expected to replace
the sheriffs and deputies, but rather work with them as needed.
An incident of this sort occurred in 1 835. A boat carrying flour down the
Mississippi River ran aground on an island within the boundary of Tipton County. The
boat owner, who was also the captain, hired men from Arkansas to help him free the

26John Sevier to John Stone, 1 0 October 1 796, John Sevier Papers, first series of
administrations, box 2, folder 9, Military Order Book, p. 1 , TSLA; John Sevier to John
Crozier, 1 8 October 1 796, ibid., p. 2; John Sevier to John Crozier, 1 3 Apri l 1 797 , ibid. , p.
5 ; John Sevier to George Gillespie, 30 October 1797, ibid. , pp. 7-8; John Sevier to David
Campbel l, 19 September 1 799, ibid., pp. 1 0- 1 1 .
27History of Tennessee from tlze Earliest Time to the Present; Together with an
Historical and a Biographical Sketch of Giles, Lincoln, Franklin, and Moore Counties,
806-807 .
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vessel, but the hired hands conspired with the boat hands and stole the flour. The owner
informed the county sheriff, who was also a militia colonel, and the sheriff called out the
militia to apprehend the thieves. The county militiamen organized a company, but the
command was not based on the pre-arranged order of battle. The men elected Colonel G.
W. Hockley as captain, the sheriff as the first lieutenant, and another colonel, Graville
Searcy, as second lieutenant. The company eventually totaled 1 03 men. Despite being
informally organized, the men agreed to serve under Colonel Hockley's command and
follow state militia laws?8
The men commandeered a cattle barge, cleaned it, and proceeded down river.
They were armed with an assortment of weapons. They also brought sufficient
provisions, including a large quantity of brandy. They planned to search houses down
river from the crime scene, and at the first house, which was on the Arkansas side, they
discovered two barrels of the stolen flour. At the house lived a man, his three sons, and
one daughter. The militiamen took the man and his sons captive, and burned the house.
The daughter escaped and ran to the nearby Arkansas river town of Shawnee Village to
seek help. The citizens, enraged by the actions of the Tennesseans, organized their own
militia and vowed to defend their community against the Tennesseans.29
That night the armed Arkansas militiamen refused to allow the Tennesseans to
land on the Arkansas side. Violence threatened until the Tennesseans decided to camp on
their side of the river. The next morning they landed in Arkansas down river and met no

28Memoirs of James Norman Smith, 3 : 50-52.
29Ibid., 52-54.
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opposition . They split into two groups, one commanded by Colonel Hockley and the
other by the sheriff. Six men remained on the boat to guard the prisoners. The
militiamen found three of the thieves and took them prisoner. They then met with the
Arkansas county sheriff, who arranged a meeting with the leader of the Arkansas militia,
who promised to cooperate. The boat owner was permitted to look for the thieves in
Shawnee Village, and he found three of them, but when discovered they escaped into
nearby woods.30
After searching the town, the militiamen traveled down river to Memphis. Their
voyage was unpleasant, for they had by this time exhausted their brandy, and the boat
smelled of river water and cattle. The people of Memphis received the men with great
excitement. Word of the expedition had reached the town, and the citizens were anxious
to hear of the men ' s adventures. In addition to spending time in the saloons, the men
paraded and drilled for the townspeople, and then were given free passage home on a
steamboat. Along the way, they made stops in Arkansas to search for the remaining
thieves, several of whom they captured. A few other men were arrested on suspicion of
other crimes, notably counterfeiting. After the expeditionary force got home, five of the
prisoners were charged with the flour theft, and several others were remanded to
authorities in other states. The five flour thieves escaped from jail, however, before their
trial .31
Pe1forming slave patrols was another quasi-law enforcement duty placed on the

30lbid. , 55-57 .
3 1 1bid., 57-65 .
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mi litia. As in most other slave states, patrols in Tennessee were not routine, and many
whites opposed them. They were expensive, and patrol lers had a reputation for abuse. In
some cases even slave holders opposed patrols, and prevented patrollers from entering
their property, often with threats of violence. Not surprisingly, the men expected to
perform the patrols viewed the duty as burdensome and avoided it when possible. Many
whites supported patrols, however, and insisted that the security they provided was worth
the burden and expense. The General Assembly modified the patrol laws several times
over the course of the antebellum era in a futi le attempt to create an acceptable and
workable system.32
The General Assembly passed the first patrol law in 1 806. It authorized company
captains to appoint militiamen to perform patrol duty as often as they deemed necessary.
This duty was assigned to men in both the regular and volunteer mi litia. As was the case
with taxes, for purposes of slave patrols the captain ' s companies were recognized as
districts within each county. Patrollers were authorized to search slave cabins and
administer fifteen lashes to slaves found away from their homes without passes from their
owners. This law also included a variety of restrictions common throughout the southern
states, such as prohibiting slaves from traveling without authorization and forbidding
blacks from insulting or threatening whites. 33
The first patrol law was ineffective, and in 1 8 1 3 the General Assembly considered

32Citizens of Montgomery County, Tennessee, to the General Assembly, 20 l 1 852- l (January 1 852), RG 60 Petitions, TSLA.
33Acts of the State of Tennessee, Sixth General Assembly, Second Session,
Chapter 32 ( 1 806).
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revtstons. To encourage participation, a new bill was proposed that would exempt from
road duty patrol lers who did not own slaves. It also would prohibit any man from being
required to serve as a patroller for more than one year at a stretch. To ensure that
company captains appointed patrols, the bill called for a twenty-dollar fine for not doing
so. The bill failed, however, and problems with the patrol system continued. Captains
frequently avoided their patrol duties. As a result, the General Assembly passed a law in
1 8 17 giving the justice of the peace within the boundary of each captain's company the
authority to determine when a patrol was necessary; however, the captain was stil l
empowered to appoint the men for the task. 34
The 1 8 1 7 patrol law did not generate enthusiasm for patrols, nor did it give the
white population a sense of security. During the next decade the General Assembly
considered a number of changes to the law, but passed none. In 1 8 1 9 it let die a bill that
would exempt non-slaveholders from patrol duty. It likewise refused to pass an 1 82 1 bill
that would take all patrol appointment authority from the militia captains and require the
county courts to appoint the patrollers; while serving, the men would be exempt from poll
taxes, militia mustering, jury duty, and road duty. In 1 823 a bill failed that would have
required each company captain to appoint six patrollers every year to serve in shifts for
twelve months and be exempt from militia and road duty. The final bill considered and
rejected during the 1 8 20s was brought before the Assembly in 1 825 and was similar to
the 1 82 1 bi ll; it would revoke patrol authority from the captains and grant it to the county

34Tennessee General Assembly, "A Bill to Amend the Law Now in Force
Concerning Patrols," box 1 6 , folder 1 6 ( 1 8 1 3), RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA; Acts of' the
State of' Tennessee, Twelfth General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 83 ( 1 8 1 7).
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courts. 35
Complaints of the inadequacy of the patrols continued throughout the 1 820s. One
group of petitioners called on the General Assembly to pass laws that would "compel
[patrollers] to do their duty in that manner which may seem . . . the most conducive in
promoting the interest and safety of the citizens of the state generally." Another group
cited the growing black population as a reason for stricter black codes and more adequate
patrols.36
The Nat Turner rebellion in Virginia in August 1 83 1 , in which more than fifty
whites died, quickly precipitated a consensus concerning the patrol system. Throughout
the southern states, fear of similar slave revolts prompted stricter control over the black
population. In Tennessee citizens immediately called on the General Assembly to enact
reform. One group of petitioners, noting the "late disturbances in Virginia," called for the
Assembly to "immediately pass laws to prevent slaves from being brought into
[Tennessee] from any place where an insurrectionist spirit has prevai led." The Assembly
wasted little time before addressing the issue: in December 1 8 3 1 it revised the patrol
ordinances and enacted new rules for slave conduct. This new law set forth a strict
standard for black gatherings, and permitted the death penalty for slaves convicted of

35Tennessee General Assembly, "A Bill to Amend Patrol Laws," box 2 1 , folder 1
( 1 8 1 9), "A Bill to Authorize County Courts to Appoint Patrols," box 22, folder 1 0
( 1 82 1 ), " A B i l l to Amend the Patrol Laws," Box 55 Folder 4 ( 1 823), " A Bill t o Amend
the Patrol Law," box 69, folder 2 ( 1 825), all in RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA.
36Citizens of Robertson County, Tennessee, to the General Assembly, 1 46- 1 826- 1
(October 1 826), RG 60 Petitions, TSLA; Citizens of Maury County, Tennessee, to the
General Assembly, 64- 1 827- 1 ( 1 827), ibid.
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conspiring to revolt. It also required captains to appoint patrollers for three-month terms,
and exempted patrollers from muster duty, road duty, and jury duty for twelve months.
Moreover, it provided for the payment of patrollers, the amount to be determined by the
county court. The money was to come from taxes already levied on slaves. 37
Company captains lost control over the appointment of patrollers in 1 838, when
the Assembly granted justices of the peace that authority. However, by 1 837 captain ' s
companies were no longer used as administrative and tax districts within each county. No
further legislation involved the militia in patrol duty, and from this point forward the
General Assembly paid little attention to the patrol i ssue. In 1 847 and again in 1 849 the
Assembly considered bills that would place limits on the amount patrollers were paid, as
well as on the exemptions enjoyed by patrol lers. Both bi lls fai led. The final patrol law
was passed in 1 856, when rumors of slave unrest again swept the state. It placed the
responsibility of appointing patrols on the county courts, eliminated the road-work
exemption, and limited the payment to patrollers to one dollar per day.38
During the antebellum years, volunteer companies became involved in politics.
The companies provided a natural outlet for political activity. Volunteers voted together,

37Citizens of Maury County, Tennessee, to the General Assembly, 7- 1 83 1 - 1
( 1 83 1 ), RG 60 Petitions, TSLA; Acts of the State of Tennessee, Nineteenth General
Assembly, First Session, Chapter 1 03 ( 1 83 1 ).
3 8Acts of the State of Tennessee, Twenty Second General Assembly, First Session,
Chapter 140 ( 1 838); Tennessee General Assembly, "House Bill 62: A Bill to Raise
Revenues to Pay Patrols for Their Services," Failed House Bills of the Twenty-Seventh
General Assembly ( 1 847), "Senate Bill 25 : A Bill to Authorize the County Courts to Levy
a Tax to Pay Patrol s for Their Services," Failed Senate Bills of the Twenty-Eighth
General Assembly ( 1 849), both in RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA; Acts of the State of
Tennessee, Thirty-First General Assembly, First Session, Chapter 80 ( 1 856).
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and men in the same company often shared values and backgrounds. Some companies,
such as the Madison Grays in Madison County, were formed purely for political
purposes. 39
Militia companies could use their numbers to influence local politics, and they
became accepted elements of the political system. In 1 808 a militia member in Carthage
complained in the local newspaper that representatives of the companies were not given
adequate respect when their views were expressed at the courthouse. In February 1 809
militiamen in Dickson County held a meeting to protest the U . S . embargo of England and
France and to petition the state legislature for economic assistance. As the volunteer
companies became affi liated with political parties, they became a support network for
political movements. Companies were especially active during national elections.
During election years political rallies were common, and volunteer companies usually
attended; in many cases militia officers and veterans were speakers.40
The militia companies developed their strongest ties to political parties after the
emergence of the second party system in the United States. During the first three decades
of the nineteenth century Tennessee' s political divisions had centered largely around
personal loyalties and regional identity. During the 1790s William B lount had developed
a strong following, notably in present-day Middle Tennessee. Following his death, his

39 The Goodspeed Histories of Madison County, Tennessee (Nashvi lle: Goodspeed
Publishing Co., 1 887; reprint, Columbia, Tennessee: Woodward and Stinson, 1 972), 824.
4° Carthage Gazette, 3 February 1 808; Citizens of Dickson County, Tennessee, to
the General Assembly, 28 February 1 809, John Sevier Papers, second series of
administrations, box 1, folder 1 2, TSLA.
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political organization remained strong. Two members of this group, Willie Blount and
Joseph McMinn, controlled the governorship between 1 809 and 1 82 1 . Andrew Jackson
was also a member of this political faction, although on the national level Jackson
became associated with the Democratic party after his 1 824 presidential campaign. A
contingent of East Tennesseans loyal to John Sevier opposed the Blount faction for a
time, as did a faction led by Andrew Erwin that produced, among other state leaders,
William Carroll and Newton Cannon .4 1
During the 1 830s two parties, the Democrats and the Whigs, established
themselves as the state ' s major political forces. Although Tennesseans were fiercely
loyal to Jackson during his two terms as president, in the 1 836 presidential campaign the
state' s voters were not enthusiastic about Jackon' s vice-president and fellow Democrat,
Martin Van Buren. Tennessee senator Hugh Lawson White won 58 percent of the state ' s
popular vote, although h e fared poorly nationwide. Soon after, the anti-Van Buren
organization that supported White openly associated itself with the Whig party. For the
next several years the two parties in Tennessee made full use of the militias as tools to
promote themselves.42
In March 1 840, at a Whig rally for William Henry Harrison in Greenevi lle, two
cavalry companies led a procession of twelve hundred citizens to the town square. Militia
officers made speeches, and the leaders created sixteen committees, each representing a

41Paul H. Bergeron, Antebellum Politics in Tennessee (Lexington : University
Press of Kentucky, 1 982), 1 -5 .
42Jonathan Atkins, Parties, Politics, and the Sectional Conflict in Tennessee,
1 832-61 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1 997), 52-57.
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county voting district. These committees were to organize the voters and maintain
communication with other Whig organizations throughout the state. Militia officers were
prominent in committee membership. In late May and early June, 1 840, at least four
companies attended a Whig rally in Clarksville, one of which was aptly named the
"Harrison Guards. "43
In August 1 844 the political parties held week-long rallies in Nashville, each
involving between thirty and fifty thousand participants. Scores of militiamen from
Tennessee and other states attended. The Democrats held the first rally, beginning
August 1 5 . The Nashville Union, a Democratic newspaper, referred to Nashville as a
"military camp," clai ming that "on every road to the city was to be seen approaching
companies, battalions and regiments, mounted and on foot. With their bands of music,
their banners, and their mottoes." The rally included banquets and parades as well as
speeches by militia leaders, politicians, and other prominent citizens. Many of the militia
companies camped outside of the city near the Hermitage, and appropriately named their
location "Camp Hickory."44
The Whig rally, which began the following week, was equally grand. Nashville
again was fil led with multitudes of Tennesseans as well as Whig representatives from
throughout the U.S. A parade on August 2 1 included thousands of participants and a
great number of militia companies. The political orientation of the companies in
attendance is evident in their names. Many showed their support of Henry Clay, the

43Republican Banner, 1 7 March, 1 June 1 840.
44Nashville Union (Nashville Tennessee), 17 August 1 844.
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Whig presidential candidate, by adopting names such as the "Clay Invincibles" and the
"Ashlanders" (in reference to Clay' s Kentucky estate).45
Safety and security was a concern for both parties, and leaders of the two parties
met beforehand and agreed to rules of conduct. Among these rules was the requirement
that neither party hold a parade or demonstration in Nashville during its opponent' s rally,
and that disruptions be settled by a committee comprised of militia leaders from both
parties. Nevertheless, di sruptions did occur. On August 24 one Whig company, the
Cumberland Straight-Outs, headed for Columbia to harass James K. Polk, the Democratic
presidential candidate, at a meeting near his home. Polk was forewarned, but refused to
alter his plans and nothing came of the matter. On the same day a group of men from
White ' s Creek severely beat the brother of one of Nashville' s Democratic party leaders,
tearing out one of his eyes and knocking out several teeth. Afterward the men continued
to harass local Democrats, and later in the evening one of the men, Sims Casey, engaged
in a shootout with Democratic militia major Robert Turner. Turner had confronted the
men, and in response Casey shot him twice in the chest. One of Casey's friends shot
Turner a third time in the shoulder. Turner then shot Casey in the abdomen . Casey later
died but, remarkably, Turner survived. Another incident, on August 23, also ended in
fatality. The night before, a group of Democratic militiamen, led by S.C. Manning,
damaged a store owned by William Merchant, a Whig. Manning was seeking revenge for
the earlier beating of a Democrat, which he blamed on Merchant. The next evening the
men returned and Merchant shot and ki lled Manning. A jury later acquitted Merchant,
45Republican Banner, 2 1 , 27 August 1 844.
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ruling that he had acted in self-defense.46
In some instances the political parties used muster days to campaign. On such
occasions representatives of both parties gave speeches. In April 1 840, at a battalion
muster in Davidson County, the men listened to Democratic and Whig leaders promote
their respective presidential candidates. Approximately five hundred militiamen were
present. An 1 839 battalion muster in Nashville included speeches by candidates for the
state legislature. During the Knox County militia election in September 1 840, a number
of prominent Tennesseans representing both parties gave speeches. Among them were
Governor James K. Polk and former governor William Carroll .47
The militia companies were i mportant tools of the political parties, but the parties
did not need them to survive. The decline in militia participation after the Mexican War
had little effect on the state' s party system. By the late 1 840s the Whigs and Democrats
had strong networks throughout the state and continued to aggressively promote their
agendas. Large meetings and conventions remained established elements of the political
framework, and voter turnout remained consistently high throughout the 1 850s.48
Militia companies usual ly played a role in public events. The Fourth of the July
was commonly an occasion for local militiamen to lead their communities in patriotic

46Herbert Weaver and Wayne Cutler, eds . , The Correspondence of James K. Polk
(9 vols . to date, Nashvi lle: Vanderbilt Uni versity Press, 1 969- 1 996), 7 : 469-70; Nashville
Whig, 10, 24 August 1 844; Nashville Union, 27 August 1 844, 1 6 January 1 845.
47 Republican Banner, 9 April 1 840; Nashville Union, 15 April 1 839; Knoxville
Argus (Knoxville, Tennessee), 23 September 1 840.
48Bergeron, Antebellum Politics, 1 1 7- 1 8 ; Atkins, Parties, Politics and Sectional
Conflict in Tennessee, 2 1 3.
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celebrations. In Jackson, the Independence Day activities usually began with the militia
leading a parade of citizens to the local courthouse followed by a series of armed salutes,
patriotic speeches, and general revelry.49
In 1 825, the Marquis de Lafayette paid a visit to Nashville during his muchcelebrated tour of the United States. To prepare for the visit, four thousand militiamen
arrived three weeks in advance and drilled six days a week. When Lafayette arrived,
Andrew Jackson escorted him in an enormous procession. Jackson made a point to first
introduce Lafayette to the militiamen . Lafayette also visited Kentucky and received and
equal ly grand reception from that state' s militia. In 1 840, Henry Clay visited Nashville
on a Sunday to express support for William Henry Harrison ' s campaign . Much to the
chagrin of the Democrats , thousands of people arrived to greet the popular statesman.
Whig companies throughout the state attended and celebrated into the evening. The
Knoxville Argus, a Democratic newspaper, called the event "an extraordinary profanation
of the sabbath. "50
Because of the high status enjoyed by militia officers, militia elections were often
highly contested events. Of particular importance were the elections for regimental
colonel, which until 1 835 was the highest ranking position fi lled by vote of the militia
privates. The most heated elections, however, were those for general . The 1 802 contest
between Jackson and Sevier was the central issue behind their notorious feud. Candidates

49lackson Southern Statesman, 7 July 1 832, 20 July 1 833.
50Memoirs of James Norman Smith, 2: 165-66; Laver, "Rethinking the Social
Role of the Militia," 782; Knoxville Argus, 26 August 1 840.
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for generalships often ran well-organized campaigns. As they did with elections for any
high-ranking political office, citizens followed these militia elections closely. 5 1
The militia remained an active military force during the antebellum years. In
addition to participating in the major antebellum wars, militiamen carried out several
small-scale military campaigns. After the Louisiana Purchase, President Thomas
Jefferson feared the Spanish government would resist American acquisition of the
territory. The Spanish had only recently transferred Louisiana to France, and still had a
sizeable presence in the territory. In 1 803 Jefferson ordered militiamen to Louisiana to
ensure a smooth transition of ownership. He ordered five hundred Tennessee cavalrymen
to proceed to Natchez, and ordered fifteen hundred Tennessee infantrymen to muster and
prepare to travel on short notice 5 2
Governor John Sevier supported thi s expedition, but meeting the president' s quota
through volunteer enlistment proved difficult. Tennesseans mostly welcomed U.S.
expansion, but were di vided over whether Tennessee militiamen should participate in
securing the territory. Many asserted that the president had no authority to call out state
militiamen in a time of peace. Others objected because once acti ve, the men were to be
placed into federal service and would thus serve under federal officers. Most
significantly, many militiamen did not believe the expedition to be worthwhile. Unlike
the earlier Indian campaigns, thi s expedition would offer no direct benefits to the state or

5 1 Jackson Southern Statesman, 6 July, 24, 3 1 August 1 833.
52John Sevier to George Rutledge, James White, and James Winchester, 23
November 1 803, John Sevier Papers, first series of administrations, box 2, folder 9,
Military Order Book, pp. 25-27.
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the men. Because it was a peacetime mission, volunteers were not inspired by a sense of
patrioti sm or hope for glory. Sevier wrote militia leaders, urging them to promote
volunteering and threatening conscription if the quotas were not reached. Sevier later
wrote to the War Department asserting that "every obstacle [was] thrown in the way that
malice and disaffection could devise," and that opponents "resorted to every pitiful
objection . "53
Ultimately Sevier did not use conscription, and most of the cavalry embarked for
Natchez in November 1 803, with the remainder leaving in December. The five hundred
men were organized in eight companies under the command of General George Doherty.
Doherty and the main body of men arrived on December 29, the others on January 1 9 .
Poor weather and primiti ve roads made the trip very difficult, but the men arrived i n
generally good health. Upon their arri val they learned that their presence was not
necessary, as the Spanish had no intention of resisting American occupation . The
Tennesseans returned home in late January. In early February, Sevier discharged the
fifteen hundred reserve infantrymen .54
Tennessee militiamen played a significant role in the removal of the Cherokees in
1 83 8 . The removal treaty, signed in December 1 835, called for the relocation of the tribe
to lands west of the Mississippi Ri ver within two years of its ratification. Although

53Ibid., pp. 22-24, 30; John Sevier to U.S. War Department, 8 February 1 804, John
Sevier Papers, second series of administrations, box 1 , folder 1 .
54George Doherty to John Sevier, 1 9 January 1 804, John Sevier Papers, second
series of admini strations, box 1 , folder 7; John Sevier to the brigadier generals of the
Tennessee militia, 2 February 1 804, ibid., box 1 , folder 1 .
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rejected by the main body of Cherokees, the treaty was confirmed by the U.S. Senate in
May 1 836.55
Governor Newton Cannon had earlier offered the services of the Tennessee militia
in the removal process. When the treaty was ratified the United States was involved in
the Second Seminole War, and Tennessee had furnished a brigade of militia, roughly two
thousand men, for the war. In June the War Department ordered that those from East
Tennessee, between one thousand and twelve hundred men, be reassigned to duty in the
Cherokee Territory. These militiamen were to rendezvous at Athens on July 7, and were
to be placed under the command of U.S. General John Wool and stationed throughout the
Cherokee territory. They were to be given arms from the state arsenals, and were to serve
for twelve months unless discharged earlier. While in the territory they were to disarm
the tribe and squelch any resistance. Hostile Cherokees were to be confined until the
removal .56
Over the course of the summer the militiamen, together with twelve hundred
federal regulars, marched through the Cherokee territory taking the arms and in many
cases other property of the tribe members. Militiamen from Georgia, Alabama, and North
Carolina undertook similar operations in their states. Militia general R.C. Dunlap
oversaw the Tennessee troops. Dunlap disapproved of the operation, not only on moral
grounds but also because he considered it inconvenient and burdensome to the

55Moore and Foster, Tennessee the Volunteer State, 1 : 258-59.
56U.S. War Department to John Wool, 20 June 1 836, Tennessee Adj utant
General ' s Papers, box 8 , folder 8 .
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militiamen. In September he refused continued participation, di scharged the men, and
ordered them home. 57
Although the Cherokees were stripped of their weapons and other belongings,
their chief, John Ross, passionately argued their case in Washington and was able to
postpone removal . However, by the spring of 1 838, Ross could no longer delay the
relocation . U.S. General Winfield Scott arri ved in May and soon after issued an order to
begin the operation. He commanded six thousand Tennessee militiamen organized into
fifty-two companies. He also commanded a small number of federal regulars. Scott
established his headquarters near present-day Calhoun. Over the course of the next three
months the militiamen entered the Cherokee Territory and moved nearly the entire
population of seventeen thousand to points along the Tennessee River or its tributaries.
From there the Cherokees began the long and deadly journey to lands west of the
Mississippi .58
Participation in the Cherokee removals is a dark chapter in Tennessee mi litia
history. Despite the scope of the call-up, militia participation received scant attention at
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the time, and few records exist documenting the operation. Although the Cherokees put
up little resistance, the campaign later acquired the title of "the Cherokee War. "59
In 1 835 Tennesseans supported Texas in its war for independence from Mexico.
In the spring of that year, a number of volunteer companies prepared to fight for the
young republic. In Madison County two companies organized, one of which was led by
Major General A. B . Bradford. Another company was formed in Warren County under
the command of General John B . Rogers. However, the war ended before these
militiamen had the opportunity to participate.60
Seven years later Tennesseans were given a second opportunity. In March 1 842
rumors reached Memphis that fourteen thousand Mexicans had invaded Tex as. This
news prompted the spontaneous mustering of West Tennessee militiamen willing to
defend the republic. Eventually eighty men organized a company and, calling themselves
the "Wolf Hunters," chose Augustus Williams as their captain. A city-wide campaign
outfitted them with supplies and on March 29 they departed for Galveston.61
The men arrived in Galveston on April 6 and learned that the reports of the
invasion were greatly exaggerated. In early March a few hundred Mexican soldiers had

59Index to Compiled Service Records of Volunteer Soldiers Who Served During
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entered San Antonio and Goli ad, but stayed only a few days before returning home.
Texas militi amen had mustered to defend the frontier, but had since been discharged.62
The Tennesseans were one of several companies from the southern U.S. that
arrived to defend Texas. President Sam Houston organized these companies into a
battalion with the task of defending against further Mexican encroachment. The men
were asked to serve for six months but were offered no supplies and were not guaranteed
pay. Fifty-four Tennesseans enlisted.63
The battalion was divided and stationed at Corpus Christi and Galveston to await
possible invasion . Over the next two months the men suffered from lack of supplies.
Di scipline and morale declined, desertion rose, and the men became angry at the Texas
government for failing to provide for them. In early July they received a report of an
advancing Mexican force, and on July 7 the remains of the battalion joined with Texas
militiamen to repulse the attackers. The battle was brief and resulted in no Amencan
casualties. By this time only twenty-three Tennesseans remained. After the battle
Houston discharged the foreign volunteers with harsh words regarding their performance
and conduct. 64
By the 1 840s militia systems throughout the United States were in decline, and in
some cases were extinct. The general allegiance to the mi litia ideal could not offset the
burden of participation. The most significant causes of militia decline were the

62lbid., 8.
63lbid., 9.
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decimation of the eastern Indians and persistent peace with the European powers. Lack
of an enemy, either real or imagined, prompted Americans to focus their energies on more
productive pursuits.
As a military institution, the Tennessee militia system of the 1 830s was little
different from that of the early years of statehood. Composed almost entirely of
volunteers, it had a small number of well-trained and well-equipped companies, and a
large number of men who put forth a feeble effort or did not participate at all . In an 1 835
letter to Governor Newton Cannon, newly appointed quartermaster general S . D. Jacobs
described the system as "being in a deplorable condition." Echoing the sentiments
expressed in the Carthage Gazette decades earlier, Jacobs claimed that the system
suffered from poor leadership and lack of enthusiasm among the rank- and-file.65
After the Indian removals, the militia system entered a period of decline. The
system did not abruptly disappear, but the lack of a large Native American population
eliminated its most significant reason to exist. When James K. Polk became governor in
1 839, he tried to preserve the system by requiring increased accountability and better
officers, but the public was not interested in keeping the system in the absence of a
potential enemy.
Militia record-keeping declined dramatically during the 1 840s. Polk was the last
governor to maintain records of militia appointments and arms distribution. Company
and regimental returns, never consistently maintained, ceased being kept altogether. The

65S .D. Jacobs to Netwon Cannon, 14 November 1 83 5 , Tennessee Adjutant
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General Assembly took little interest in the militia during the 1 840s. It did not create new
regiments to match the rapidly growing population. It passed few militia bills of any sort,
and most of those concerned scaling back militia activities.66
The first significant step toward abolishing the militia came in 1 84 1 , when the
General Assembly passed a law eliminating the spring battalion musters and reducing
company musters to one per year. Subsequently, the Assembly rejected a number of bi lls
that would further reduce militia requirements. In 1 845 the House considered a bill
eliminating the requirement for the men to appear armed at musters and exempting from
the muster requirement men who lived more than six miles from the muster ground and
owned no horse. In 1 846 the House considered a bill to reform the use of militia fines.
Before the third, and final vote, an amendment was added that eliminated all militiarelated fines during times of peace. Such a law would have further decreased militia
participation, but the bill failed after the amendment was added.67
During the Mexican War ( 1 846-48) the state militia experienced renewed
popularity as thousands of young Tennesseans participated in the war effort. However,
militia enthusiasm waned again after the war, and efforts to eliminate the system
continued in the General Assembly. In 1 850 the Assembly ended the requirement for
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privates to be armed at musters. In 1 852 a bill failed in the Assembly which would
eliminate battalion musters year-round as well as the preceding company musters.68
In 1 854 the House considered a bill to repeal all laws pertaining to the militia.
This bill was later amended to instead remove all militia fines. In this altered form it
passed the House but failed in the Senate. The bil l that eliminated the militia system was
introduced in the House in 1 857 as a bill removing all muster and drill requirements. As
with the 1 854 bill, this one was amended to remove only the fines. The Senate, however,
returned the bill to its original form with the added requirement that surplus militia
money be transferred to the common school fund. The Senate passed it on February 1 2,
1 857; the House of Representatives concurred three days later.69
By 1 8 1 8 most organized militia activity had ended. Thus the ending of muster
requirements received little public attention . However, individual Tennessee militiamen
retained their identities as members of specific companies and regiments, and the militia
ideal remained strong. The outbreak of the Civil War in 1 86 1 gave thousands of young
Tennesseans the opportunity to muster and fight as militiamen, although most had no

68Acts of the State of Tennessee, Twenty-eighth General Assembly, First Session,
Chapter 1 23 ( 1 850); Tennessee House of Representatives, "House Bill 288: A Bill to
Repeal All the Laws that Requires [sic] the Malitia [sic] of this State to Attend and
Muster at Battalion and Company Musters," House Bills of the Twenty-ninth General
Assembly ( 1 8 5 1 -52), RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA.
69Tennessee House of Representati ves, "House Bill 46: A Bill to Amend the
Militia Laws," House Bills of the Thirtieth General Assembly ( 1 853-54), RG 60
(unprocessed), TSLA; Tennessee House of Representatives, "House Bill 66: A Bill to
Abolish Militia Duty," House Bills of the Thirty-Second General Assembly ( 1 857-58),
ibid., TSLA; Acts of the State of Tennessee, Thirty-second General Assembly, First
Session, Chapter 32 ( 1 857).
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military training and had never participated in an active militia company.
In the antebellum years the Tennessee militia system evolved to meet the needs of
the growing state. The major wars of the era provided the opportunity for the men to
fight as soldiers and they invoked the militia ideal . Aside from these conflicts militiamen
were active in a variety of pursuits that made the system an important agent of the state ' s
social, economic, and political development.
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Chapter VI
Mustering the Volunteer Spirit: Antebellum Militiamen at War

Even though the roles of the militia evolved during the antebellum years,
mi litiamen did not lose sight of their primary purpose. Tennesseans participated in the
major antebellum wars and in the Civil War as both militiamen and as enlisted men in the
U.S. army. The performance of the militiamen was mixed, but generally they performed
as well as their army counterparts. Participation and victory in the antebellum wars
served to reinforce the militia ideal .
After the British attack on the U.S.S. Chesapeake in 1 807, anti-British sentiment
erupted in Tennessee. Recognizing the possibility of war with Britain, state officials
began to regulate the militia system more closely and make preparations for future
military action. In March 1 808, the U.S. Congress passed a law calling on the states to
hold one hundred thousand men in readiness for military action. In response, Tennessee
increased brigade inspections, and began to enforce muster requirements more
stringently. In August 1 808, the commander of the Fourth Brigade ordered his men to
attend their fall musters and reminded them that "the sacred laws of nations has been
trampled upon," in reference to the impressment of U.S. seamen and the refusal of
European countries to recognize American neutrality. Over the next few years militia
leaders continued to call for better militia preparedness. In 1 8 1 1 the state undertook a full
assessment of the militia, and thus in 1 8 1 2 was able to present to the federal government
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its first report on the strength and condition of the militia. For several years federal law
had required the states to give annual militia reports, but few had complied. '
Tennessee made less ambitious preparations regarding the acquisition of war
materials. In 1 809 it purchased fifteen hundred pounds of gunpowder and three thousand
"weights" of lead, but it made no other purchases before the war. In early 1 8 1 2, as war
loomed, the General Assembly tabled a bill authorizing thirty thousand dollars for the
purchase of war materials.2
As hostile sentiments toward the British increased, so too did such feelings toward
the Indians . B y this time most of the Indians residing in and around Tennessee lived
peacefully and had neither the desire nor the ability to wage a war against the whites.
However, the violent conflicts between the two peoples were of recent memory, and
whites in Tennessee lived in constant fear of renewed hostilities. Tension with Britain
heightened this fear, for Tennesseans believed that if war came the British would ally
with the Indians and incite them to attack. Additionally, many whites sought to acquire
more land from the Indians, and a renewed conflict would give them the excuse to do so.
Rumors of Indian conspiracies began to spread, and by 1 8 1 1 many Tennesseans were
calling for a campaign to crush what remained of the Indian' s military strength. In

1 Public Statutes at Large of the United States of America, Tenth Congress, First
Session, Chapter 39 ( 1 808); Carthage Gazette, 1 3 August 1 808; 1 8 1 2 Militia Return of
the State of Tennessee, Governor Willie Blount Papers, box 1 , folder 9, TSLA.
2Tennessee General Assembly, "Report to Purchase I ,500 lb of Powder and 3 ,000
Weights of Lead," box 8, folder 32 ( 1 809), RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA; Tennessee
General Assembly, "A Bill Authorizing a Loan of Money for the Purpose of Purchasing
Munitions of War," box 10, folder 37 ( 1 8 1 2), RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA; Carthage
Gazette, 8 July 1 8 1 2.
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August 1 8 1 1 a group of citizens in Knoxville petitioned President James Madison for
federal support in such a campaign. They clai med that "if the government will not direct
their energies . . . the innocent will feel the effects . . . and general war will be the
consequence." By 1 8 1 2 Tennesseans were primed to respond forcefully to the slightest
Indian transgression. In March of that year a prank by white youths sparked a rumor that
Indians had attacked w hites in Huntsville, Alabama, and were moving north toward
Tennessee. As the rumor spread, hundreds of frontier families fled. The ensuing militia
response was enormous: thousands of mi litiamen, some from as far north as Lexington,
Kentucky, mustered and prepared to meet the presumed enemy.3
The U.S. declaration of war against Britain in June 1 8 1 2 was popular in
Tennessee. After the declaration the General Assembly passed a resolution endorsing the
war effort, and militia leaders i ssued orders to specific units to hold themselves in
readiness. State leaders expected to organize the militia rapidly, but little happened in the
months following the formal declaration of war. As was the case in the Revolutionary
War, the United States prosecuted the War of 1 8 1 2 with a mix of federal troops and
mi litia. However, many in the U.S. government appreciated the advantages of a
centralized federal army, and in early 1 8 1 3 the federal government began to place less
emphasis on militia use. In Tennessee the U.S. army offered eight dollars per month, one
hundred sixty acres of land, and a sixteen dollar bounty to men who signed up for fi ve
years or the duration of the war. This policy of emphasizing regulars received a mixed
response from military leaders. Army general William Henry Harrison was angered, for
3 Carthage Gazette, 28 August 1 8 1 1 ; Memoirs of James Norman Smith, 2: 3-8.
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he believed volunteer mi liti amen to be better soldiers than regular recruits.4
Although marginalized, the Tennessee militia did play an active role in the war.
In October 1 8 1 2 the U.S. War Department directed Governor Wi llie Blount to comply
with any requests for militiamen made by General Harrison. Harrison subsequently
requested two regiments, but in February 1 8 1 3 the governor learned that the men would
not be needed. In the fall of that year, the War Department ordered Blount to provide
fifteen hundred men to support General James Wilkinson, then in New Orleans.5
Blount chose Andrew Jackson to lead the men to New Orleans. Jackson had
sought the opportunity to lead Tennesseans on a military campaign since the beginning of
the war. When the war began, he offered to raise twenty-five hundred militiamen but was
rebuffed by the leadership in Washington . When Blount offered Jackson the command,
Jackson was disappointed, having hoped to lead his men on a more significant campaign.
He also disliked General Wilkinson, but nevertheless accepted the appointment. The
governor ordered the men to assemble in Nashville and to be ready to march by
December 1 0 . They were to be uniformed and provide their own arms. The remaining
equipment necessary for the expedition would be provided by the U.S. government or
procured by Jackson, for which he would be reimbursed.6

4Tennessee General Assembly, "Declaration of War against Great Britain and
Ireland," box 1 1 , folder 24 ( 1 8 1 2), RG 60 (unprocessed), TSLA; Carthage Gazette, 8
July 1 8 1 2 , 23 April 1 8 1 3 ; John K. Mahon , The War of 1 81 2 (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 1 972), 1 33-34.
5 Carthage Gazette, 4 September 1 8 1 3 .
6Remini. Andrew Jackson, 1 69; John Spencer Bassett, ed. , The Correspondence of
Andrew Jackson (6 vols., Washington : Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1 926-35) 1 :
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Jackson assembled 2,07 1 men and divided them into three regiments. One was
cavalry and mounted infantry and the other two foot infantry. The men assembled in
Nashville on time; but much to the chagrin of Jackson a shortage of arms and a delay in
initial pay hampered the deployment. The men came primarily from West Tennessee, and
among the officers were future governors William Hall and William Carroll. Hall
commanded the mounted regiment and Carroll served as brigade inspector. The troops
did not depart until January 1 0 , 1 8 1 3 , and even then some men still lacked their initial
pay and the necessary arms, although a number of weapons had been provided by the
federal government. The force divided, the mounted regiment traveling by land and the
foot soldiers, with Jackson, by boat via the Cumberland, Ohio, and Mississippi rivers.
The units were to rendezvous at Natchez and from there proceed to New Orleans.7
The infantrymen, who traveled in approximately thirty boats, had a difficult and
dangerous trip. The cold weather created severe problems of ice. Also, boats leaked,
accidents happened, and the men, Jackson included, suffered from winter-related
illnesses. In one instance a number of men almost drowned when a swift current flooded
their boat. In another mishap the roof of a boat collapsed when too many men gathered
on it for a prayer service.8
The difficulties of the river journey did little to dampen morale, however, and
Jackson maintained high expectations of the men. He was critical of militiamen from

240-4 1 .
7Bassett, Correspondence,

I:

247-48 , 254-57, 265 .

8Ibid. , 1 : 25 8-60, 264-65 , 268.
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other states, notably those of Kentucky and Ohio, who he believed had behaved up to that
point in the war in an embarrassing, unsoldierly manner. He was determined to see that
his men performed like well-trained, professional soldiers. While traveling he dril led
them frequently, usually when the weather or river conditions delayed the boats. During
the journey one observer noted of the troops, "their rapid progress in the science of
tactics. They are emerging from a state of ignorance to the honourable qualifications of
soldiers." Jackson was fortunate in having been given the opportunity to pick his men.
He chose officers whom he knew and trusted, and he held to high standards when
selecting the rank and file. As a result, Jackson ' s authority remained unquestioned, and
the men performed their duties with little resistance.9
The troops arrived in Natchez on February 16, and promptly received orders to
stay there. They remained camped outside of town for several weeks. On March 1 5 ,
Jackson received a letter from the War Department, dated February 5 , dismissing them
from service. Jackson was outraged, believing Wilkinson and leaders in Washington had
conspired against him. Although Jackson was in fact di sliked by many, it is probable that
the War Department dismissed the Tennesseans simply because it had abandoned a plan
to use them to invade Florida. The men were offered the opportunity to enlist with
Wilkinson in the regular army, but none did. Jackson refused to dismiss his men, but
instead marched them home, departing on March 25. 1 0
The march home was very difficult. The men had been given provi sions by the

9Ibid., 1 : 244-45, 262.
10Ibid., 1 : 275-77, 302-303 ; Remini , Andrew Jackson, 1 76.
1 80

army, but Jackson had also acquired some at his own expense. Jackson sent the cavalry
and mounted infantry ahead, but remained with the slower foot soldiers. Despite his best
efforts, the men l acked food and medicine. At the beginning of the march, more than 1 50
were ill, and all officers' horses were employed to transport the sick. Eleven wagons
were used to move the most seriously afflicted. Through the ordeal the troops remained
loyal and well-disciplined. Jackson earned their respect by being strong and resilient, and
showing a genuine concern for their well -being. He was i mpressed with his troops,
noting that "Altho' I am perhaps partial to the men whom I have the honour to command .
. . I thi nk they have the military worth enough to be distinguished under any other
commander." Under Jackson' s capable leadership the troops traveled rapidly; they
arrived in Nashville on April 22, 1 8 1 3 , having traveled almost eight hundred miles in less
than one month. 1 1
At the same time Jackson organized the West Tennesseans for the Natchez
campaign, Tennessee Adjutant General John Williams organized a campaign to assist
Georgia in an invasion of Florida. By 1 8 1 2 the federal government was seeking an
opportunity to take Florida from Spain. The idea of seizing Florida was especially
popular in the southern states. In fact, Americans had already begun settling northern
Florida. When the war began, a detachment of Georgia militia and a small number of
U.S. regulars invaded Florida with the unofficial support of the Madison administration .

1 1Remini , Andrew Jackson , 1 78-79 ; Bassett, Correspondence, 1 : 294-96, 303-304,
306.
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B y October they had engaged in a number of skirmishes with the Seminoles. 1 2
Williams saw the fighting i n Florida as an opportunity to engage militiamen from
East Tennessee in the war. With permission from Governor Blount he organized one
hundred sixty-five cavalrymen and departed for Florida in December 1 8 1 2 . The
Tennesseans arrived in Florida in early January 1 8 1 3 , and joined the U.S. and Georgia
troops. On February 9 the combined force of about three hundred men attacked and
destroyed the Seminole village of Payne' s Town . Fifteen Seminoles were killed and
seven wounded. The troops then proceeded to bum Bow Legs, which had earlier been
abandoned. The next day two hundred Seminole warriors l aunched a surprise attack, but
the American troops repulsed them, kil ling thirty-eight. One Tennessean was killed and
seven wounded. After this battle the federal government ordered the men to return home.
The U.S. leadership feared that this American aggression would trigger a war with Spain.
The Tennesseans returned home and, like Jackson' s men , were hailed as heroes despite
having engaged in a meaningless expedition. 1 3
In the summer o f 1 8 1 3 , hostilities among the Creek Indians drew the Tennessee
militia into another campaign. The Creeks, then residing primarily in Georgia and
present-day Alabama, had become fiercely divided. Some called for peace with the
whites and adoption of white culture while others sought to resist the whites and retain
the Creek way of life. The latter group hoped to wage a war against the whites and form

12Samuel C. Williams, "A Forgotten Campaign," Tennessee Historical Magazine
8 (January 1 925): 266-68 .
1 3Ibid., 269-75.
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an independent Creek federation. Both the British and the Spanish assisted those Creeks
hostile to the United States. During the summer of 1 8 1 3 , mi litiamen in Georgia and the
Mississippi territory prepared for hostilities. On July 27 a group of Mississippi
militiamen defeated a party of Creek warriors at the battle of Burnt Com Creek. These
warriors had recently been supplied by the Spanish. 14
Tennesseans were eager to fight the Creeks, and on August 1 4 Governor Blount
instructed Andrew Jackson to prepare his division of militiamen for defense. Blount also
recommended to the federal government that Tennessee be authorized to raise five
thousand militiamen for use against the Creeks. On August 20 Jackson ordered his
division to prepare for action, noting that they "will undoubtedly be called on, to chastise
in an examplary [sic] manner, that insolent and savage nation."15
On August 30 a force of about one hundred Creek warriors, known as Red Sticks,
led by Chief William Weatherford, also known as Red Eagle, launched a surprise attack
on Fort Mims, a hastily built fortification near Mobi le in which white families and their
slaves had gathered for protection. Inside the fort were more than four hundred people,
one hundred twenty of whom were militiamen. The Creeks overran the fort, killing
almost every white.16
News of the attack on Fort Mims created near hysteria in Tennessee. The General
Assembly immediately authorized the governor to raise thirty-five hundred militiamen for

1 4Mahon, War of 1 812, 23 1 -32.
1 5Bassett, Correspondence,
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a campaign against the Creeks and to raise three hundred thousand dollars to equip and
pay them. Only a few weeks earlier Andrew Jackson had been shot in the shoulder during
a street fight, and he was not in good condition to lead men on the campaign ; yet he
insisted on doing so. He wanted the troops to be organized quickly. On September 1 9 he
ordered the militiamen still armed and equipped from the Natchez expedition to
rendezvous near Nashville within five days. The preparations for war with the Creeks
were made without permi ssion from Washington, and Jackson, stil l angered over the
Natchez expedition, hoped the federal government would stay out of the affair. In a letter
to David Holmes, governor of the Mississippi Territory, he vowed that "if the General
Government will only [keep] hands off, we will give peace in Israel."17
The final plan was to launch a four-pronged assault into Creek territory. Against
Jackson' s wi shes the campaign was brought under the umbrella of the federal
government, with U.S. general Thomas Pinckney in overall command. Twenty-five
hundred Tennessee militiamen under Jackson would invade from West Tennessee and the
same number, under the command of General John Cocke, would invade from East
Tennessee. A regiment of Georgia militia and another of U.S. regulars were to invade
from positions farther south. Militia equipment being in short supply, many of the
Tennesseans received weapons and ammunition from the federal government. Jackson
hoped to strike quickly. Hi s plan was to march his men into North Alabama, where he
would link up with the East Tennesseans. From there he intended to travel deep into

1 7 Acts of the State o,{ Tennessee, Tenth General Assembly, First Session , Chapter
l ( 1 796); Bassett, Correspondence, 1 : 3 1 9-320, 322.
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Creek tenitory, destroy the Creek forces, and then construct a road to Mobile. Keeping
fed was the most significant challenge for the Tennesseans. Jackson arranged for
supplies to be taken south, but the rugged wilderness in North Alabama was without
roads, making hauling provisions nearly impossible. Jackson hoped to have other
provisions sent from East Tennessee via the Tennessee River. 1 8
O n October 7 Jackson' s men were without sufficient rations and three hundred
were unarmed. Nevertheless they departed that day for the Creek tenitory. Jackson was
confident that the needed arms and provisions would be procured swiftly. John Cocke
had assured him that supplies could be sent soon from East Tennessee. Within a few
days the troops were very low on food, yet they pushed ahead. On October 1 8 Jackson
learned that food could not be delivered from East or West Tennessee. He wrote alternate
suppliers asking them to use every means at their disposal to provision his men. He also
wrote John Cocke with similar instructions. On October 24 the Tennesseans reached the
southernmost point of the Tennessee River in Alabama and there they constructed a small
fort, named Fort Deposit, designed to receive supplies. Although they had almost no
food, one hundred men remained at the fort while the remainder pressed on . 19
On October 27 two hundred cavalry, on orders from Jackson, separated from the
main group and destroyed the Creek village of Littlefutchee. About November 1

1 8Bassett, Correspondence, 1 : 3 2 1 -22; Mahon, War of 1812, 236; Sam Smith, et
a! . , eds. , The Papers ofAndrew Jackson (6 vols. to date, Knoxvi lle: University of
Tennessee Press, 1 980-2002), 2 : 432; Tom Kannon, '"Glories in the Field' : John Cocke
vs. Andrew Jackson During the War of 1 8 1 2," Journal ofEast Tennessee History 7 1
( 1 999): 50.
19Bassett, Correspondence, 1 : 327, 328, 332, 335-37.
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Jackson' s men reached the Coosa River, and established a base at Fort Strother. On
November 2 one brigade, approximately one thousand men, left Fort Strother to attack the
Creek village of Tallushatchee. They were led by General John Coffee, a talented officer
and one of Jackson ' s most trusted friends. The next day Coffee' s men destroyed the
village, killing almost two hundred Creek warriors. Five Tennesseans were killed and
forty-one were wounded. 20
A few days later Red Sticks surrounded the village of Talledega, about thirty
miles south of Fort Strother. The village was friendly to the whites which provoked the
ire of the hostile Creeks. Jackson was expecting a brigade of East Tennesseans under
General James White to arrive at Fort Strother. He hoped to have White ' s men guard the
fort, thus freeing his to attack the Red Sticks. White, however, did not arri ve. John
Cocke had ordered White to abandon his plans to assist Jackson, and instead to
rendezvous with him and the other East Tennesseans. When Jackson learned of White ' s
change o f orders h e proceeded to attack the Red Sticks, leaving only a skeleton force to
hold Fort Strother. The Tennesseans masterfully executed the attack on Talledega.
Outnumbering the Red Sticks two to one, Jackson ' s troops l ured them into attacking, and
then surrounded them. Although hundreds were able to escape the trap, the Tennesseans
killed almost three hundred, while sustaining only fifteen ki lled and eighty-five
wounded.21
When the men returned to Fort Strother, they found their food supplies all but

20 Smith, Papers of Andrew Jackson, 2: 442-44.
2 1 Ibid., 2: 448-49.
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exhausted. After several days of hunger they petitioned Jackson to return to Tennessee.
Jackson denied their request but did agree to leave after two days if provisions had not
arrived. On November 14, having received word that food would arrive shortly, Jackson
called his officers together and instructed them to reassure the men . By this point,
however, many of the troops were determined to return home, with or without
permission. On November 17 all but 1 50 of the men, including Jackson, embarked for
Fort Deposit in hopes of meeting the expected supplies. After traveling only twelve miles
they met the provisions, which included 1 50 head of cattle and nine wagons loaded with
flour. The men stopped and ate on the spot. Afterward, however, a number of them
refused to return to Fort Strother. Jackson and some cavalrymen under John Coffee
blocked their departure for home. Shortly after this incident, a full brigade threatened to
desert. Jackson, alone, stood in their way, brandishing a musket and threatening to shoot
any man who attempted to leave. After a tense standoff the men returned to the fort.22
After returning to Fort Strother the men did not again attempt to leave early, but
the one-year term for the militiamen who had participated in the Natchez expedition (who
comprised the First Brigade) was to expire on December 10. These troops expected to be
di smissed on time. Jackson asserted that the time they did not spend in the field did not
count toward their term of service. On December 9 the men of the brigade made ready to
leave. They stopped when Jackson lined up the Second Brigade with the artillery and

22Ibid., 2: 457-5 8 ; James Parton , Life ofAndrew Jackson (3 vols., New York:
Mason Brothers, 1 86 1 ), 1 : 463-64.
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threatened to fire on any man attempting to depart.23
On December 1 2 John Cocke arrived with fifteen hundred troops. Between
November 1 1 and 1 8 the East Tennesseans had destroyed two towns in the northern part
of the Creek territory. These towns had attempted to make peace with the whites, sending
a proposal of reconciliation to Jackson, but because of poor communication Cocke was
unaware of the peace offer. 24
After Cocke ' s men arrived, Jackson grudgingly allowed the First Brigade to return
home. Over the next few weeks the Tennesseans took no action against the Creeks, and
in January the commissions of Jackson' s Second Brigade and Cocke' s troops expired.
Despite Jackson ' s pleas for the men to remain, most left. At one point in early January
only 1 30 soldiers manned Fort Strother. 25
On January 14, eight hundred new recruits arri ved at Fort Strother and Jackson
immediately began offensive operations. On January 22 they engaged the Creeks at
Emuckfaw Creek. The Red Sticks attacked the Tennesseans in what they believed was a
surprise. However, the militamen were prepared and the fighting was very intense.
During the battle the Creeks attacked three times, and each time were repulsed. After the
battle the Tennesseans retreated and two days later the Red Sticks attacked them again as

23Parton, Life of Jackson, 1 : 465-72; S mith, Papers ofAndrew Jackson, 2: 455-56.
24Smith, Papers ofAndrew Jackson, 2: 456-57, 462; Frank Lawrence Owsley Jr. ,
Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New Orleans, 1 8121815 (Gainesvi lle: University Press of Florida, 1 98 1 ), 66.
25Smith, Papers ofAndrew Jackson, 2: 482-84; 487-90; Bassett, Correspondence,
1 : 448 .
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they were crossing Enotachopco Creek. Here the militiamen once again repulsed the
Indians, but the battle was hard fought and not a clear victory for the militiamen. During
these engagements twenty militiamen were killed and seventy five were wounded. At
least two hundred Red Sticks were killed.26
After the battles of Emuckfaw Creek and Enotachopco Creek, Tennessee
militiamen enthusiastically volunteered for the war effort. B y March, Fort Strother had
almost five thousand troops, including the Thirty-Ninth Regiment of U.S. infantry. On
March 1 4, 1 8 14, the men embarked on the final action of the war. The U.S. regulars rode
flatboats thirty miles down the Coosa River while four thousand Tennesseans traveled
south by foot. Their destination was the Creek fortress at Horseshoe Bend, a peninsula on
the Tall apoosa River. On March 27 between two and three thousand troops arrived at the
Bend. The remainder stayed behind to guard the rear. The assembled troops, who
outnumbered the Red Sticks by almost two to one, attacked at 1 0:30 in the mommg, but
found the fortress very strong and well defended. They had two small artillery pieces,
which did little damage. But after a small number of men moved to the rear of the Red
Sticks to create a diversion, the Tennesseans were able to cross the river and storm the
fort. They poured over the wal ls and the Creeks soon scattered. Fighting continued until
sunset and resumed briefly the next morning. Approximately nine hundred Creeks were
killed. Forty-seven whites were killed and one hundred fifty-nine wounded. Some
friendly Creeks and Cherokees had fought with the Tennesseans. Among them twenty-

26Bassett, Correspondence, 1 : 447-54.
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three were killed and forty-seven were wounded.27
Although they comprised the primary striking force, the Tennessee militiamen
were not the only Americans to see action during the Creek War. On November 29, nine
hundred fifty Georgia militia and friendly Indians destroyed the Creek town of Autosse,
near the Tallapoosa and Coosa Rivers. In late December twelve hundred Mississippi
militia and U.S. regulars under the command of Mississippi militia general Ferdinand
Claiborne destroyed the Creek village of Holy Ground on the lower Alabama River. On
January 27 thirteen hundred Red Sticks launched a night attack against the camp of
seventeen hundred Georgia militia and friendly Indians near Calabee Creek. The abruptly
awakened men were initially confused, but eventually, after several hours of fighting,
drove off their attackers. Late in the war militiamen from North Carolina and South
Carolina joined the other Americans but saw no action.28
After the Battle of Horseshoe Bend, the Tennessee militiamen moved south along
the Tallapoosa River and destroyed a number of Creek villages, meeting little resistance.
On April 1 7 the men converged with a force of U.S. regulars and rebuilt an abandoned
fort, renaming it Fort Jackson. From this point the Tennesseans scouted the countryside,
but found the Creek resistance broken. Many Creeks were on the verge of starvation .
Over the next few weeks many came to the fort to surrender, after which were permitted
to return to their homes. Eventually, William Weatherford surrendered and was granted
amnesty. In late April most of the troops marched back to Tennessee and were dismi ssed;

27lbid., l : 466-70, 48 1 , 489-92.
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a few remained to guard posts in the conquered Creek territory. In June 1 8 14, Governor
Blount organized one thousand militiamen to maintain a presence in the Creek Territorl9
In September John Cocke stood for courts martial for what Jackson considered
disobedience of orders and mutinous conduct. Jackson had become infuriated at Cocke
before the battle of Talladega, when Cocke ordered James White to change course and
not join Jackson at Fort Strother. Jackson maintained that with White ' s men the
Tennesseans could have ended the war earlier; furthermore, Cocke h ad no authority to
override Jackson' s orders. Jackson came to believe that Cocke was more concerned with
personal glory than with winning the war, and that he was jealous of Jackson' s
prominence. At the time of the incident Thomas Pinckney had recommended that Cocke
be courts martialed but Jackson had taken no action because he needed the cooperation of
the East Tennesseans.
In February 1 8 14 a second incident occurred. While leading two thousand new
six-month East Tennessee recruits to Fort Strother, Cocke learned that the West
Tennesseans had been commissioned for only three months. Angered by what he
considered unfair treatment of hi s men, Cocke railed against Jackson and the governor.
Although it is unlikely that he expected any of his men to desert in response to his
accusations, one hundred eighty-seven did so. Jackson, calling Cocke ' s behavior
"rascally and mutinous," did not overlook this second act of insubordination. When
Cocke arrived at Fort Strother, Jackson had him arrested. The trial began in September

29Bassett, Correspondence, 1 : 500-508; United States House of Representati ves
Document 1 40, Twentieth Congress, First Session ( 1 828), 22.
191

1 8 1 4 and lasted several months. Future Governor William Carroll served as the
prosecutor. Witnesses were called from throughout the state, but Cocke was acquitted.
He was well-known and liked among the militia officers who tried him, and many
witnesses failed to appear.30
A second courts martial was held in December 1 8 14. The previous June, when
Governor Blount had organized the one thousand militiamen to occupy the Creek
territory, he had not made clear their term of service. He expected them to serve for six
months and had such authorization from the president and the War Department.
However, state militia law required only a three- month term. In September more than
two hundred of the men attempted to leave their posts and return to Tennessee. They
were arrested and charged with mutiny. The courts martial found them guilty. One
sergeant and five privates were executed; the remainder were dishonorably discharged.3 1
During the Creek War Andrew Jackson served a s a militia general , not a s an
officer in the U.S. army. After the war he was granted the rank of major general in the
U.S. army and given command of the seventh military district, which comprised
Louisiana, the Mississippi territory, and Tennessee.

In July 1 8 14 he returned to Fort

Jackson and forced the Creeks to sign a treaty ceding to the United States more than
twenty-two million acres of land. 32

30Bassett, Correspondence, 1 : 342, 353, 440, 472, 478-79; Kanan, "Glories in the
Field," 58-59.
31United States House of Representati ves Document 1 40, 3-8.
320wsley, Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands, 87-88 .
1 92

After the treaty-signing Jackson began making plans to defend the Gulf coast from
the British and the Indians. Although the Creeks had been crushed, thousands of Creeks
and Seminoles lived in Florida and southern Mississippi and with help from the British
could wreak havoc. Also, the federal government had learned that the British planned an
assault on the U.S. Gulf coast with a force of at least twelve thousand men . Jackson had
at his command only three thousand men, scattered throughout his district. The War
Department gave him permission to call twelve thousand five hundred militiamen from
Tennessee, Georgia, and Kentucky. Men in these states greeted the opportunity to fight
under Jackson with great enthusiasm, and enlistment was brisk. Militiamen from
Louisiana and the Mississippi territory also began to organizeY
Jackson expected to rely primarily on Tennesseans for what he believed would be
a maj or defensive campaign. Secretary of State James Monroe confirmed this
expectation, informing him in late September that "on the militia of Tennessee your
principal reliance must be." In October 1 8 14 Governor Blount informed him that
thousands of Tennessee militi amen were being organized. That month a brigade of two
thousand West Tennesseans, along with four companies of East Tennesseans, all
mounted, departed from Fayettevi lle and traveled by overland through Alabama. These
men were commanded by General John Coffee. In mid-November two thousand East
Tennesseans under the command of General Thomas Coulter departed from that region,
also traveling by land. On November 20 two thousand West Tennesseans under the
command of William Carroll embarked for New Orleans via the Tennessee, Ohio, and

13lbid., 87 ; Bassett, Correspondence, 2: 7 1 -7 3 .
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Mississippi rivers.34
The British had three possible points of entry on the Gulf coast: Pensacola,
Mobile, and New Orleans. Pensacola was, at the time, a weak Spanish outpost. B oth the
British and Americans recognized its strategic potential as well as the Spanish inability to
defend it. In fact, the British navy had been using it and the Spanish governor had
considered an alliance with the British to prevent it from being taken by the Americans.
In the fall of 1 8 1 4 Jackson threatened to attack Pensacola if the Spanish did not expel all
British subjects and hosti le Indians. The Spanish did not comply to Jackson ' s
satisfaction, and on November 7 h e launched an attack. He had put together a force of
approximately four thousand militiamen, friendly Indians, and U.S. regulars. From
Tennessee he had John Coffee' s brigade, which had arrived in late October. The Spanish
offered little resistance and Pensacola fell quickly, with few losses on either side.35
Jackson then learned that the British planned to attack New Orleans. He
dispatched Coffee and half of his brigade to B aton Rouge and ordered the other half to
scour the territory above Mobile along the Escambia River and destroy hostile Creek and
Seminole villages. He then proceeded with the remainder of the men to Mobile. He
made arrangements to defend that city with a force of eight thousand militiamen, U.S.
regulars, and friendly Indians, among them two thousand Tennessee mil itiamen under

34Bassett, Correspondence, 2: 7 1 -75; Smith, Papers ofAndrew Jackson, 3 : 1 8889. In a letter of October 1 4 Jackson stated that Coffee' s brigade had one thousand men.
He gave the figure as two thousand in a letter to James Monroe dated November 20. See
Bassett, Corre::,pondence, 2: lO l - l 02.
35Bassett, Correspondence, 2: 96-99.
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Coulter. At this point troops were arri ving in Jackson' s district from every direction, but
many of those designated to defend Mobile had yet to arrive. Those missing included
Coulter' s men . Jackson put James Winchester in charge of the defense of Mobile, then
proceeded to New Orleans, arriving December 1 .36
Procuring adequate arms and equipment was the greatest challenge faced by the
American forces defending the Gulf coast. Many of the men, including three regiments
from Kentucky, arrived entirely unarmed. Even the Tennesseans were poorly armed.
Responding to what they perceived as an immediate emergency, governors had sent
troops with virtually no supplies, expecting the federal government to supply them when
they arrived. Jackson was forced to scour the region for weapons and equipment. He
even accepted the assistance of pirate and smuggler Jean Laffite, who provided arms,
equipment, and one thousand men.37
The British invasion fleet of approximately forty-five ships sai led into Lake
Borgne, east of New Orleans, in early December, and on the fourteenth easi ly captured
the five U.S. ships anchored near the mouth of the Pearl River and took the crews as
prisoners. The captive Americans exaggerated the strength of the American forces, which
convinced the British commander, Alexander Cochrane, to delay the main invasion by a
few days. This gave Jackson time to prepare his forces. He ordered Coffee' s brigade,
which was north of the city, to come as quickly as possible. He also was expecting the

36Ibid., 2: 1 00- 1 02, 1 04- 1 07 .
37Bassett, Correspondence, 2: 73n, 78; Owsley, Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands,
1 32.
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two thousand men under William Carroll. The two brigades arrived on the twentieth and
twenty-first, respectively. Carroll ' s men had left Tennessee unarmed, but had acquired
arms along the way. 38
The Tennessee militiamen played a primary role in the ensuing campaign, which
culminated with the battle of New Orleans on January 8, 1 8 1 5 . Of the six thousand or so
Americans who participated, thirty-five hundred were Tennessee militiamen. On
December 23, 1 8 14, a force of eighteen hundred Redcoats moved inland toward the city.
That night Jackson attacked with two thousand men, half of whom were the Tennesseans
under John Coffee, but after several hours of intense fighting Jackson withdrew the
troops. Of the Tennesseans he later wrote, "the best compliment I can pay to genl . Coffee
and his brigade is to say they behaved as they have always under my command." Over
the next two weeks the British and American forces engaged each other on and off. The
crippling British defeat came in the battle of January 8, when several thousand redcoats
charged heavily fortified American positions and were repulsed. Jackson had placed
Carroll ' s Tennesseans and a small number of Kentuckians at the point in the line where
the British attack was heaviest. 39
The people of the United States were overjoyed by the victory, and Andrew
Jackson emerged a national hero. He was pleased by the performance of the
Tennesseans, who during the course of the war had proven their worth as soldiers. In

38Mahon , War of 1812, 355-57; Bassett, Correspondence, 2 : 1 1 7 , 1 22.
39Bassett, Correspondence, 2: 1 69; Owsley, Struggle for the Gulf Borderlands,
1 59.
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February he learned of the peace treaty ending the war, and in March he began to
discharge his troops.40
In 1 8 1 7 Jackson once again called on the Tennessee militia, this time to fight in
the First Seminole War. This military expedition, officially conducted to subdue hosti le
Seminole Indians, was in fact a campaign by the United States to seize Florida from the
deteriorating Spanish empire. In December 1 8 1 7 the War Department authorized Jackson
to invade the Spanish province.4 1
For the campaign Jackson raised one thousand militiamen, primarily from West
Tennessee. He organized them into companies commanded by officers of his choice.
The state took no part in raising the troops, and Governor Joseph McMinn did not
officially endorse the general ' s actions. Privately, however, McMinn supported Jackson
and encouraged volunteering. Jackson likely did not involve the state in the recruiting
because he wanted the troops, particularly the officers, to be men of his own choosing.
After the war a U.S. Senate committee reprimanded Jackson for recruiting in violation of
the militia laws.42
A brigade of militiamen from Georgia joined Jackson and his men, and on
January 22, 1 8 1 8, they departed for Florida. Although hampered by heavy rain and
difficult terrain , the troops traveled 450 miles in forty-six days, arriving at Fort Scott in

40Smith , Papers ofAndrew Jackson , 2: 3 1 0- 1 1 .
4 1 Remini , Andrew Jackson, 346-47 ; John C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, 26
December 1 8 1 7 , American State Papers, 1 6 : 690.
42Remini , Andrew Jackson, 350; "Lacock Report," American State Papers, 1 6 :
739-43.
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southern Georgia on March 9. Despite their weariness, Jackson soon ordered the men to
move into Florida. B y then he commanded a combination of volunteers , U.S. regulars,
and friendly Creek Indians totaling five thousand men . They moved south and in five
days reached Negro Fort (later re-named Fort Gadsden) near the mouth of the
Apalachicola River. There they were re-supplied by U.S. barges from the Gulf of Mexico
and then began to move east.43
They traveled more than two hundred miles, and on the way were joined by a
company of Tennessee volunteers under Colonel George Elliot. Mid-way they occupied
St. Mark's, a Spanish fort, and on April 1 6 they reached the village of Bow Legs. Along
the way they left a trail of destruction, burning one Indian village after another. They met
little resistance, for the Seminoles typically fled in advance of their arrival . After
destroying Bow Legs the men returned to St. Marks.44
At St. Mark' s Jackson left a small garrison, and then led the rest of the troops
back to Negro Fort. During the return trip he dispatched one company to capture a
Georgia militia captain responsible for destroying a friendly Indian village in that state.
When Jackson and his men reached Negro Fort, they did not remain. He and eleven
hundred of them, almost exclusively Tennesseans, embarked for Pensacola, arriving on
May 24. The Spanish commander at nearby Fort Carlos de Barrancas put up a token

43Remini , Andrew Jackson, 352-53 ; Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, 26
February, 25 March 1 8 1 8 , American State Papers, 1 6 : 698-99.
44Remini, Andrew Jackson, 353-35 5 ; Bassett, Corre,\pondence, 2: 358-59 ;
Andrew Jackson to John C. Calhoun, 20 Apri l 1 8 1 8, American State Papers, 1 6 : 70070 1 .
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resistance before surrendering. Soon after, Jackson and his men returned to Tennessee.
This victory enabled the United States to acquire Florida from Spain, the Spanish being
too weak to defend the territory further. The Florida campaign was Andrew Jackson ' s
final military action.45
During the 1 820s and early 1 830s, the Tennessee militia was not involved in any
major military campaigns; but in the mid- 1 830s war with the Seminoles erupted in
Florida. At i ssue was the removal of the tribe to western lands. In 1 83 2 the Seminoles
were misled into signing a treaty which forced their removal. Over the next two years the
tribe turned hostile toward the United States; many warriors threatened to fight rather
than be expelled from their land. In 1 83 5 skirmishes erupted between these warriors, led
by Chief Osceola, and white Floridians. Full-scale fighting broke out on December 1 8 ,
when four hundred Florida militiamen engaged Osceola and h i s party at the battle of
Black Point. Two weeks later, five hundred Florida militiamen and two hundred fifty
U.S. regulars engaged Osceola' s force near the banks of the Withlacoochee River. On
December 28 Osceola and his men attacked a detachment of U.S. regulars under Major
Francis Dade near the Wahoo Swamp, killing all one hundred six Americans. This battle
became known as the Dade Massacre.46
In 1 836 the United States began to prepare for war with the Seminoles. The army

45"Field Report," American State Papers, 1 6 : 7 1 8 ; Andrew Jackson to John C .
Calhoun, 2 June 1 8 1 8, ibid., 1 6 : 708-709.
46George Walton, Fearless and Free: The Seminole Indian War, 1 835-42
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merri ll Company, 1 977), 80-8 1 , 88-92, 95- 1 00; John K. Mahon,
History of the Second Seminole War 1 835-42 (Gainesvi lle: University of Florida Press,
1 967), 1 04- 105.
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sent General Winfield Scott to command the operation, and militia companies throughout
the South mustered and prepared to serve. When Scott arrived in Florida he found five
thousand militiamen and regulars. He moved them into the Seminole territory in March
1 836, and began offensive operations.47
Tennesseans were eager to participate in the war. In February Governor Newton
Cannon, with the permission of the General Assembly, offered the use of the militia, but
was turned down. At that time the leaders in Washington did not believe that the
Tennesseans were needed. Scott's campaign, however, went badly. Although his troops
outnumbered the Seminoles, Osceola and his men adopted guerrilla tactics. They refused
to engage the Americans in a pitched battle, but instead broke into small bands and
harassed the Americans as they moved. Scott was also hampered by the rugged and
unforgi ving wilderness, and by poor discipline and morale among his men. A second
offensive movement by one thousand troops commanded by General Edmund P. Gaines
also went badly. By April the War Department concluded that more troops would be
necessary, and accepted Tennessee' s offer to send militiamen.48
After receiving detailed instructions from the War Department, Cannon issued the
official order to muster on June 6. (Companies had actually been organizing since at least
early May.) The men were to arrive at Fayetteville by late June. So enthusiastic were the

47Walton , Fearless and Free, 1 03 - 1 06, 1 1 3 .
4xNewton Cannon to Andrew Jackson , 20 February 1 836, Tennessee Adjutant
General ' s Papers, box 8, folder 6; U.S. War Department to Newton Cannon, 10 March
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militiamen that four thousand turned up. Only twenty-five hundred were selected. The
men not chosen were angry, but little could be done by the state other than to issue an
apology, explaining that the companies were picked on a first come, first serve basis. The
chosen companies without captains then held elections, and the inspector general supplied
arms to companies without them. On July 2 the troops paraded. On July 4, twelve
hundred fifty from West Tennessee set off for Florida with General Robert Armstrong in
command. The same number of East Tennesseans were sent to Athens to serve under
John Dunlap. Their orders were to disarm the Cherokees.49
The men selected for the Seminole campaign marched first to Alabama where, if
needed, they were to suppress a small number of belligerent Creeks who had refused to
move. The Creeks left after they learned of the Tennessean s ' expedition. This action
delayed the militiamen for several weeks, but by the end of August they were once again
moving toward Florida. This delay was welcomed by the men, as they feared the
uncomfortable and unhealthy summer climate in Florida. The Tennesseans arri ved in
Tallahassee on September 1 2, and on the nineteenth headed southeast for the Seminole
terri tory. 5 0
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Conditions in Florida were dreadful. One of the men described the environment
as "swampy, hammocky, low, excessively hot, sickly and repulsi ve in all its features."
Rations were short, as was feed for the horses. The worst problem was illness. By
September 25, when the troops arri ved at Sewanee Old Town, seventy had contracted
yellow fever. The sick were sent by steamboat to Pensacola, and four days later the
remaining men moved into the interior of the Seminole country. Their first destination
was Fort Drane, which was believed to be occupied by the Seminoles. On October 1 the
troops lined up and charged the fort, but found it abandonedY
For the next several days the men did little other than send their sick east to St.
Augustine. On October 10 they joined with two hundred regulars and set out for the
Withlacooche River. Two days later, near the river, their advanced guard skirmished with
about fifty Seminoles, killing eight. A second s kirmish took place the next day between
the Seminoles and a detachment of three hundred Tennesseans. Two whites were killed
and eight wounded, including the governor' s son. One of the Indians guides was also
killed. 52
On October 1 7 the men received orders to march sixty miles northeast of Fort
Drane, near B lack Creek, where they were to be re-provisioned. They had little food, and
their horses had become so exhausted that they had released half of them. The troops
arrived at Black Creek after marching four days, and there they found supplies. They

5 1 Hom, "Tennessee Volunteers in the Seminole Campaign" ( 1 942), 353-56.
52Ibid., 364-66; Guild, Old Times in Tennessee, 1 3 1 ; Stanley F. Hom, ed.
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Tennessee Historical Quarterly 2 ( 1 943): 6 1 -63 .
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were especially pleased to replenish their supply of whiskey, of which they drank so
much that after four days General Armstrong prohibited them from purchasing more
without permission from an officer. On October 30 the men returned to their previous
encampment on the Withlacooche River. Over the next few days they moved in separate
groups as they acquired horses. B y November 1 3 they were camped at the Withlacooche
River with eight hundred friendly Indians and about fi ve hundred regulars and Florida
militiamen. 53
At the Withlacooche River the men burned two abandoned villages and took one
Indian captive, who informed them of a l arge party of Seminoles to the south, near
Wahoo Swamp. The next day they headed for the Indian encampment. Their plan was to
engage the Indians, and then move toward Fort Volusia, which was to the east, on the St.
Johns River. There they would receive supplies. They marched on each side of the
Withlacooche River, and on the seventeenth encountered between two and three hundred
Seminole warriors. The First Tennessee Regiment engaged the Indians for about half an
hour and drove them away. The next day, as the men neared the Wahoo Swamp, they
discovered a larger force of Seminoles. The Tennessee brigade lined up and prepared to
attack, but as it was doing so the Seminoles launched a surpri se attack. The Tennesseans
were briefly pinned down by enemy fire, but formed a line and charged the Indians,
driving them into nearby woods. Fighting continued for two and a half hours before the
Seminoles retreated. On the twenty-first the militiamen, regulars, and friendly Indians

53Hom, "Tennessee Volunteers in the Seminole Campaign" ( 1 943), 67-73, 1 6468.
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formed a line and attacked the Seminole camp near the same ground as the battle of the
eighteenth. The Seminoles fell back, stopping every few hundred yards to fight. After
pursuing for three miles, the U.S . forces retired. 54
After the battle of Wahoo Swamp, the Tennesseans marched to Fort Vol usia,
where they found provisions and their mai l . On December 1 2 they set off for Tampa B ay.
Along the way they stopped at the site of the Dade Massacre and helped construct a fort.
They left Tampa Bay by boat on December 25, traveling first to New Orleans and then to
Tennessee. 55
The actions of the U.S . forces in 1 836 did not defeat the Seminoles, and so in
1 837 General Thomas Jessup, now in command, organized a second campaign. In
September of that year he issued a call for militiamen. The response was overwhelming:
so many showed up that he could not field them all , and was forced to send back twelve
hundred Georgians. To avoid command conflicts and an excessive number of officers,
Jessup called for individual companies, not regiments or brigades. Tennessee sent six
companies totaling fi ve hundred thirty-two men commanded by Major \Vi lliam
Lauderdale. 56
By December Jessup had under his command more than nine thousand troops.

54Guild, Old Times in Tennessee, 1 34-37 ; Horn, "Tennessee Volunteers in the
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Lacking the means to support them all in the field, he sent many to occupy forts. He
ordered the Tennesseans to occupy Fort Mellon, located on the St. Johns River south of
Fort Volusia. In January 1 838 the Tennesseans became part of a force of fifteen hundred
sent to attack Seminoles in the Alpatiokee Swamp, east of Lake Okeechobee. On January
24 the men encountered a large body of Seminole warriors opposite the Lochahatchee
River, and Jessup ordered them to attack. The Tennesseans, however, did not advance
quickly, and the frustrated Jessup therefore attempted to lead them forward. In doing so
he was shot in the cheek and forced to retire from the field. As the troops crossed the
river the Seminoles retreated. 57
On March 2 two companies of Tennesseans became part of a force dispatched to
the southernmost portion of the state. There they built Fort Lauderdale, named after their
commander. In early April the Tennesseans' terms of service expired, and they returned
home. Hostilities continued in Florida until 1 842.58
The Tennessee militia played a primary role in the Mexican war ( 1 846-48).
Tennesseans had strongly supported Texas independence, and when hostilities began
between the U.S. and Mexico the war spirit in the Volunteer State was strong. In May
1 846, Governor Aaron Brown i ssued a call for three regiments of volunteers--two of
infantry and one of cavalry, a total of twenty-four hundred men. The response was

57United States Senate Document 1 99, Twenty-Fifth Congress, Second Session
( 1 838), 4; Mahon, History ofthe Second Seminole War, 222; Jacob R. Motte, Journey
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overwhelming. Approximately thirty thousand men from all parts of the state formed into
companies. Many of these companies were formed on the spot, while others had existed
prior to the war. So popular was volunteering that men attempted to purchase places in
the ranks of companies. Although the Whig party officially opposed conflict with
Mexico, when the war began Tennesseans from both parties volunteered. 59
The companies selected to serve came from throughout the state,. but the number
of companies from Middle Tennessee was disproportionately high. The First Regiment
consisted of twelve companies, all from Middle Tennessee. The Second Regiment
contained eight companies, three from West Tennessee and five from East Tennessee.
The cavalry regiment contained ten companies from throughout the state. In choosing the
companies, the policy of the state (established by the governor) was to hold a lottery in
each of the state ' s four militia di visions; it is possible, however, that the governor used
discretionary power to ensure that only well-trained companies were chosen . Both
political parties were represented in the companies chosen. For example, the Whiggish
Harrison Guards were selected, as were the Democratic Polk Guards. Once organized, all
three regiments elected their officers.60
The First Regiment mustered near Nashville and elected William Campbell as its
colonel. On June 4 it left for New Orleans by river. The men traveled without incident,

59John Blout Robertson, Reminiscences of a Campaign in Mexico; by a Member of
" The Bloody First " (Nashville: John York & Company, 1 849), 59-6 1 ; Nashville Whig,
2 1 , 23 May 1 846.
60Mexican War Muster Rolls, RG 1 59, TSLA; Robertson, Reminiscences of a
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and were greeted enthusiastically at towns along the way. Between June 1 1 and 1 3 the
companies arrived at their destination. The troops spent the next few days in New
Orleans, where they were billeted in a warehouse. On June 1 7 they boarded three
sailboats to j oin Zachary Taylor in northern Mexico. Unlike the trip to New Orleans, this
voyage was extremely uncomfortable. The boats were smal l ; on one of them there was
not enough room for each man to lie down. Nearly everyone on board, save the crew,
suffered from seasickness and the water supply became undrinkable due to improper
storage. On June 23 the men arrived at the mouth of the Rio Grande, where they
remained until July 7. On that day half the regiment set out up the Rio Grande, arriving
after several days at the town of Lomita, near Matamoras. The remainder of the regiment
arri ved there ten days later.6 1
The men remained at Lomita until early August. Between August 8 and 25 they
traveled with other American forces along the Rio Grande to Camargo. There they joined
the Second Tennessee Regiment, which had arrived in Mexico a few days earlier. At
Camargo disease spread quickly due to the hot weather, swampy environment, and
unsanitary conditions. Of the one thousand forty men in the First Tennessee Regiment,
half either died or were discharged due to illness. The Second Tennessee Regiment,
consisting of almost six hundred men, also lost half its number.62
Commanding General Zachary Taylor intended to attack the city of Monterey, and

6 1Robertson, Reminiscences of a Campaign in Mexico, 64, 68-76, 82-86.
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in September began making plans that included the Tennessee troops. He chose the First
Tennessee to join the attack. The Second Tennessee went south to the town of
Montemorelos. The First Tennessee headed for Monterey in early September, arri ving on
the nineteenth. The Tennesseans numbered fewer than fi ve hundred; the whole American
force numbered six thousand. The town, surrounded by mountains, was well fortified.
After two days of skirmishing, the main battle began on September 2 1 . The Tennesseans
were placed with some Mississippi volunteers under the command of John Quitman,
forming a brigade. Quitman' s brigade was part of a force sent to attack a fort on the east
side of the town. Initially the brigade was held back, but after the initial assault failed it
moved forward in a spirited charge. The men overran the fort and placed the first
American flag over the city.63
The next order was to capture a well-defended fort that the Americans had named
"EI Diablo." The Tennesseans and other American troops attacked the fort for several
hours, but could not capture it. They then attempted unsuccessfully to take a nearby
bridge. Despite a few successes, the day went badly for the Americans, and Taylor thus
withdrew his forces from all but a few points that had been captured. Between three and
four hundred Tennesseans had participated in the battle. Of that number twenty-five were
killed seventy-five were wounded.64
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That evening the Mexican forces withdrew from all outlying fortifications and
concentrated in the center of the town. The next morning Quitman ' s brigade entered El
Diablo and two Tennessee companies then joined with other American forces and entered
the town. After several hours of fighting in the streets the Americans were near the center
of the town ; however, Taylor ordered them to retire. The next day American forces made
significant progress attacking the city, although the Tennesseans were no longer engaged.
On the twenty-fourth the Mexican army surrendered the city and after negotiating with
the Americans, was permitted to evacuate.65
The men of the First Tennessee remained at Monterey for almost three months.
On December 14 they began a march toward Victori a, more than two hundred miles to
the southeast. Along the way they were joined by the Second Tennessee at
Montemorelos. On the march the troops passed through several Mexican towns,
including Linares, Villa Grande, and Hidalgo. They did not lack for food and the weather
was tolerable, but they were being fol lowed by several hundred Mexican cavalrymen and
thus marched quickly, not pausing even on Christmas day. As they approached Victoria,
they learned of a large Mexican force in the city, and expected to engage in a major battle.
However, the Mexican troops, numbering two thousand, evacuated the city as the
Americans approached.66
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At Victoria the army paused for a few days. The Tennesseans awaited the arrival
of the Tennessee cavalry. Unlike the infantry regiments, it had traveled to Mexico by
land. The cavalry had embarked at Memphis on July 27, arriving at Little Rock on
August 7. From there the troopers traveled southwest, marching fourteen hundred miles.
Their original orders were to march to Carmargo and join the force under Zachary Taylor,
but as they neared their destination they received orders to go instead to Matamoras.
They arrived at the Rio Grande River on November 6 and crossed to Matamoras three
days later. The cavalrymen remained in the city for several weeks, spending much of
their time drilling. Other American units arrived during this time, and on December 24
the troopers set out with two regiments of Illinois infantry for Victoria, two hundred sixty
miles to the southwest. After a hard march they reached Victoria on January 4, 1 847 .
There they joined the other American troops, including what remained of the First and
Second Tennessee regiments.67
At Victoria the three Tennessee regiments were organized into a brigade under the
command of Gideon Pillow. Pillow , a Tennessean, was a general in the U.S. army. At
this time Winfield Scott replaced Zachary Taylor as commander of the U.S. forces. Scott
planned to land a large force at Vera Cruz, on the east coast of Mexico, lead it northwest,
and capture Mexico City. In mid-January 1 847, forty-seven hundred, including the
Tennessee brigade, set out for Vera Cruz. They first traveled to Tampico, on Mexico' s

67Furber, Twelve Month 's Volunteer, 43-44, 145 , 1 87, 2 3 8 , 3 1 8.
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east coast north of Vera Cruz, arriving there about February 1 . 68
The men remained in Tampico through February as Scott procured vessels to
transport them to Vera Cruz. They enjoyed their stay, for the weather was good and they
had ample supplies. They did, however, have to drill five hours per day. In early March
the Tennesseans, along with the other troops, embarked for Vera Cruz. The army could
not acquire ships to transport the horses, so the cavalrymen traveled by sea with the rest
of the brigade while their horses were led overland. The boats were crowded and
uncomfortable. The men used the time to prepare for what they believed would be a hard
fight, cleaning their weapons and equipment, dividing rations and ammunition, and
studying battle plans and tactics. On March 5 they arrived near Vera Cruz and four days
later landed on a beach two and a half miles below the city. The entire American force of
ten thousand disembarked in one day with no Mexican interference. That evening there
were minor skirmi shes with Mexican troops, and the Americans anticipated a maj or
battle. Winfield Scott planned to lay siege to the city, and the next day the men began to
move into position. They engaged in more skirmishes with the Mexicans in which both
the First and Second Tennessee regiments were involved.69
Over the next several days the men surrounded the city and posted arti llery, doing
much of the work at night. On March 22, after the Mexicans rejected a demand for the

68Smith, War With Mexico, 1 : 365-67 ; Robertson, Reminiscences of a Campaign
in Mexico, 1 96-200; Furber, Twelve Month 's Volunteer, 3 88-98.
69Robertson, Reminiscences of a Campaign in Mexico, 2 1 4-24; Furber, Twelve
Month 's Volunteer, 435-36; Smith, War With Mexico, 2: 23-27 ; Robert W. Johannsen . To
the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination (New York
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 985), 98- 1 00.
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city' s surrender, the American arti llery opened fire on the city and its surrounding forts.
Over the next three days the two sides fought what was mainly an artillery battle. Even
with three hundred artillery pieces, the Mexicans could not inflict significant damage on
the American forces. The Americans bombarded the city, damaging buildings and
causing panic among the civi lians. On March 26 Scott learned of a Mexican force behind
the American positions and sent a number of cavalrymen, Tennesseans included, to
investigate. They discovered a company of Mexican cavalry. The Second Tennessee and
two companies from the First Tennessee joined the American cavalry and attacked the
Mexicans, driving them away after a fierce, but brief, skirmish. Also on that day the
governor of the state of Vera Cruz, Juan Soto, began negotiating the surrender of the city.
The next day the Mexicans surrendered and the American forces entered the city.70
Scott intended to move northeast along the Mexican National Highway toward
Mexico City. On April 3 he i ssued marching orders to the men. On April 8 a division of
regulars set out for Mexico City, and two days later a division of volunteers departed that
included the two Tennessee infantry regiments and one company of the Tennessee
cavalry. Over the next several days the rest of the U.S. army headed out. The l ast
division, including most of the Tennessee cavalry, departed Vera Cruz on the eighteenth .
The Mexicans established a defensive position at the hamlet of Cerro Gordo, sixty miles
northeast of Vera Cruz. With hills on either side of the highway, Cerro Gordo was an
excellent location to stop or stall the American advance. Commanding the Mexican army

70Robertson, Reminiscences ofa Campaign in Mexico, 227-33; Furber, Twelve
Month 's Volunteer, 542-43 ; Smith, War With Mexico, 2: 28-3 3 ; Johannsen, To the Halls
of the Montezumas, 100- 1 02.
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was dictator Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, who had placed twelve thousand Mexican
troops in highly defensible positions.71
The battle of Cerro Gordo was one of the most significant of the war, for the
American victory there cleared the way for the capture of Mexico City. On April 1 1 and
1 2 an American division under General David Twiggs was attacked as it approached the
Mexican positions . Over the next several days Winfield Scott made preparations to
assault the hills that Santa Anna had heavily fortified. The Americans attacked on the
eighteenth. Scott, with eighty-five hundred men, significantly underestimated the number
of Mexicans. Nevertheless, after less than four hours of fighting the Americans drove the
Mexicans from their positions and took more than four thousand pri soners. The Mexican
army retreated in confusion.72
Of the several assaults made by the Americans, only the one involving Pi llow ' s
brigade failed. Two Tennessee regiments and two regiments of Pennsylvania militia
made the assault. The men had orders to attack Mexican positions on three hills.
Pillow ' s brigade consisted of two thousand men; the Mexicans on three hills totaled four
thousand. Pillow' s plan was to attack one hill with the First Pennsylvania Regiment
supported by the First Tennessee, and to attack a second hill with the Second Tennessee
supported by the Second Pennsylvania. His orders were poorly communicated, and the
men were late getting into position. As the Second Tennessee and Second Pennsylvania
regiments prepared, the Mexicans hit them with a massive artillery barrage. The two

7 1Furber, Twelve Month 's Volunteer, 577; Smith, War With Mexico, 2: 44.
72Smith, War With Mexico, 2: 48-58.
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regiments scattered. Some men charged haphazardly, others hid or fled. Within three
minutes every field officer except Colonel Haskell had been killed or wounded. Pillow
was wounded and took cover, and transferred command to William Campbell. Under
Campbell ' s command the First Tennessee and First Pennsylvania began their attack, but
after consulting with Pillow and George McClel lan (a member of Scott ' s staff), Campbell
halted the charge. Lacking sufficient strength to carry the Mexican position on the three
hills, the Americans postponed further operations. Soon, however, the battle of Cerro
Gordo came to an end and the entire Mexican force fled the field.73
Cerro Gordo was the final engagement of the Tennessee militia prior to the
capture of Mexico City. Most of the Tennessee cavalry troopers reached Cerro Gordo
two days after the battle. During their journey they engaged in minor skirmishes with
Mexican forces, which fled in disarray. From Cerro Gordo the American forces
continued their movement toward the Mexican capital . They met no resistance on April
23 when they captured the city of Jalapa. The Tennesseans remained in Jalapa for one
week. In early May Scott ordered the twelve-month volunteers to return to Vera Cruz to
be discharged. The Tennessee cavalry arrived in Vera Cruz on May 8 and the infantry
two days later. During the march they engaged in minor skirmishes with Mexican
bandits. Once in Vera Cruz the cavalrymen sold their horses. The Tennesseans, with
other volunteers, left Mexico on May 1 1 and traveled directly to New Orleans. Illness,
injury, or death had claimed two-thirds of the original twenty-four hundred

73Robertson, Reminiscences of a Campaign in Mexico, 245-48 ; George B .
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Tennesseans.74
In 1 847 the federal government once again called on Tennessee to provide
militiamen. Two more regiments and one battalion traveled to New Orleans in the fall of
1 847, and then on to Mexico. By this time American troops had captured Mexico City
and the Tennesseans served as an occupation force. The occupation was difficult. The
men had to march frequently and suffered from lack of supplies. They spent much of
their time either in Vera Cruz or in Mexico City, and also patrol led the highway that
joined the two cities. They saw little military action, although in February 1 848 they
engaged approximately one hundred Mexican bandits. The Tennesseans returned home,
via New Orleans, in July 1 848.75
When the Civil War erupted in 1 86 1 , the state was without an experienced
volunteer militi a force. The militia did, however, exist as a paper organization. In early
1 86 1 , as military conflict became likely, Governor Isham Harris recommended
reorganization of the militia. In late January the General Assembly repealed the 1 857 law
abolishing militia muster requirements. The state was divided over the secession issue,
but the governor and some members of the General Assembly favored j oining the
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Confederacy. 7 6
In Apri l, during a special session following the outbreak of war, the General
Assembly passed an act authorizing the governor to raise fifty-five thousand volunteers,
twenty-five thousand of whom were to be armed and prepared for service without delay.
This act addressed other important issues such as the order of battle, compensation, and
officer elections. It also permitted the state to issue bonds and levy taxes to pay for the
war effort. Throughout the state men rapidly organized into companies and regiments. A
number of the top officers had been militia officers during the Mexican War. Notably,
Generals Robert C. Foster, John L.T. Sneed, S. R. Anderson, and Benjamin Cheatham
had served as captains.77
The state held a referendum on June 8, and the voters chose to secede. In July the
state transferred the militiamen (who had been organized as the "Provisional Army of
Tennessee") into the service of the Confederate government, and the officers accepted
comparable commissions as Confederate officers. The Confederate government
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inspected the men, and by early August the transfer was complete.78
In East Tennessee, Union sentiment was predominant, and in the early months of
the war a constant stream of East Tennesseans traveled to Kentucky to j oin the Union
army. A number of Tennessee companies and regiments served in the Union army during
the war. Other Tennesseans joined companies from other states. Of the one hundred
thirty thousand Tennesseans who fought in the Civil War approximately one hundred
thousand were Confederate and thirty thousand Union.79
Although many of the Tennesseans seeing action in the Civil War were
technically militiamen, the Civil War ended the militia system as it had exi sted during the
antebellum years. Tennessee Confederates differed from the antebellum militiamen in
that they had not participated in a militia organization prior to the war, and they received
training under the supervision of the Confederate government. Also, the Tennesseans
were not necessarily commanded by their own officers. When Governor Harris tumed
over the Tennessee militia to the Confederate govemment, he relinquished the authority
to appoint officers. The status of Tennessee soldiers fighting for the South was further
complicated in February 1 862, when the Union army captured Nashville; and the state
govemment was dissolved soon thereafter. From this point forward the Tennessee
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Confederate soldiers had no link to their own state bureaucracy.80
The Civil War ended all vestiges of the Tennessee militia as it had existed during
the antebellum years. The idea of citizen soldiery continued with the State Guard, a
militia organization which, in the years after the Civil War, enforced the rule of the
radical state government. However, as in the rest of the country the militia ideal gave
way to the notion of a federal army as the best means to fight national conflicts.81
Tennessee militiamen were an important component of the U.S. military during
the antebel lum years. Their unique connection to Andrew Jackson and their eagerness to
fight any enemy earned them prominent roles during every mi litary conflict. The
militiamen typically fought well against a variety of enemies, and were recognized as
good soldiers. Their admirable performance helped to reinforce the militia ideal , but it
did not prevent the decline of the Tennessee militia system.
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Conclusion

In the summer of 1 772 a few hundred weary pioneers living in present-day East
Tennessee were struggling to survive in a harsh, unforgiving environment. Surrounded
by hostile Indians and isolated from the more established white settlements, these
pioneers maintained a vigilant military guard and in doing so ensured the success of their
settlement. This informal collection of citizen-soldiers represented the beginning of one
of Tennessee' s key institutions--the mi liti a.
During Tennessee' s earliest years the militia remained little more than an informal
body consisting of all able-bodied men whose duty was to protect the settlers from the
constant barrage of attacks by Native Americans determined to keep their territory free
from white habitation. As the years went by, whttes increased their numbers and their
power and used their militia strength to wear down the Indian tnbes. Through a
succession of militia victories white settlers acquired the Indians' temtory piece by piece.
The militia's role as conqueror of the tribes ended in 1 838, when militiamen carried out
the removal of the Indians.
The Tennessee militia was, however, far more than a weapon of war wielded
against Indians. By the 1 790s, as Tennessee was developing its political and economic
institutions, the militia became an instrument of governmental processes, notably voting
and tax collection. As the only institution to which virtually every man belonged, the
militia was well suited for this purpose.
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The militia also emerged in the 1 790s as an important social institution. Militia
musters became popular community events at which military training was often less
important than celebration and convi viality. Men seeking to advance politically and
professionally were quick to realize the importance of militia membership. From the
earliest years of white settlement, Tennessee' s most prominent citizens culti vated their
militia ties. This practice continued through the antebellum years.
The establishment of volunteer companies, which became common in the years
following statehood, marked a turning point for the militia as a mi litary organization.
With the state no longer needing every white male for defense, volunteers came to
dominate the militia system. Volunteerism strengthened the social role of the militia.
Moreover, volunteer militia companies became political entities and used their influence
to support political parties.
The presumption that America' s militias were unprofessional due to lack of
support by the federal and state governments has been insufficiently scrutinized by
military historians. Tennessee militiamen cannot be labeled simply as good or bad
soldiers, for the Volunteer State' s militi a was a diverse institution that changed over time.
This complicates the task of evaluating the competence and preparedness of the
Tennessee militia.
The extent to which the Tennessee militia was armed and equipped varied
throughout its history. Evidence suggests that during Tennessee' s earliest pioneer years
the militi amen were well-armed. In fact, guns were the single greatest advantage the
militiamen held over their Indian adversaries. Thereafter Tennessee came to rely heavily
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on the federal government for firearms, which generally supplied them only in times of
war. The government' s record of supplying needed weapons was poor at first but
improved over the years. The Tennessee militia received few, if any, federal arms during
the American Revolution ; and during the War of 1 8 1 2, Andrew Jackson had a very
difficult time procuring arms for his men. During the Second Seminole War and the
Mexican War the men were much better armed. The proportion of militiamen possessing
a firearm in peacetime declined dramatically during the antebellum era, but at all times
several thousand militiamen had weapons, and rarely were the militiamen without
firearms during active military service.
The Tennessee militia was, for its entire history, inadequately trained. Musters
were common, but the emphasis on socializing hindered military training. Nevertheless,
at all times a small proportion of companies were well trained, and took pride in their
abilities.
Despite the dearth of training and arms, Tennessee militiamen achieved an
impressive record of performance on the battlefield. As Indian fighters they proved far
superior to their adversaries; they consistently defeated their Native American foes. The
militia' s performance was also impressive during the Revolutionary War, the War of
1 8 1 2, the Seminole wars, and the Mexican War. Volunteer State militia units contributed
to a number of major victories in these wars.
In addition to achieving battlefield success, the Tennessee militiamen frequently
proved capable of enduring harsh conditions. Most of their campaigns were marked by
long and difficult marches, unforgiving environments, and inadequate provisions. Only
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during the Creek War did they yield to these difficulties.
The militiamen ' s military success during the pioneer years was not due to their
superior weaponry alone. These early settlers planned for Indian hostilities, made defense
a top priority, and chose men with military experience to lead them. They also wisely
constructed sturdy forts and blockhouses and engaged in offensive operations only when
they held a tactical advantage.
Only a small number of the state' s militiamen saw service during the antebellum
conflicts. These chosen few were usually among the best trained and best equipped and
as a result were generally successful . Only during the New Orleans campaign were
thousands of Tennessee militiamen mustered into service without scrutiny, an episode
that demonstrated that Tennessee was wholly unprepared for a large-scale militia call-up.
The militia began to decline in the 1 830s. The state no longer needed thousands
of able-bodied men to maintain domestic peace and security. This decline is evidenced
by the lack of attention given the militia by the General Assembly. During the 1 830s the
enactment of militia legislation decreased dramatically. Although the militia was still an
active institution, the state' s leaders awarded priority to other institutions such as school s,
banks, and railroads. After the Indian removal in 1 838, the militia declined rapidly.
While the volunteer companies remained active as political organizations, the General
Assembly virtual ly ignored the militia; and in the absence of a known enemy the
militiamen no longer felt compelled to maintain military readiness. After a brief revival
during the Mexican War, the militia di sappear from the Tennessee landscape. The men
who mustered for the Civil War in 1 8 6 1 were militiamen in name only, with no
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meaningful connection to the traditional mi litia. Having served the citizenry for more
than eight decades, the Tennessee militia passed into hi story.
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